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# Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions

## **Full Report**



Helené Lackenbauer and Richard Langlais, eds.

Review of the Practical  
Implications of UNSCR 1325  
for the Conduct of NATO-led  
Operations and Missions

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# Executive Summary

## Background

This Review is a result of the commitment by NATO, and by its Operational Partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), to support implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In the declaration of the Lisbon Summit of November 2010, Heads of State and Government expressed their continued support for the implementation of the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Policy on UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, and endorsed a NATO Action Plan for the mainstreaming of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations and missions. Since 2010, the NATO Action Plan has been updated, and a progress report on implementation was delivered at the Chicago Summit, in May 2012. At Chicago, Heads of State and Government tasked the Operations Policy Committee to conduct a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions.

The North Atlantic Council invited the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM), based in the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, to compose and lead an international team of experts to conduct the Review. The NCGM accepted the task and invited the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) to execute the Review. The NCGM and FOI were joined by representatives from eight nations. The Review Team made three field study trips to Kosovo/KFOR and Afghanistan/ISAF.

## The Aim of the Review

The Terms of Reference, endorsed by the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council and the non-NATO countries contributing to ISAF and KFOR, identified the following key questions to be answered by the Review:

- What elements of UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, are applicable to NATO-led operations and missions?
- How has the practical implementation of the gender perspective and UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions been taken forward in NATO-led operations and missions?
- What are the more significant measurable effects or consequences of activities advancing the gender perspective and the women, peace and security agenda on the broader objectives of NATO-led operations and missions?
- What have the main challenges been to date, both in terms of our own internal work within the missions, but also when it comes to mainstreaming the gender perspective as well as UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions within the local security forces?
- What lessons can be drawn so far from this implementing process which could improve current NATO-led missions or assist futures ones, including Afghanistan post-2014?

## **Findings**

### **NATO/EAPC Policy on implementing UNSCR 1325 and working mechanism**

This Review has revealed that, since the adoption of the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy on implementation of UNSCR 1325 in 2007, NATO has made significant progress in integrating the gender perspective. Policy frameworks have been adopted and working mechanisms developed in order to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325 throughout NATO's entire structure. A significant and symbolically important step was taken with the appointment of the Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security in 2012.

These achievements constitute a robust platform in support of the advancement of the UNSCR 1325 agenda. The Review has thus not identified any urgent need for additional policy frameworks, or working mechanisms. The current challenge is to proceed with the implementation of the already adopted UNSCR 1325 and existing policies in the entire organization—from the strategic to the tactical level.

### **NATO/Allied Command Operations**

In response to political decisions, NATO's military component developed practical proposals and guidelines for implementation of UNSCR 1325, in the form of the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 in 2009, and a revised version in 2012. The Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 is a comprehensive directive, which provides adequate and relevant guidance to all levels in the military structure, including national armed forces. According to the findings of this Review, the immediate challenge with regard to the Directive is to disseminate and reinforce its instructions for implementation. The Review established that few commanders and staff officers in KFOR and ISAF are aware of the guidance it provides. The overwhelming majority were not aware of the Directive's existence. If it were properly enforced and implemented, however, Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 would provide a solution to many of the dilemmas identified by this Review.

In addition, NATO's military component, under the leadership of Allied Command Operations has established a structure for ensuring the integration of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming. This is being achieved through the creation of Gender Advisor positions throughout the organization, which includes NATO's Joint Force Commands—maritime, land and air components. This measure has been accompanied by the creation of Gender Field Advisors at the tactical level. The main challenge with regard to the Gender Advisor structure is the dilemma posed by vacant positions. If these positions, at the various levels, remain vacant, it creates a situation that will hamper the chain of command, which would in turn be detrimental to the implementation of directives and orders related to UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1.

### **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Kosovo Force (KFOR)**

The Review's overall impression of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 is mixed. Although, progress has been made through the establishment of Gender Advisors positions, Gender Focal Points and gender enablers, the integration of a gender perspective and its relevance to military operations leaves ample room for improvement.

The Review found that there was a higher degree of understanding of gender relations and their impact on operations within ISAF than in KFOR. This is explained by the extreme stratification between men and women in Afghanistan, in comparison to Kosovo where women also are subordinated to men but not to the same extent. In Afghanistan efforts at the tactical level would not be possible if gender roles and gender relations are not taken into account. This is especially true when it comes to force protection.

The Review identified the following areas as pivotal to progress on the integration of a gender perspective in NATO's military operation:

- dissemination and enforcing of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1;
- regular monitoring and assessments of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1;
- leadership, at all levels, within NATO's military structure;
- Gender Advisors, and filling of vacant Gender Advisor positions;
- integration of a gender perspective in tools used for assessments, intelligence work, planning, operations and reporting;
- training of all personnel;
- identification of women as actors.

## **ISAF**

The stratified relations between men and women, and women's subordinated role, in Afghanistan are key factors that contribute to enhanced awareness of the importance of a gender perspective in ISAF's operations. The counterinsurgency strategy, which guides ISAF's efforts, is population-centric, although the population has often been defined as men. At all levels, gender is a factor that has to be taken into account in order to fulfil mission objectives. This is particularly true at the tactical level, when, during operations, ISAF troops have to take into account the position and situation of women in Afghan society.

Gender work in ISAF is currently characterized by the individual initiatives of personnel who are working hard to implement a gender perspective in all aspects of the ISAF mission. At ISAF Headquarters level, they enjoy the support of the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and the Chief of Staff. COMISAF has pushed gender mainstreaming as a critical element of the counterinsurgency strategy. Several Gender Advisor positions are vacant. There have been achievements, especially regarding the Afghan National Security Forces, but those gains are currently at risk due to ISAF's withdrawal in 2014.

The level of training on gender is generally low. Gender training is needed at all levels of the organization. Given the importance of having leadership on gender mainstreaming, a key point of leverage is to focus on training for flag officers, although training is required at all levels.

Reliance on Gender Advisors is currently ISAF's main approach for realizing its gender intentions. With the highly limited knowledge on gender that is available outside the Gender Advisor group, the conclusion is that Gender Advisors will have to continue to be deployed for the foreseeable future in order to realize these policy goals.

ISAF's main analytical outcomes, the intelligence and planning products, do not factor in gender as part of their core analyses. This means that gender, by definition, is not mainstreamed, which makes it difficult to leverage the accomplishments that actually have been achieved at the tactical level.

This lack of gender analysis and a gender perspective may have affected the Afghan Local Police (ALP) programme. The ALP is implicated in violence against women in Kunduz and Baghlan. Had a more thorough analysis been conducted, it is possible that these problems could have been foreseen.

The presence of female personnel has allowed ISAF to reach out to Afghan women to some extent. Approaches such as the use of Female Engagement Teams, Mixed Engagement Teams, Mixed Civil Military Cooperation Teams and Cultural Support Teams have been tested. The results of the work of these teams are reported to be mixed, but there are other reports on successes in intelligence-gathering and in affecting armed opposition groups. Those teams that have specific training are reported to perform well.

Afghan women respondents reported that women are rarely approached by ISAF. The respondents consider that ISAF has failed to identify women as important actors and, having done so, consult with them on that basis. This is also applicable when considered in several other respects –including from a security perspective, especially during the transition in responsibility for security –from their roles as mediators in local disputes and conflict, and from the complexities of the transformation process.

ISAF's capacity-building is focused on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). When it comes to gender work, the Government of Afghanistan has built up gender units at both the MoD and the MoI. Both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) have recruited women into their forces. Women personnel in the ANSF report that they have received threats and are being harassed. The Review Team learned that the recruitment of women to ANA and ANP had come to a standstill. Representatives of ANSF, the MoI and MoD explained that this is due to the high rate of illiteracy among Afghan women, the reluctance of families to allow their women to join the security forces, and a desire to retain the ethnic balance in the ANSF. There have been pronounced gains in working from a gender perspective in the ANSF. ISAF has a hand over process in place, but it is not certain how effective it will be. All of these gains face interdependent risks of being rolled back, however, unless the international community can muster the resources for further military and police reform, and for an improvement of the overall situation for women in Afghanistan.

## **KFOR**

The position of the Gender Advisor is essential for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in KFOR. The position is located directly under the Chief of Staff, which is a prerequisite for enabling a gender perspective at all levels in KFOR. The fact that the Gender Advisor is a one-person staff cell reduces the likelihood that UNSCR 1325 is being sufficiently implemented throughout KFOR's operations. The common misunderstanding that it is the Gender Advisor's role to be the sole guarantor of "the gender perspective" in all aspects of KFOR's operations poses a significant limitation on the prospects for the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in all of the Force's operations. Apart from the Gender Advisor's efforts, this misunderstanding results in only random consideration of a gender perspective and little gender mainstreaming in KFOR.

Gender Focal Points have been established in the Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT), which provides KFOR with an important opportunity for developing far-reaching gender oriented practices. The LMTs, even if not originally created with a gender perspective in mind, allow the possibility of close liaison with the local community, and identification of security risks and protection

needs among women, men, girls and boys. This demands, however, that KFOR takes concrete actions to integrate a gender perspective in LMT reports and analyses, in combination with gender trained LMT personnel.

The Review identified the general absence of pre-deployment gender training as being a major detriment to gender mainstreaming. The Gender Advisor does give briefings on gender mainstreaming and UNSCR 1325, but this cannot compensate for the lack of pre-deployment or proper in-theatre training. Few KFOR officers among the respondents were able to describe how a gender perspective relates to their specific task in KFOR. This indicates the need for more training opportunities, wherein methods for operationalizing a theoretical understanding of the importance of a gender perspective can be taught and learned.

Within KFOR, the notions of gender and of a gender perspective are generally understood as being brought into military operations through and by female military staff. The absence of women in the staff, conversely, is held to be a reason for the lack of a gender perspective in operations. Moreover, this is ramified by the impression that the implementation of a gender perspective is held to be the task of the Gender Advisor alone. The Review found that there is often incomprehension of how a gender perspective is relevant for the operations and tasks at hand.

The intelligence-gathering, reporting and planning process does not incorporate a systematic and structured consideration of a gender perspective, which undermines the prospects for gender mainstreaming in operations. This means that any aspect of a gender perspective that does occur in the operations is reliant on the capacity and initiative of specific individuals, which in turn makes its presence sporadic and serendipitous. This is specifically troublesome since the vulnerabilities, security risks and protection needs of men and women, and boys and girls, are not being properly identified or assessed. This is a serious detriment to the provision on protection in UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1.

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has made significant progress in advancing the UNSCR 1325 agenda; there is a clear and established gender focus in its policies and recruitment processes. The policies that have been adopted by the KSF enable and encourage women to join and seek careers among its ranks, which indicates a significant potential for sustained gender equality in KSF operations. Women regard the KSF as an attractive employer, since it is seen to provide a source of livelihood and training that improves quality of life for women. The measures being implemented by the KSF suggest that a good foundation for a relevant, effective and sustainable gender balanced force is being built. The existence of a Gender Advisor position at the Land Force Command level of the KSF organization is another measure that has the potential to develop a gender perspective in an effective, systematized and routine way that can reach into all of the KSF's operations. There appears to be significant capacity for effective and sustained gender mainstreaming in the KSF's operations, if it can be fully utilized. In addition, provided that the guidance instrument on gender and community is sufficiently promoted and implemented throughout the KSF, its implementation may lead to effective incorporation of a gender perspective at all levels of the organization.

## Recommendations

The Review has advanced the following recommendations:

### Recommendations to NATO:

- seize the opportunity and devote itself to the implementation of existing instruments;
- focus on the dissemination and enforcement of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1(2012) throughout the entire military structure;
- ensure that the implementation of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 is executed and monitored and that its progress is regularly assessed;
- make gender training a requirement for the advancement to, and holding of, high-ranking commands; and
- hold Senior Military Leadership accountable for the implementation of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (2012), through regular reporting on Directive-specific indicators.

### Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- ensure that every Commander's initial mission analysis is informed by UNSCR 1325;
- ensure that in-theatre training on UNSCR 1325, specifically the 3Ps<sup>1</sup> is held regularly throughout the existence of a mission (such as KFOR and ISAF);
- establish the Gender Advisor positions to support the Commander, and ensure that the placement of the position in the organization is a reflection of this;
- standardize job descriptions for Gender Advisors in order to guarantee that the roles and responsibilities of the Gender Advisor are coherent throughout the chain of command, are not subject to the interpretations of individual Commanders, nor of the individual Gender Advisors;
- revise relevant intelligence, planning, report and assessment tools so that they include a gender perspective, with the objective of facilitating gender mainstreaming through all phases of military operations;
- make the inclusion of a gender perspective and the principles of UNSCR 1325 a basic requirement for military orders, guidance and operational plans.

### Recommendations to NATO and all current and future Operational Partner nations:

- ensure that there is a roster of trained Gender Advisors, deployable to NATO's missions;

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<sup>1</sup> **Women's Participation** in conflict, prevention, peace-building and reconstruction; **Protection** of women and girls' human rights during conflict; and the **Prevention** of gender-based violence.

- ensure that Gender Advisor positions throughout the military system are filled and not left vacant;
- make UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming a mandatory requirement in all education, training and exercises for military staff, at all levels, regardless of whether they are, or about to be, deployed in a theatre of conflict. The minimum level for Commanders should include doctrines, policy context and content, and facilitate the ability to provide leadership. Staff should learn what tools can be used to implement the principles of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (2012);
- train trainers on UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming, with the objective of supporting on-the-job training;
- make UNSCR 1325, and specifically the 3Ps, a mandatory requirement in pre-deployment training.

**Recommendations to NATO and KFOR and ISAF Operational Partner nations:**

- continue the support of the Afghan National Security Forces, with a distinct focus on training women in the police and military personnel post-2014;
- continue the support of the Kosovo Security Force, with the objective of facilitating the implementation of its gender policy framework.



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## Preface

Armed conflict has always impacted men and women in different ways; this is especially true in contemporary conflicts. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was a landmark, since it acknowledges the importance of the participation of women and the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace-keeping operations, post-conflict peace-building and peace negotiations. The Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) has been established with the intention to support armed forces in their implementation of UNSCR 1325. NCGM seeks to build capacity, train and support military forces in their effort to implement the Resolution. NCGM's training and education is derived from lessons identified and lessons learned in peace support and peace-building operations, such as ISAF/Afghanistan and KFOR/Kosovo.

This Review is the result of the commitment by NATO, and by its Operational Partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), to support implementation of UNSCR 1325. The Review is an important initiative that identifies gaps and achievements in NATO-led missions. The report is the effort of an international cooperation between the many NATO nations and ISAF/KFOR partner nations.

The implementation of UNSCR 1325 is imperative to peace support and peace-building operations. NATO has made progress, but more effort is needed. The results in this report establish a baseline, which can inform future decisions on how to advance the implementation of the Resolution.

It is the NCGM's profound hope that this report will contribute valuable information on how to improve its performance in keeping to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. The Review's results will also be used by NCGM to inform training and provide support to the Armed Forces.

Stockholm, 15 May, 2012

Jan Dunmurray, Commander

Nordic Center for Gender in Peace Operations

## Acknowledgements

This Review is the result of an international cooperation between several NATO and Operational Partner nations. It was led by Jan Dunmurray, Commander, and Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). The Review Team consisted of 16 persons from eight countries. In addition, many other people contributed their time, skills and knowledge of gender in military operations. The main contributors to and authors of this report are the members of the Team:

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(\*Authors)

# Acronyms

ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ADCB	Afghan National Security Forces Development Coordination Board
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDP	Afghan National Development Program
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
Bi-SC	Bi-Strategic
CCOE	CIMIC Center of Excellence
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJMED	Combined Joint Medical
CJOC	Combined Joint Operations Centre
COM	Commander
COMM	Commander's meeting
COMIJC	Commander of Joint Forces Commands
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
COS	Chief of Staff
CPT	Close Protection Team
CST	Cultural Support Team
DCOM-A	Deputy Commander–Army
DCOM-P	Deputy Commander-Police
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union deployed its Rule of Law mission
FAS	Foreign Area Specialists
FET	Female Engagement Team
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency

FRAGO	Fragmentation Order
F-RIC	Force Reintegration Cell
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
GENAD	Gender Advisor
GFP	Gender Focal Point
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence
J5	Joint Planning Division
J9	Joint Civil-Military Cooperation Division
JFC	Joint Forces Commands
JOPG	Joint Operational Planning Group
JRD	Joint Regional Detachment
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KMTC-A	Kabul Military Training Center - Army
KP	Kosovo Police
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LMT	Liaison Monitoring Teams
MCAD	Military Civil Advisory Division
MoD	Ministry Of Defense
MoI	Ministry Of Interior
MTA	Military Technical Agreement
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAP	NATO Action Plan
NAPWA	National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAT-TF	NATO-Afghanistan Transformation Task Force
NB TSU	Nordic Baltic Training Support Unit

NCGM	Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCPJ	National Consultative Peace Jirga
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLD PTG	Dutch Police Training Group
NPA	National Police Academy
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OF	Officer
OPC	Operations Policy Committee
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PPC	Provincial Peace Committee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC	Regional Command
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VTC	Video Teleconference

# 1 Introduction

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security addresses the fact that women and girls account for the majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, and recognizes the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation. UNSCR 1325 underlines that women have been excluded in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and reaffirms the important role they can play in these processes. The Resolution emphasizes the importance of women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase women's participation in decision-making in conflict prevention and resolution.

This review is a result of the commitment by NATO, and by its Operational Partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), to support implementation of UNSCR 1325. In the declaration of the Lisbon Summit of November, 2010, Heads of State and Governments expressed their continued support of the implementation of the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy on UNSCR 1325, and related resolutions, and endorsed a NATO Action Plan (NAP) for the mainstreaming of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations and missions. Since 2010, the NAP has been updated, and a progress report on implementation was delivered at the Chicago Summit, in May, 2012. At Chicago, Heads of State and Government tasked the Operations Policy Committee (OPC) to conduct a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions.

In October, 2012, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) invited the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM), based in the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, to compose and lead an international team of experts to conduct the review. The NCGM accepted the task and invited the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) to execute the review in close cooperation with it.

## 1.1 The aim of the Review

The aim of the review ("the Review") is to assess the practical implications of UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, for the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions in Afghanistan/ISAF and Kosovo/KFOR.

The Terms of Reference, endorsed by the Permanent Representatives to NAC and the non-NATO countries contributing to ISAF and KFOR, identified the following key questions to be answered by the Review:

- What elements of UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, are applicable to NATO led operations and missions?
- How has the practical implementation of the gender perspective and UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, been taken forward in NATO-led operations and missions?<sup>1</sup>
- What are the more significant measurable effects or consequences of activities advancing the gender perspective and the women, peace and security agenda on the broader objectives of NATO-led operations and missions?
- What have the main challenges been to date, both in terms of our own internal work within the missions, but also when it comes to mainstreaming the gender perspective as well as UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, within the local security forces?
- What lessons, so far, can be drawn from this implementation process that could improve current NATO-led missions, or assist futures ones, including Afghanistan, post-2014?

## 1.2 The scope of the Review

This Review does not cover all of the achievements made by ISAF and KFOR, nor does it address all of the challenges faced by the missions. What it does do is provide an overview of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, based on a comprehensive assessment of crucial elements within each mission, with the aim of providing future-oriented and cross-operational recommendations. This provides a baseline against which future assessments or reviews can be compared.

The scope of this Review is limited to the assessment of planning, training and operations, which are crucial elements in any military mission. Special attention has been given to the staff planning cycle. In view of the complexity and size of those elements, and in light of the five key questions for the Review, the Terms of Reference identified a number of areas that should be focused on:

### *Planning and Training*

- the NATO Action Plan, the Bi-SC Directive 40-1 and other relevant operations-related documents are fit for purpose;
- the degree and effectiveness of the gender perspective and relevant UNSCR 1325 provisions used during the strategic, operational and tactical planning;
- the effectiveness of NATO-led training and capacity-building in Afghanistan and Kosovo;

### *Operations*

- the integration of a gender perspective in the military structures and processes, with a special focus on functions of staff work, planning and conduct of operations.
- the effective use of the Gender Advisors, Gender Focal Points and other gender-related experts and teams in NATO-led operations and missions;
- the degree and effectiveness of implementing a gender perspective and women's participation in local security sector reform and armed police forces;
- role of civil-military cooperation in conducting operations with a gender perspective and the degree and effectiveness of NATO's civilian and military reporting and reporting mechanisms;
- the degree and effectiveness of senior civilian and military leadership activities aimed at developing gender awareness and competence within NATO-led operations and missions, and within the local security forces in Afghanistan and Kosovo;
- the degree of influence of cultural and social factors, which may be detrimental to women's full participation in NATO-led efforts to build local capacities and support conflict resolution, peace building and reconciliation processes. This would include the tools and strategies, used to overcome these factors, and their effectiveness.

## 1.3 Methodological considerations

Formally speaking, the entity under consideration in this Review is NATO and its efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 (and its related Resolutions). According to the Terms of Reference, this Review studies the activities of two NATO-led forces, ISAF, in Afghanistan, and KFOR, in Kosovo.<sup>2</sup> The timespan covered by the Review is from 2010, to April, 2013; this corresponds to the period that began with the issuance of NATO's first

directive (Bi-SC Directive 40-1) on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (the Resolution), and that ends with the preparation of this report.<sup>3</sup>

Bi-SC Directive 40-1 was issued by NATO in 2009 for the specific purpose of providing guidelines for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its various activities. Both of those documents are of central importance to the Review. It is important to note that NATO also released an updated version of the Directive, Bi-SCD 40-1 REV1, in August, 2012.<sup>4</sup> Since so little time had elapsed between its release and the inception of this Review—a circumstance that provided almost no opportunity for NATO to begin implementation of the revised directive—the point of departure for the Review has been the Bi-SC Directive 40-1’s original version, from 2009.

Since the 2009 Bi-SC Directive 40-1 was NATO’s first on the subject of UNSCR 1325, there has been no baseline available with which to compare, or measure, the extent of the implementation that may have been achieved. The Review has had to grapple with “beginning from scratch,” with no other alternative than to assume that any of the evidence that might be ascribed to the implementation of the Resolution, had arisen post-2009, unless otherwise indicated. One clearly desirable outcome of this Review is that, no matter the extent of its findings, it will have created such a baseline, which in itself will be invaluable in later follow-up reviews. It is envisioned that the baseline that emerges from this Review of the implementation of the 2009 version of Bi-SCD 40-1 will provide an important aid, firstly, in showing the way towards how the 2012 version may be better implemented. Secondly, it will also provide a useful basis for a follow-up review, which would then be able to undertake a comparison of the progress that will almost certainly have been made during the intervening period.<sup>5</sup>

The methodological foundation for this Review is the OECD’s most recent framework for evaluating peace-building operations.<sup>6</sup> That framework has three main components, which have been adapted to the requirements of the Review, as follows:

- the performance of a *conflict analysis* of the situation that the activities are intended to address. This is required in order to discuss their *relevance* for achieving their objectives;
- a derivation of the *theory of change* that underpins the activities. The theory of change is a snapshot of *how* the activities are *intended* to work; a more complete explanation can be found in Section 1.3.4, below, and in Appendix A;
- a set of criteria. For this Review, three have been selected: relevance, effectiveness and sustainability. *Relevance* is used to assess whether an activity is *applicable* to the situation, especially when compared to the conflict analysis. *Effectiveness* is used to assess whether the activities have met their *intended* objectives. For this Review, the objectives are those that have been identified in the theory of change analysis of Bi SCD 40-1 2009. *Sustainability* is used to assess the potential for the continuation of benefits after the termination of the program of assistance. In that respect, this Review assesses how implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming may continue, especially in the local security forces, after the withdrawal of ISAF and KFOR.

The main data was gathered in interviews of both military personnel and civilians that were conducted during field trips, in February and April, 2013. In total, 142 interviews were conducted.

In order to assess any potential ethical aspects of the Review, the guidelines of the American Evaluation Association and the Swedish Research Council have been consulted.<sup>7</sup> To ensure systematic inquiry, the Review has exercised the current best practice in the field of evaluations for conflict settings. To protect the respondents, and encourage them to speak freely, all interviews are presented anonymously. Where it has been important to refer to the function that a respondent represented, every effort has been made to eliminate the possibility that the identity of the individual may be traced.

### **1.3.1 Afghanistan**

In Afghanistan, 108 interviews were conducted during one field trip, in April 2013.

The initial aim of the field study was to visit ISAF HQ and 2 or 3 Regional Commands. Due to the security situation, the Review Team could only visit ISAF HQ and Regional Command North. This was compensated for by undertaking interviews via video teleconference.

The field trip focused on ISAF's operations, ANSF's recruitment and training, and the security situation for women and girls, and men and boys. The Review Team conducted interviews with various ISAF staff, with ANSF trainers and trainees and various actors from the local community, including women's organisations, government staff, and the international community. The purpose was to obtain a broad and comprehensive overview of ISAF's integration of the gender perspective, and on the security situation. Diversity was sought, but ISAF is a complex organisation with different units, cells and civilian tools, and the Review Team had no intention of covering all aspects of the mission. The selection was based on the relevance of the function for gender integration. An additional factor that hampered the "freedom of selection" was the prevailing security situation, which had an impact on the freedom of movement of both the Review Team and the respondents.

### **1.3.2 Kosovo**

In Kosovo, 44 interviews were conducted during two field trips, one in February, and the other in April, 2013.

The emphasis of the first field trip was to collect material for use in an analysis of the security situation there. The Review Team conducted 11 interviews with various actors from the local community, including women's and political organizations, as well as from the international community (the United Nations Development Program, or UNDP; the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, or UN Women; and the European Union Rule of Law Mission, or EULEX), for the purpose of obtaining their perspective on the security situation. In order to achieve a broad and comprehensive overview, a diversity of respondents was sought. All of the interviews were conducted in Pristina, but some of the respondents travelled to Pristina from other parts of Kosovo, solely for meeting with the Review Team.

The second field trip, in April, 2013, was focused on KFOR's operations. Most of the 33 interviews were conducted at KFOR HQ, in Pristina, and a smaller number were carried out at two different regional locations, the Joint Regional Detachment (JRD) North (Mitrovica) and JRD South (Prizren). They were chosen because they offered two different security situations, which would allow the Review Team as much exposure to the variety of KFOR's operations as possible, given the limiting circumstances of the field trip. The choice was also influenced by the staff rotation that was underway at the time and that made some regions less suitable for the Review.

### **1.3.3 Conflict analysis**

For this Review, it was not only necessary to perform a conflict analysis for each of the situations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, but also to develop an innovative approach that provided for a gender perspective. The conflict analysis framework that was developed and used consists of the following key elements:

#### **Context analysis**

The key to incorporating a gender perspective into this framework is to begin with a context-specific analysis of gender relations, and then ask how gender relations have shaped the ways in which women engage in, are affected by and seek to resolve, conflict.

Gender relations intersect with many lines of social stratification, for example, class, race, ethnicity, age and geographical location, so as to determine the main actors in a conflict and their capabilities to exacerbate or resolve it.

### **Actors**

The interaction of women and men in the armed conflict depends on the social attributes, expectations and social constructions associated with being a man or a woman, respectively, in a society involved in armed conflict. This might determine, for example, that men become combatants, and that women provide indirect, logistic and moral support.

### **Causes**

Conflict analyses often distinguish between three types of causes of conflict:

- root structural factors, such as systematic political exclusion and stratification between groups;
- demographic changes, such as forced displacement due to ecological degradation, or migration caused by economic decline;
- triggers, such as military coups, election fraud, corruption scandals, human rights abuse and the means by which conflict is pursued.

### **Capabilities**

Capabilities refers to those that the actors have, such as resources, skills and the capacity to provoke, exacerbate, or resolve, armed conflict.

The conflict analysis methodology is informed by recommendations for conflict analysis that were produced by UN Women. UNSCR 1325 and 1820 were considered when studying root causes, triggers, and manifestations of violence.<sup>8</sup> While the manifestations of armed conflict, for example, violence, especially sexual violence, towards women or men can affect conflict dynamics, the specific gender dimensions of root causes have also been addressed in order to increase the understanding of the drivers of armed conflict.

#### **1.3.4 Theory of Change analysis**

One of the premises of this Review is that if one is to understand any and all aspects of the implementation of a policy, then an understanding of the policy itself is first required. One way to develop such an understanding is to perform analyses of the policy documents. One method of analysis is based on the notion that a document is an expression of a *theory* of how to instigate *change*. Analysing the document in order to extract the *theory of change* that it represents can then lead to a greater understanding of the meanings that it conveys, whether explicit or implicit. In other words, performing a theory of change analysis of a policy is a way to gain access to what those who formulated it may have intended with it. Comparing the intentions that are embedded in a policy document with the outcomes that it leads to provides a helpful understanding of its relevance, effectiveness and sustainability, among other things.

For this Review, as explained above, theory of change analyses of UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions, and NATO's Bi-SC Directive 40-1 2009, were performed. The way in which NATO's Directive provides a selective interpretation of the UN Security Council's Resolution 1325 was the main question for the analyses. An example and summary of the reasoning that was used for those analyses can be found in Appendix 1, illustrated by the case of NATO's Bi-SC Directive 40-1 2009.

The results of the theory of change analyses have been useful for establishing a background against which to approach NATO's efforts at implementing UNSCR 1325. They reveal the ideas, expectations and prescriptions that NATO considers as a valid response to the Resolution. How well have KFOR and ISAF lived up to the expectations and instructions announced by the Bi-SC Directive 40-1? Have any of its prescriptions

been implemented? Is there any progress? What are obvious things that can be improved in the near-term and which are the things that NATO may want to consider more profoundly for future missions? Through these questions we land at the core of the Review.

## **1.4 Delimitations**

The Review is limited to the NATO-led missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, due to the Review's Terms of Reference, adopted by Allied Nations and relevant Operational Partners in ISAF and KFOR.

Due to the directives in the Terms of Reference for the Review, assessment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Afghanistan has not been conducted, although they have significantly contributed to the advancement of the NAP. In addition, the PRTs are all led by the headquarters of individual ISAF nations.

The Review of ISAF was originally designed not only to include a visit to ISAF facilities in Kabul, but to two or three Regional Commands at other locations in Afghanistan, as well. As events dictated, the Review Team was only able to visit ISAF facilities in Kabul and at the Regional Command North, in Mazar-e-Sharif, because of security restrictions. Those circumstances may have somewhat biased the analysis towards the situation in northern Afghanistan. However, the Review Team was partially able to compensate for this by conducting interviews via video teleconferences (VTC) with the representatives from the Regional Commands outside Kabul.

## **1.5 Definitions**

The definitions of the central concepts used for this Review are in accordance with BI-Strategic Command Directive (BI-SCD) 40-1, dated 8 August 2012, as follows in the list below. (Their wording has been edited.)

### **Gender**

Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female and learned through socialization; it determines a person's position and value in a given context. Notably, gender does not equate to woman.

### **Gender relations**

Gender relations are defined as being the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as to the relations between women and those between men. Their attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed, and are learned through socialization processes.

### **Gender mainstreaming**

Gender mainstreaming is defined as a strategy for achieving gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programs in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of women and men are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres. This leads to equal benefit for women and men, while inequality is not perpetuated. Gender mainstreaming, in a NATO context, represents the process of recognizing and incorporating the role that gender plays in relation to NATO's various operational missions. Gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women, but the

benefits of mainstreaming practices recognize their disadvantaged position in various communities.

### **Integration of a gender perspective**

The integration of a gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences between women and men as reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources.

### **Gender analysis**

Gender analysis is defined as the systematic gathering and examination of information about gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender. It could also be understood as “methods used to understand the relationships between men and women in the context of society.”<sup>9</sup>

### **Gender equality**

Gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men, girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that one’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether one is born as a woman or as a man.

### **Sexual violence**

Sexual violence is when an act of a sexual nature is perpetrated “against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.”<sup>10</sup>

## 2 Underpinnings

### 2.1 UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions

On 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325). The Resolution is based on previous initiatives, such as provisions in international humanitarian and human rights law (Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979), among others.<sup>11</sup> In the Resolution, the Security Council expresses its determination to incorporate a gender perspective in peace-keeping operations and highlights the different protection needs, risks, threats and opportunities for men, women, boys and girls in armed conflict. Furthermore, the Resolution urges all Member states to ensure increased representation of women in the prevention of conflict, as well as in conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms.<sup>12</sup> In this sense, UNSCR 1325 stipulates the transition from seeing women not only as victims, but also as actors, in conflicts.

In the core of UNSCR 1325 are three provisions, commonly called the “3 Ps.” The first two of the 3 Ps are *prevention of conflict* and *protection* of women and their rights during and after armed conflicts.<sup>13</sup> The Resolution calls on States and parties in conflicts to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence.<sup>14</sup> These measures include ensuring respect for international law, protecting women and girls from sexual abuse, ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence and rape, and excluding crimes of sexual violence from amnesty agreements.<sup>15</sup> Women’s peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes are underlined, and the need to understand that gender relations and needs change during different conflict phases is also stressed. Article 6 of the Resolution expects states to provide training guidelines and materials on women’s rights and on the particular needs of women, as measures of prevention and protection.

The third of the 3 Ps, *participation*, refers to increasing the numbers and involvement of women in decision-making at all levels, in all mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.<sup>16</sup> The Resolution, since it also stresses the need to increase women’s participation at the national, regional, international and local levels, visibly addresses a broad range of stakeholders, while imposing obligations on, among others, governments and the UN as a whole. It also provides a political framework for governments and international institutions to take action by involving women in all peace-keeping and peace-building measures.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to the 3 Ps, gender mainstreaming is another of the Resolution’s important pillars; it also strives to have an impact on how international and regional organizations design, plan and implement peace and security strategies, and other measures. The Resolution calls on all actors to adopt a gender perspective, so as to better understand the special needs of women and girls and ensure their protection.<sup>18</sup> To achieve this, the Resolution envisions gender-sensitive training for mission personnel (military and civilian); the incorporation of a gender perspective in processes of negotiating and implementing peace agreements; the carrying out of more research; and the improvement of gender-specific reporting on issues related to gender mainstreaming in peace-keeping missions.<sup>19</sup>

In 2008, the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 1820 on sexual violence against civilians. This resolution reinforces the clauses on such violence in UNSCR 1325, and establishes sexual violence both as a tactic and weapon of war, and as a security issue that exacerbates conflict and impedes the restoration of peace.<sup>20</sup> It further demands the adoption of concrete protection and prevention measures to end such violence.<sup>21</sup> These include disciplinary action against security forces that are guilty of misconduct, rape, or sexual violence, and training for military forces on the prohibition of all forms of sexual

violence. The Resolution also recognizes that sexual violence may continue even after the cessation of an armed conflict.<sup>22</sup>

Several additional UN Resolutions have further developed the intentions of UNSCR 1325 and 1820. UNSCR 1888 (2009) strengthens the implementation of Resolution 1820 through the establishment of specific mechanisms and also calls for the inclusion of the issue of sexual violence in peace negotiations.<sup>23</sup> UNSCR 1889 (2009) also strengthens the implementation of Resolution 1325, particularly in regards to women's participation and the needs of women and girls in conflict situations. It also calls for the development of indicators, for use at the global level, for monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1325.<sup>24</sup> Resolution 1960 (2010) mandates the Secretary-General to list those parties credibly suspected of committing, or being responsible for, sexual violence in conflict, and calls for monitoring, analysis, and the creation of reporting arrangements that are specific to conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>25</sup>

## **2.2 NATO's work on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions—the policy and military strategic levels**

The importance and relevance of gender issues is increasingly being recognized in NATO. A number of initiatives to integrate a gender perspective into its agenda, both on the political and military levels of the organization, have been taken.<sup>26</sup> Although gender issues were on NATO's agenda even prior to UNSCR 1325, the promulgation of the Resolution has generated recognition of gender's potential role in all aspects of peace-keeping.<sup>27</sup>

In order to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1325, NATO has created new mechanisms, and approved new political guidelines and recommendations that include gender aspects in all military operations, in cooperation with all allied members and partners.

### **2.2.1 NATO/EAPC Policy on implementing UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security**

In 2007, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), together with Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners, developed the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy on implementing UNSCR 1325. The policy marked the start of efforts by military authorities in the Alliance to fulfil Resolution 1325.<sup>28</sup>

The NATO/EAPC document declares that member states should be tasked with developing practical proposals for implementation of UNSCR 1325; and that they should report on and follow the work undertaken by such organizations as the UN, the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in incorporating a gender perspective in peace-keeping. Those measures are intended to guarantee compatibility of efforts, exchange of experience and development of good practice.<sup>29</sup>

The NATO/EAPC policy also recognized that the complexity of NATO missions requires that the incorporation of gender issues is consistent with the efforts and contributions of other agencies involved in conflict zones. In 2009, at the Strasburg-Kehl NATO summit, the application of and commitment to supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1325 was reiterated. The summit set a timeline for ensuring that a comprehensive set of measures would be in place by autumn, 2010.

The NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 was updated in June, 2011, with an increased focus on prevention, protection and participation, and by taking into account the five key areas identified in the *Comprehensive Report* that was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit.<sup>30</sup> The updated policy recognizes the importance of national

initiatives and states that, in parallel with Bi-SC Directive 40-1 and the NATO Action Plan, it is a framework for assisting nations in adapting their national policies and programmes.

### **2.2.2 The Bi-Strategic Command Directive Bi-SCD 40-1 2009**

Following the 2009 NATO summit, the Strategic Commanders were tasked to develop practical proposals and guidelines for implementing UNSCR 1325. This resulted in the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (Bi-SCD 40-1) of September, 2009. The Bi-SCD 40-1 is an effort to translate the provisions of UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions into NATO operational terms.<sup>31</sup> It serves as a core document for integrating a gender perspective with NATO's military organization and its operations.

The Directive provides a set of guidelines for how the Alliance and NATO-led missions and operations should implement a gender perspective and ensure gender mainstreaming. It recognizes that the protection during armed conflict of women and girls and boys, is an obligation that all of NATO's members and partners are committed to fulfil, through a range of United Nations resolutions as well as the Geneva Conventions.<sup>32</sup> The Directive stipulates that integrating a gender perspective has positive consequences for operational effectiveness. It further states that women should be seen as actors in ensuring a sustainable peace and they should be involved in all stages of crisis or conflict.

The Directive addresses the need for a gender perspective on internal action regarding recruitment, training and expertise. To this end, it introduces an Operational Planning checklist, which serves as a tool when planning and conducting operations, and includes questions related to situational awareness, force generation, conduct of operations and reporting. In addition, the Directive establishes the position of Gender Advisors.<sup>33</sup>

The Directive recommends that the NAC, together with ISAF and KFOR Non-NATO contributing countries, should prepare a NATO-led Action Plan to be approved in time for the 2010 Lisbon Summit. Since the adoption of the Directive, in 2009, additional United Nations Security Council Resolutions and policies on gender issues have been passed.<sup>34</sup> For this reason, a new, updated Bi-SC Directive was issued in May, 2012.<sup>35</sup>

### **2.2.3 The Lisbon Summit-Roadmap for the Future**

The Lisbon Summit meeting, in November, 2010, resulted in the adoption of a new Strategic Concept that would serve as the Alliance's roadmap for the coming decade. UNSCR 1325 and NATO's gender commitments were not included in the Strategic Concept, but gender mainstreaming was, as a part of the NATO Action Plan for implementing UNSCR 1325 that the Summit endorsed.<sup>36</sup> The Action Plan states that the provisions of UNSCR 1325 should be mainstreamed into current and future crisis management and operational planning, into Alliance training and doctrine and into all relevant aspects of the Alliance's tasks.<sup>37</sup>

The Summit also endorsed the *Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions*.<sup>38</sup> The report outlines what had been achieved so far and made recommendations. Much in line with the Bi-SCD 40-1, it identifies four key areas:

- mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 in policies, programmes and documentation; and cooperation with civil society and international organizations (e.g., OSCE, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the implementation of UNSCR 1325;
- training and educating civilian and military staff about UNSCR 1325;

- effectively integrating gender perspectives in operations (in line with the Bi-SCD 40-1); and
- engaging in public diplomacy, taking into account the strong influence of the media on perceptions of the role of women in society, on culture, the military and public life.<sup>39</sup>

One of the final tasks identified in the report was for the NATO Secretary General to provide an annual progress report on overall implementation of UNSCR 1325.<sup>40</sup>

## **2.2.4 NATO working mechanisms**

A number of NATO committees and other structures are currently working on implementing UNSCR 1325 in the organization. The Operations Policy Committee is engaged, within NATO's political structure, in integrating the notions of "Women, Peace and Security" into the context of NATO missions and operations. This is supported at the NATO HQ-level by the International Staff's Public Diplomacy Division. In NATO's military structure, the Committee on Gender Perspectives, together with the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives, works with a wide range of gender issues.

In addition to these mechanisms, there is an inter-staff civilian-military task force, which was established in September, 2012, to coordinate the work across NATO. It is chaired by the Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, and brings together civilian staff from different divisions of NATO Headquarters. It also includes the International Military Staff, the ACO and ACT representatives.

### **2.2.4.1 Gender Advisor (GENAD)**

In 2011, the Gender Advisor position at Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE) was established, and today has two deputies. Its aim is to ensure the integration and understanding of UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions within SHAPE. The Gender Advisor at SHAPE has the role of supporting the Command of SHAPE, as well as to provide the Joint Forces Commands (JFC), at Brunssum and Naples, with advice and practical support in implementing a gender perspective in NATO operations and missions. A GENAD position was also established at Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, USA. With the structure now being put in place, Gender Advisor positions are made available at the JFCs, and in the different components—maritime, land, and air—in their respective headquarters. A number of these positions have not yet been staffed.

### **2.2.4.2 Gender Field Advisor (GFA)**

In addition to the Gender Advisor, the position of Gender Field Advisor has been established. The role of the GFA is to ensure that gender is an integrated part of operational and tactical levels, and to provide guidance in order to ensure that planning, execution and evaluation properly integrate a gender perspective.

## 3 ISAF

### 3.1 Background - history and mandate

In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, in the United States, a US-led military alliance, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), ousted the Taliban regime from power. In December, 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met in a conference under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the way forward. As a result of that meeting, an agreement was reached that defined the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the setting of guidelines for adoption of a new constitution and elections.<sup>41</sup>

The Bonn Agreement recognized that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves.<sup>42</sup> The participants at the Bonn Conference pledged their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all UN and other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan. With this objective in mind, the Bonn Agreement requested the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.<sup>43</sup>

Shortly after the Bonn Conference, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1386 (2001). The resolution authorized, as envisaged in the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for six months of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in the capital and its surrounding areas.<sup>44</sup> NATO assumed command of ISAF in August, 2003.<sup>45</sup> Soon after, UNSCR 1510 (2003) authorized the expansion of the mandate of ISAF to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs.<sup>46</sup> In 2006, ISAF completed the expansion of its area of operation across Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

In 2004, a constitutional Loya Jirga, or “grand assembly,” adopted a new Constitution. It was followed by a presidential election, in which Hamid Karzai was elected. The following year, a parliamentary election took place, the first in more than thirty years.<sup>48</sup>

Shortly after the Taliban were ousted from power, they began to reorganise and launch an insurgency movement, which has its main stronghold in the South and Southeast of the country. After years of intensified fighting, in 2009 ISAF officially adopted the Counter Insurgency Strategy (COIN), of which the so-called “surge,” deploying 33000 additional US troops, was a substantive part.<sup>49</sup>

In 2009, the country’s second presidential election was held; it extended Karzai’s mandate for another five years, and was followed by a second parliamentary election, in 2010.<sup>50</sup>


In January, 2010, London hosted a large donor conference, where it was decided that the international forces should commence their withdrawal, so that a period of transition could be completed by 2014. The first provinces were transferred to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2011.<sup>51</sup> The participants welcomed the Afghan government’s stated goal that the ANSF would take the lead and conduct the majority of operations in the insecure areas of Afghanistan. The goal was to achieve this within three years, and within five years of taking over the responsibility for physical security in the country.<sup>52</sup> At the Kabul Conference, in July of the same year, the Afghan Government and the international community endorsed a plan for the transition.<sup>53</sup>

Another result of the London International Conference was the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) that was held in Kabul, in June, 2010. The aim of the Jirga was to agree on a national reconciliation plan in order to resolve the on-going conflict with the armed opposition through negotiations. The NCPJ agreement defined elements for the peace and reconciliation strategy and included a framework for talks with disaffected

Afghan nationals. Based on the outcome of the NCPJ, a peace and reintegration process for Afghanistan was established. At time of writing, although no formal peace negotiations are under way; various “talks” between the parties to the armed conflict are proceeding.<sup>54</sup>

By mid-2013, all parts of Afghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be in the lead for maintaining security nation-wide. By the time transition is completed, all Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will have been phased out and their functions handed over to the Afghan government, traditional development actors, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.<sup>55</sup> ISAF is gradually drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014.<sup>56</sup> As agreed by Allied leaders and their ISAF partners at the Chicago Summit in May, 2012, NATO will after 2014 lead a new mission to continue to train, assist and advise the ANSF.<sup>57</sup>

Image 3-1: Map of Afghanistan, ISAF RCs and PRTs Locations, NATO



## 3.2 Conflict Analysis

The conflict in Afghanistan can be described as the sum of a number of conflicts and drivers of insecurity. Typically, the conflict is described as an asymmetric conflict with an insurgency conducted by armed opposition groups (AOG), who share the goal of overthrowing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and fighting the international presence in Afghanistan. GIROA and the international presence, including ISAF, are perceived by the insurgency as collaborators and regarded as enemies. The consequences of this assessment, however, are that several factors that are not directly linked to the insurgency are missing, and must be included in order to understand the threats that the population are facing. Additional factors driving insecurity are, in particular, local conflicts, weak rule of law, organized crime and a high level of corruption.

The conflict in Afghanistan is well-researched and analysed. This analysis, therefore, concentrates solely on the gender dimension, which is a key element in understanding the dynamics of the conflict there, at both the national and local levels. This is accompanied by a discussion on the security risks for women and men.

### 3.2.1 The Gender-Conflict Nexus

Conflicts in Afghanistan are closely linked to gender relations and the position of women in the society. It is an issue that can be directly assigned to the social contract between the Afghan state and its citizens, and lies at the very core of Afghan society.<sup>58</sup>

The history of Afghan women is a tale of severe marginalization and subordination. An often-quoted proverb is, “*A women’s place is in the home or in the grave.*”<sup>59</sup> The position of women in the family and society has been shaped by many factors, with strong roots in culture, religion and history, and causing gender discrimination.<sup>60</sup>

The “woman quest” has historically assumed a dominant position in the political discourse in the struggle against the central government and in state policies in Afghanistan. Opposition to governmental reforms in girls’ education, reduction of the bride price and an increase of legal age for marriage has arisen on numerous occasions and also led to rebellion against the state.<sup>61</sup>

Two important elements in the understanding of gender relations in Afghanistan are the divisions between the urban and rural population and between the central government and the tribes in the periphery. The role of women in public life has historically been a source of contention and conflict, and several reforms to strengthen women’s rights have been met with violent resistance from communities outside Kabul.<sup>62</sup> The changes to the status of women, in combination with attempts to restrict the power of tribal leaders have been perceived as governmental attempts to limit the autonomy of the periphery and the tribes; with the result in reassertions of autonomy by the peripheries.<sup>63</sup>

Women’s rights, and participation in the society, have improved since 2001. This is due to pressure from the international military presence, the international community and human rights activists. A policy framework for the welfare of women has been put in place by the government. Most noteworthy are the core strategic documents that guide the development process; i.e. the Afghanistan Compact, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). Similar progress has been made in other sectors, e.g., in health and education, which contributed to increased life expectancy, reduced child mortality and increased school enrollment of girls. These developments have mostly affected the urban female population and, to a lesser extent, women and girls in rural Afghanistan.<sup>64</sup>

The role of women in Afghanistan, however, continues to be a central theme in the on-going conflict. The Taliban is an Islamic movement with a political agenda that focuses on women’s status and private moral issues. Their view of women, as subordinated and separate from society, is a noticeable feature in their interpretation of good governance.<sup>65</sup> They target institutions that benefit women’s and girl’s education, health and participation in public life. The on-going implementation of women’s rights across Afghanistan is considered to be a threat to their agenda, and a symbol for the influence of the central government and the international community—which they oppose—in the country. Likewise, the numbers of girls who have access to education and health, and to an improvement in their freedom of movement, are referred to by ISAF and the international community as indicators for mission success.<sup>66</sup>

In spite of the developments after 2001, Afghanistan is still almost at the very bottom of the UNDP gender index, ranking 178<sup>th</sup>, out of 179 countries.<sup>67</sup> The index shows that Afghan women continue to be amongst the worst-off in the world, especially in the areas of education, health, employment, human rights and domestic violence. Women’s rights continue to be a contagious issue on the political agenda, and are challenged and debated in different sectors of the society, especially among religious clerics. There is a widespread fear among Afghan women that future peace negotiations will be sacrificed in an agreement with the Taliban and the armed opposition.<sup>68</sup>

### **3.2.2 Local Conflict Dynamics**

Local conflict dynamics are the ones that most commonly create insecurity for the population. Social and family dynamics are central in the understanding of these conflicts, which commonly involve marriage settlements, and land or water disputes. Some of the clan or family disputes have a long history, and involve several families in repeated actions of vengeance, hence creating insecurity. Such conflicts have a tendency of becoming aligned with the overall struggle between armed opposition groups and the government.<sup>69</sup>

In a recent study, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was identified as a driver of conflict in some parts of the country, at the local level. ALP forces are currently being used on a grand scale in Afghanistan, to facilitate the transition process and extend the Afghan government's reach to remote and inaccessible areas.<sup>70</sup> The study revealed that women have no faith in the ALP and that women have suffered severely from violations, in particular sexual violence and harassment, committed by ALP members. In support of this perception, Afghan news reporting, reports from UNAMA and Human Rights Watch bear witness to repeated violations committed by ALP forces,<sup>71</sup> including, but not limited to, sexual abuse, abductions, unauthorized raids, illegal taxation, land-grabbing and extra-judicial killings.<sup>72</sup>

In contrast, the ALP is often hailed by ISAF and the US military as a success factor in dismantling the insurgency, protecting the local population and expanding the influence of the Afghan government to remote districts and villages.<sup>73</sup>

### **3.2.3 Gender Relations and Insecurity**

Many years of on-going conflict, has resulted in widespread war weariness among Afghans. At the same time, in spite of the positive trend for women during the past ten years, decades of civil war and other forms of insecurity have strengthened the male culture of violence. It has decreased the space and opportunities for women in recently militarized areas, and subsequently increased women's vulnerability and protection needs.<sup>74</sup>

Closely associated with the strengthening of the male culture of violence and the coinciding insecurity of women is the prevalence of weapons. Many women in the country (as well as analysts, whether men or women) have expressed their view that armed men are the greatest source of insecurity for women, and that the most common mitigation action for them is to stay at home.<sup>75</sup>

The poverty and social vulnerability of the population, especially in terms of insecurity and given that there are few alternatives, have also contributed to the support of strongmen, criminal elements and armed opposition groups. The most enforced element of this vulnerability has been the recruitment of young men, which is reinforced by the aggressive male culture of pride and violence. In addition, that same male culture has been institutionalized in Afghanistan, after so many years of armed conflict. This means that men are seen as perpetrators, nevertheless they are also victims, since they are recruited, wounded or killed in the armed unrest.<sup>76</sup>

Employment opportunities are pointed out as a key factor in addressing insecurity. This is both in terms of decreasing the recruitment base for insurgents and organized crime, and for strengthening households and allowing them more independence and access to education and healthcare.<sup>77</sup>

Sexual violence is one of the primary threats for women, as well as for girls and boys. It is, however, a topic too sensitive and coupled with shame to address in public, if at all. During the civil war between the Mujahedin groups, in the 1990s, mass rape and mutilations of women, girls and boys were common. In order to mitigate risks, families, and particularly women and children, were kept in their homes so as not to be exposed to threats. The risk of being sexually violated is still one of the primary reasons for keeping

women and children in their homes. That said, another perspective is that the same practices of *pardah*<sup>78</sup> are also significant in terms of separating men and women.<sup>79</sup>

Finally, it is important to realize that women are also actors in the conflict. They take part in the insurgency, directly or indirectly, as wives and daughters of members of the armed opposition. They might not be the ones pulling the trigger, but their support is realized through the provision of logistic and moral support.<sup>80</sup>

Image 3-2: Afghan girls, Kabul



### 3.3 Gender and UNSCR 1325-related activities

ISAF is a complex organisation with different units, cells and civilian tools that are all solely deployed to address the multi-faceted environment and the particular security problems pertaining to the Afghan context. This is also true for the gender and UNSCR 1325-related efforts, which are being implemented at ISAF HQ, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the Regional Commands (RC).

This section is primarily based on the material collected during the field study in Afghanistan. It summarizes the gender- and UNSCR 1325-related activities in ISAF, which were identified through 108 individual interviews. This section does not report on every single initiative, however, but presents the main findings of the Review's works.

The next section provides a brief introduction to ISAF's structure. It is followed by a description of the main activities relating to gender mainstreaming and UNSCR 1325, along with an assessment of the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of those activities. Finally, the assessment of the actions is compared to the goals set in the NATO guidance instrument, BI-SCD 40-1 2009; this allows the identification of the degree to which ISAF has enabled the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

#### 3.3.1 ISAF's structure

The ISAF upper command structure consists of a higher strategic Headquarters, ISAF HQ, and two subordinate Headquarters, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) HQ. In addition, there is a NATO Special Operations Element.<sup>81</sup>

NTM-A is responsible for overseeing the training and equipment of Afghan forces throughout Afghanistan.<sup>82</sup> There are a number of major units assigned to NTM-A, such as Infantry Battalions, Field Artillery Battalions, Defence Artillery Battalions and Regional Support Groups.<sup>83</sup>

The IJC, in full partnership with ANSF, conducts population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace.<sup>84</sup> The IJC Commander (COMIJC) has, under its command, the PRTs, the Theatre Enablers and the six Regional Commands (RCs)—RC North, RC East, RC South, RC West, RC Southwest and RC Capital. In addition, COMIJC ensures the co-ordination of ISAF and ANSF operations.<sup>85</sup>

### **3.3.2 Gender Advisor (GENAD) and Gender Focal Points**

#### ***ISAF HQ***

Previously placed under the Deputy Chief of Stability, the Gender Advisor Unit at HQ ISAF is, as of January 2013, located under the Chief of Staff (COS).<sup>86</sup> It has four positions, although some of them are vacant. The highest-ranking position is at the level of Brigadier General (OF6). This OF-6 position has recently been created at the request of a number of NATO nations. At time of writing, it has not been filled. Instead, a civilian Gender Advisor, who has been ascribed with a rank equal to a Colonel (OF5), has been deployed by Iceland. The second position, the Military Assistant to the Brigadier General, placed at the level of a Lieutenant Colonel (OF4), is also vacant. The third position is filled by a Major (OF3) and the fourth position is as an assistant, a non-commissioned officer (NCO). The Gender Advisors are now part of special staff, i.e. advisors such as the Legal Advisors.<sup>87</sup>

The GENAD Unit provides assistance and advice to COMISAF, and to key staff members, on gender mainstreaming and UNSCR 1325 implementation. GENAD Unit also contributes to the induction training.<sup>88</sup> The Review found that GENAD Unit was rarely approached by staff at the branches; contact is usually made through the initiative of the GENADs. The GENAD Unit has no work order; it is the prerogative of the individual holding the position to decide on priorities, focus and tasks. There is no clear division of work between the OF5 and OF3 position.

The GENAD Unit has no available budget. Before the move to the COS office, the Unit had their own transportation. Since the move to the COS office, this resource has been restricted. However, the GENADs have access to the COS' Close Protection Team (CPT), for conducting movements, when the CPT is not being used by the COS. The current security restrictions that are in force limit the GENAD Unit's possibilities for liaison with organisations outside ISAF HQ, since movements out of the camp are limited. Civilian women and men are often reluctant to visit ISAF HQ, due to their perception of the security risks.<sup>89</sup> The GENADs have reacted to this by changing their focus to internal work at ISAF HQ.<sup>90</sup>

The GENAD Unit has established Gender Focal Points in several branches within ISAF HQ. The Gender Focal Points' work with gender mainstreaming and UNSCR 1325 implementation has to be accommodated along with their other tasks and responsibilities. These individuals are appointed by the branch head, based on their own interest and initiative. They are often women.<sup>91</sup> There are also voluntary Gender Focal Points; dedicated individuals who understand the importance of gender mainstreaming in military operations. The Gender Focal Points are not coordinated and they do not receive any specific training. There are no figures available on how many branches have appointed Gender Focal Points.

### ***ISAF Joint Command***

The IJC has one GENAD position. Currently it is held by a Lieutenant Colonel (OF4). The GENAD's position is placed in the J5 branch (Planning), since gender is perceived to be an issue related to stability of districts, within the IJC. The focus of the GENAD's job is mostly internal at the IJC, while its aim is to incorporate a gender perspective in operations. GENAD IJC takes part in regular staff meetings.<sup>92</sup> The overall objective is to incorporate a gender perspective in operations. The IJC provides the RCs with guidance on UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming. As part of the IJC's induction training, the GENAD contributes a ten-minute brief on gender.<sup>93</sup> GENADs liaise with NGOs and Afghan women, in Kabul. The provinces are out of reach, due to the security situation and a lack of transportation resources.<sup>94</sup>

### ***Regional Commands***

RC South has a GENAD who has access to the commanders on the Stability Platform<sup>95</sup>, or, if needed, to the COS, but not to the commander. The Gender Advisor is a Subject Matter Expert (SME), who influences or informs the planning process. The Gender Advisor provides knowledge on the NATO Action Plan, as well as on UNSCR 1325, particularly in the planning process. The guidance that the Gender Advisor contributes to the planning process has the potential to affect orders that are sent to the field. In RC South, the battle brigades also have a Gender Focal Point, who supports the commander. The gender representatives are trained for that role, which is to provide information to the brigade commander.<sup>96</sup>

In RC North, the GENAD section is run by one trained Gender Advisor.<sup>97</sup> GENAD contributes to and take part in the daily Deputy COS' COMM meeting, the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG), the Operational Assessment Working Group, the Information Operations Coordination Board and the Afghan National Security Forces Development Coordination Board (ADCDB).<sup>98</sup> Generally, most of the branches are aware of the support that the GENAD can provide, although few branches seek support or advice on gender or UNSCR 1325.<sup>99</sup> The GENAD also acts as a subject-matter expert. GENAD RC North has performed a briefing about the increased number of reported cases of violence against women, and a training component for female engagement teams and mixed engagement teams.<sup>100</sup> The GENAD also conducted search training for women trainees of the Afghan Border Police.

There is no GENAD at RC East. USAID advisors are responsible for maintaining a gender perspective. The Cultural Support Team incorporates a gender perspective in its activities.

There is no GENAD at RC West. UNSCR 1325-related activities are the responsibility of J9 (CIMIC).

The Review found that the GENADs' work is based on their own initiatives to a large extent; they work both with assisting various staff process, advising senior commanders, and liaising with external contacts. While there are Standard Operating Procedures for some GENADs in ISAF, there is no common definition of their tasks that is used throughout the organisation.

### ***NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan***

NTM-A has Gender Advisors placed at the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and at the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Within the Ministries, they are in charge of promoting the UNSCR 1325 agenda and of building the Ministries' institutional capacity as enablers of gender mainstreaming.<sup>101</sup>

NTM-A Gender Advisors work closely with the two Ministries, in particular with the Gender Integration and Human Rights Units. At the Ministry of Defence, the Gender Integration and Human Rights Unit has only recently been established, with its personnel

strength approved to stand at 35 people. The Unit were not fully staffed during the Review Team's visit to Afghanistan, in April, 2013.<sup>102</sup>

### **3.3.3 Gender Enablers - Female Engagement Teams, Cultural Support Teams and Foreign Area Specialist**

Some of the Regional Commands, as well as further down the chain of command, have gender enablers, such as Female Engagement Teams (FET), Cultural Support Teams (CST) and Foreign Area Specialists (FAS). An aim in creating these teams is to increase the engagement and liaison with the women in the local population. The main objectives are to gain a better understanding of the local security situation, increase women's participation and input on decisions related to operations, obtain information on insurgent activities and inform local women about ISAF's tasks and activities.

FETs were originally developed as force protection for the US Marines, with the task of taking care of and searching women during operations at the local level, e.g., in arrest operations. The FETs are made up of female soldiers, or civilians. Today the scope of their work includes outreach to women at the local level; identifying needs and constraints among the women in the population; and gathering information about the situation in the communities. The Review identified FETs in RC North, RC East, RC South and RC West. In RC South, each brigade also has a FET, whose role is to collect information and provide analysis of the sentiment of the population, "atmospherics", which in turn is used to inform the planning process.<sup>103</sup>

In RC East, the Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) incorporate a gender perspective in their support of special operations. The CSTs are employed in stability operations, in three phases: security, governance and development. During the security phase, the activities include the clearing of villages, which is said to be done in a gender and culturally-sensitive way. In the governance phase, they discuss with the government in order to involve it in developing projects for women. During the development phase, they bring development projects directly to women, by asking women about their needs and about their views on the Afghan Local Police. The CSTs work through female military interpreters.<sup>104</sup>

Foreign Area Specialists are a tool deployed in RC North. They are linked to information operations, communication and PsyOps. Female Foreign Area Specialists are responsible for meeting influential women in the area, understanding their networks and mechanisms of decision-making mechanisms, and advising COM RC North regarding cultural issues, including the role of women and how to approach Afghan women in a culture-sensitive manner.

### **3.3.4 Gender training**

Few people working at ISAF HQ and IJC had participated in gender training. Many nations do not provide gender training, neither in their regular education and training curricula, nor in the pre-deployment training. Occasionally, in the pre-deployment cultural awareness training, an outline of the role of women in Afghanistan, and how to behave towards them, has been presented.<sup>105</sup>

During the induction training at ISAF HQ and IJC, the GENAD is allotted ten minutes for explaining the UNSCR 1325 framework. There is no time for questions.<sup>106</sup>

NTM-A staff officers reported that they had not been provided with relevant gender training, with the exception of a section included in an online pre-deployment training.<sup>107</sup>

RC South is guided by UNSCR 1325, but they have no formal programs that emphasize gender in the training activities.<sup>108</sup> A form of gender training is provided in RC South, in the female-engagement training. The FET members also receive more extensive training on Afghan culture and historical developments. They have classes on religion, learn basic

Pashtu and receive special training on how to work with interpreters. They also receive training, acquire skills and gain experience in engaging with other groups than women; it is considered that they are able to collect different answers than male teams can, even when engaging with men. The gender representative in the battle brigades must complete on-line gender training and NATO training.<sup>109</sup>

RC West does not have any specific gender training. They have cultural awareness training, which includes some gender related aspects, but this is mainly about how to interact with female interpreters and not how to engage with local women.<sup>110</sup>

RC North is currently developing in-theatre training on gender. Gender is addressed through the cultural awareness training.<sup>111</sup> Few personnel had received gender training prior to being deployed in RC North. Some personnel received a short cultural awareness briefing, including material about the role of Afghan women, before arriving. The differences between gender and culture are rarely made clear, and the topic of gender is usually limited to learning how to deal with Afghan women.<sup>112</sup> High-ranking military personnel from RC North received gender training as part of their pre-deployment training, at JFCT Bydgoszcz.<sup>113</sup>

The absence or limited amount of gender training received by ISAF personnel is reflected in the poor awareness of the provisions and content of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SC Directive 40-1, as well as in the limited understanding of basic gender concepts. The majority of the respondents at ISAF HQ associate gender with women; gender is generally considered a task and gender mainstreaming is defined as outreach to women.



### **3.3.5 Planning, Operations and Assessments**

#### ***Orders and Reports***

The OPLAN for ISAF has a gender annex, Annex WW, which makes reference to the Bi-SC Directive 40-1.<sup>114</sup> There are almost no traces of a gender perspective in the main body of ISAF OPLAN.<sup>115</sup> ISAF GENAD has not been present in most of the planning meetings that ISAF is conducting.<sup>116</sup>

ISAF HQ has issued an order on gender mainstreaming, which aims to promote a gender perspective in all operations. The order has gone out to all commands under HQ ISAF, and

makes reference to Bi-SC Directive 40-1.<sup>117</sup> COMISAF has made two separate reports on the implementation of gender mainstreaming and UNSCR 1325 within ISAF.

IJC Operations (J5) documents do not usually incorporate a gender perspective, since the notion of a gender perspective is perceived as an isolated issue. Hence gender is not mainstreamed in operations.<sup>118</sup> No gender regulations are formulated in the OPLAN.

RC South states that it has received orders from IJC (IJC gender-specific order) to incorporate a gender perspective in planning. The RC South's Campaign Plan has a gender annex and personnel are expected read it. The respondents in RC South, expressed that they are well aware that they have been ordered to incorporate gender in planning activities.<sup>119</sup>

In RC North, a gender perspective is included as an annex to the current OPLAN. The task of incorporating a gender perspective is also part of the main body of the OPLAN. In addition, both the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and the FRAGOs, incorporates gender mainstreaming.<sup>120</sup> Reporting on gender is conducted through the Quarterly Gender Report, from GENAD RC North to GENAD IJC.

### ***Planning, Operations and Assessments***

The majority of staff at ISAF HQ and IJC identified gender mainstreaming- and UNSCR 1325-related efforts as a task to be handled by the GENAD. This was also true for some of the RCs. However, the staff that were aware of UNSCR 1325 and gender claimed to be willing to include a gender perspective, but did not know how to proceed. Gender has not been mainstreamed or incorporated in tools used by staff in their daily work.

The Review found some attempts to include either, or both, a gender and a women's perspective in operations. Such attempts are often made by individuals with a strong commitment, or personally interested, in a gender perspective. One example is the gender focal point in the ISAF HQ intelligence community who performs some intelligence analysis with a gender focus. Apart from that example, the main intelligence products only rarely include a gender perspective, and gender is not mentioned in any of the priority intelligence requests.<sup>121</sup>

Other offices at ISAF HQ tried to promote women's participation in their work. One example is the Shafafiat Office, which is supporting the government of Afghanistan with counter-corruption work (*shafafiat* means transparency, in Dari and Pashto). ISAF is supporting ANSF in their development of a capability for inspecting supplies of fuel, food, ammunition, weapons, and so on. They organize Transparency and Accountability Committees, which is a mechanism for filing complaints. These committees have been put in place for the ANP, and a similar structure is being organized for the ANA. ISAF has advocated for the inclusion of women members on these committees.<sup>122</sup>

The NATO-Afghanistan Transformation Task Force (NAT-TF) is also taking the GENAD function into consideration in the transformation process. ISAF is in the process of making an inventory of strategic-level tasks, in order to decide whether they will be terminated, transferred to the follow-on mission, or transferred to GIROA, or other stakeholders.<sup>123</sup> The NAT-TF leads the inventory process, and is taking into account all tasks, including those related to gender. There are currently more than 20 gender tasks that have been identified for termination, transfer to GIROA and other stakeholders, or to the follow-on mission. NAT-TF consults with the GENAD to acquire a general understanding of which tasks are going to be transferred to the follow-on mission in 2015 and, respectively, to track the likelihood of having a GENAD in the new mission.<sup>124</sup>

The main criterion that is applied in the decision-making process is the impact that the absence of a task may have on the campaign in the event that it fails to be transferred to the follow-on mission. The tasks are therefore prioritized according to this criterion. The gender-related responsibilities fall under the criterion of tasks which will not have a disruptive impact on the campaign if not transferred.<sup>125</sup> According to NAT-TF, with the new mission focused on training and advising ANSF, NATO's ability to work on gender is

likely to be restricted to security ministries, with engagement solely at the highest political level, and not at the level of provinces and districts.<sup>126</sup>

The Force Reintegration Cell (FRI-C) supports the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process, which is led by the High Peace Council. The F-RIC specifically assists in the reintegration process for middle-level commanders and foot soldiers from the armed opposition who wish to lay down their arms. The APRP is guided by a gender policy, and the F-RIC has a GENAD. However, women's role in the APRP is limited, and women's grievances are not being met. According to ISAF F-RIC, women only benefit from the APRP if they are a member of the family of a former insurgent, which is always a man, whom the APRP is supporting.

The assessment cell in the plans department at ISAF HQ uses gender-disaggregated data in its statistics, after having consulted with the GENAD.<sup>127</sup>

### **3.3.6 NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)**

In 2011, the NTM-A/CSTC issued a White Paper with the title *Gender Integration: An Afghan Priority*. This paper is informed by BI-SC Directive 40-1 and UNSCR 1325. NTM-A reaffirms its commitment to support MOI and MOD in their effort to recruit Afghan women to the ANSF.

The NTM-A conducts capacity-building in the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior, as well as in some of ANSF's central schools, such as the Kabul Military Training Centre and the Afghan National Defence University. The NTM-A sends its reports to HQ ISAF.

On the operational level, the NTM-A's counterparts are the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTTC), the Police Training Academy and the Afghan National Defence University. In order to keep gender from being a separate issue, efforts are being made to enact gender mainstreaming within the entire context of ANSF professionalization.<sup>128</sup>

The force-manning concept, which is based on three components - recruit, train and assign - applies equally to women's participation in the ANA and the ANP. The target for women's participation in the ANSF is set at ten per cent, while it currently stands at one per cent, which was reached in the period beginning in 2010. Some 300-400 women are trained per year. The ANP has 1577 female police officers spread out across the entire country.<sup>129</sup>

Women's recruitment is a major challenge, as a result of existing constraints that are linked to culture and the traditional family role of women in Afghan society, as well as of the high rate of illiteracy among the female population. Security remains an important issue with regard to attracting women to the ANA. In less secure places, it is difficult to recruit women to the ANA.<sup>130</sup>

Information campaigns are being conducted, with a view to attracting more women to apply to the ANSF. During interviews at KMTTC-A and NPA, Afghan ANA/ANP women trainees and instructors have cited opportunities for education and career advancement as being among their main motives for applying.<sup>131</sup>

In addition to the focus on mere numbers of trainees as an indicator of women's participation and empowerment, NTM-A is aware of the need to leverage the issue of ethnic balancing. This adds an additional layer of concern to NTM-A, which warrants special attention in the process of recruitment.<sup>132</sup>

Efforts to attract more women include separate training sites for women at the Police Training Academy and KMTTC-A, as well as special infrastructure for women, including changing facilities, dormitories and a kindergarten within the bounds of the Police Training Academy. There is also a women's ANP training camp in Herat, as well as a mobile training team of nine instructors, who provide on-the-spot-training. The instructors are Afghans and are mentored by a NTM-A mentor. At the time of the Review, the mobile team was in Farah, to train 28 female police officers.<sup>133</sup>

It has been reported that the attrition rates for women in the ANSF are lower than those for men.<sup>134</sup>

Image 3-4: Afghan male trainees at KMTC-A



### 3.3.7 Training of ANSF in RC North

The Nordic Baltic Training Support Unit (NB TSU) has a trained gender field advisor, who is part of the special staff.<sup>135</sup>

The Dutch Police Training Group (NLD PTG) operates with a gender board consisting of 13 persons, which holds bi-weekly meetings.<sup>136</sup>

The German Police Project Team, although not part of ISAF, have two gender advisors, who coordinate the training of the women recruits. Neither of them has received any gender training. They have women interpreters for addressing the women trainees.<sup>137</sup>

All personnel in the ANSF, both women and men, are mentored and trained by different branches. In RC North, most women serve in the 303rd Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Pamir Zone, and in the 5th Zone, Afghan Border Police. Their specific needs are considered and ISAF attempts to assure that the necessary facilities for the women soldiers are provided. For example, the women of 209 ANA Corps, in Camp Shaheen, now have their own container, where they can change, rest, stay (in case of disease), or hold meetings with other women..<sup>138</sup> The 209th ANA Corps sets up civil military cooperation (CIMIC) courses and supports operations with small CIMIC projects. CIMIC is one of the enablers for linking the ANA to the population and GIRoA.<sup>139</sup>

ISAF supports recruitment campaigns for the ANSF; the campaigns include the aim of recruiting more women. Other campaigns directed at women have also taken place, for example one that sought to encourage more women to enter the labour market. Those campaigns are designed to approach both men and women in a culturally appropriate manner.

### 3.3.8 Senior Civilian Representative

The Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) is NATO's representative in Afghanistan and reports to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The facility is not part of ISAF, but does provide the political advisory functions to ISAF HQ. The SCR has a staff of around 40 persons, mainly civilians.<sup>140</sup>

The SCR's goal is to include women in all discussions with Afghans. The SCR also has a gender focal point, to ensure that gender is not just discussed with women, but also with men.<sup>141</sup>

## 3.4 Assessment

The first criterion of the assessment is *relevance*, which is used to consider whether the gender integration intervention is relevant for the conflict situation that ISAF has encountered in Afghanistan.

The second criterion is *effectiveness*, which is used to consider what results ISAF has achieved in the gender field, and how these compare with the intentions of the Bi-SCD 40-1.

The third criterion is *sustainability*, which discusses how the achieved benefits may continue as ISAF is being phased out.

### 3.4.1 Relevance

The discussion of relevance hinges on the analysis of the activities that are part of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as restated through the NATO Bi-SC Directive 40-1, and on the conflict analysis that was conducted for the present Review.<sup>142</sup>

#### **Conflict Analysis**

The analysis reveals that conflicts in Afghanistan are closely linked to gender relations and the position of women in society. It is an issue that can be directly assigned to the social contract between the Afghan state and its citizens, and lies at the very core of Afghan society.

The position of women has always assumed a dominant position in the political discourse in struggles against the central government and in state policies. Afghanistan is a society where men and women are kept apart, are assigned widely different roles and women are severely discriminated. This has also meant that the conflict in Afghanistan has had different consequences for men and women, and that women generally are the more vulnerable group.

A key ingredient for assessing the relevance of an intervention is the conflict analysis that is used by the intervening organization.<sup>143</sup> In the case of a military intervention, the conflict analysis is mainly found in the various intelligence products that are used to shape planning and action. The Review was not able to find any evidence to suggest that gender has been mainstreamed in these products at ISAF HQ level.

One of the dilemmas identified in the Review relates to how intelligence collection assets are being reduced as part of the overall reduction of the force; intelligence staffs lack tools for gender analysis; and gender remains absent among the priority intelligence requirements. At the same time as intelligence staff seem to understand the complexities of the conflict, other users of intelligence products seem to operate from simplified notions of a two-sided war between GIRoA and ISAF, on one side, and the insurgents, on the other.<sup>144</sup> The effect of this undeveloped understanding is that the gender perspective carries little weight in the overall deliberations of ISAF, and hinders other actions that could lead to an implementation of UNSCR 1325.

### ***ISAF's Gender Advisors***

The Review has found that the Gender Advisors play a relevant and pivotal role in the effort to implement UNSCR 1325 through gender mainstreaming in all of ISAF's efforts. Although there are committed individuals at all levels of ISAF, gender mainstreaming has eluded being institutionalised within ISAF, or in the armed forces of the coalition partners. As mentioned above, many commanders and staff have reported that they have not yet received any gender training, or knowledge, about UNSCR 1325, or Bi-SCD 40-1.

The implementation of UNSCR 1325 remains fragmented, albeit slowly and surely improving. The GENAD position is not only relevant, but remains imperative for the implementation of UNSCR 1325; this is equally so with regard to the work of the gender focal points and gender enablers.

### ***The NTM-A***

The training of the ANSF that is performed by the NTM-A is a relevant form of support, and contributes to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The NTM-A's female trainers can also serve as role models for women in the Afghan police and military forces. The support the NTM-A provides to the MOI and to the MOD is of importance, since it impels the Afghan government to step up its efforts to recruit more women to serve in the ANP and the ANA. Women in the ANSF are a small minority; it is important that a critical mass of women is established in the force in order to ensure their impact and acceptance by the society at large. This could additionally enhance the security of women in the ANP and the ANA, since women in the police and the military would be less "abnormal" than they are today.

### **3.4.2 Effectiveness**

In general, and rather abstractly, the effectiveness of the measures that are under consideration in this Review, can be ascertained by considering the extent to which the objectives that they are aimed to fulfil have been achieved.<sup>145</sup> In this section, more specifically and concretely, the Review proceeds from the theory of change analyses that it performed on a number of important documents, especially UNSCR 1325 and NATO's Bi-SC Directive 40-1 2009. Those analyses provided a foundation for considering how effectively ISAF has responded to the documents' objectives. Those objectives can be summarized by saying that NATO requires the implementation of a gender perspective in all its operations, or, in other words, that gender mainstreaming shall be achieved.

In considering how well that primary objective has been fulfilled, it was not possible, given the constraints that have applied, to review each and every detail of UNSCR 1325, or of Bi-SCD 40-1's, numerous sub-objectives. Instead, the most important objective, the extent to which NATO's missions—in this chapter, ISAF—have achieved gender mainstreaming through the implementation of a gender perspective in all operations, is the primary focus of the Review.

### ***Incorporation of a gender perspective in peace-keeping operations***

While both UNSCR 1325 and the Bi-SC Directive 40-1 2009 call for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace operations, the latter also emphasizes the inclusion of women's perspectives. The mere presence of "women's perspectives" must not be mistaken for a gender perspective, however. Just as "women" should not be equated with "gender," it must also be remembered that "an awareness of women's perspectives" should not be mistaken as fully constituting a gender perspective.

The Review was not able to gain access to detailed records for the gender composition of ISAF's personnel, but a working estimate is that between 7 and 15 % are women.<sup>146</sup> The highest-ranking military women in HQ ISAF are colonels. Since colonels only rarely have

access to the decision-making boards of HQ ISAF, the influence of women is considered low

Only a small minority of the ISAF respondents had read UNSCR 1325; those who had read it confided that they had done so only in preparation for their interview. Although NATO's Bi-SCD 40-1 was generally not known or used in ISAF, a gender perspective is addressed in several other ISAF documents. The ISAF OPLAN has a gender annex; there have been several FRAGOs regarding a gender perspective and there is currently some reporting with a gender perspective, but, as far as could be ascertained, this is not present in key intelligence products.<sup>147</sup> The extent of the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in ISAF is modest; it is represented by gender personnel (GENADs and GFPs) and specific documents.

The presence of female personnel has allowed ISAF to reach out to Afghan women to some extent. Approaches such as the use of Female Engagement Teams, Mixed Engagement Teams, Mixed CIMIC Teams and Cultural Support Teams have been tested. Some of the female Engagement Teams are trained to different extents in different areas of the country, but others not at all, while Cultural Support Teams are volunteers who receive eight weeks of training. The results of the work of these teams are reported to be mixed, but there are reports on successes in intelligence-gathering and in affecting Armed Opposition Groups. Those teams that have specific training are reported to perform well.<sup>148</sup>

In addition, outreach through women's "shuras" (consultative meetings) has been conducted across Afghanistan, by RCs and at the tactical level.<sup>149</sup> Psychological operations teams in RC North work with female focus groups to design products.<sup>150</sup> Although there are reports of good results from these efforts, they appear to have mostly limited local consequences. Since the mainstreaming of a gender perspective needs further development in ISAF, these achievements are usually filtered out before they can enter into Afghanistan-wide considerations. So, while attempts at outreach to women have been attempted by ISAF, the results have been useful mostly at the tactical level. Within ISAF, mere outreach to women is often equated with gender mainstreaming. At the same time that every effort to reach out to women in the population is essential and should be applauded, such measures are only a small component of full-scale gender mainstreaming.

### ***Inclusion of a gender component in field operations***

The main focus of gender activities within ISAF is the Gender Advisor role. They are deployed at ISAF HQ (2 persons), IJC (1 person), NTM-A (2 persons), RC S (1 person) and RC N (1 person). At the time of writing, there are vacancies at ISAF HQ, for a GENAD with the rank of Brigadier General, and for a Military Assistant. The IJC GENAD was vacant for most of 2012.<sup>151</sup> Currently, there are efforts underway to make the GENADs in both ISAF HQ and IJC directly subordinate to the COS.

While there are Standard Operating Procedures for some GENADs in some organizations, there is no common definition of their tasks throughout ISAF.<sup>152</sup> When they have acquired access to decision-makers, GENADs report that they are successful in influencing decisions.<sup>153</sup> Because of that impact, the GENADs can be considered to be ISAF's most crucial source of competence and initiative for the success of its gender mainstreaming efforts. The GENADs at ISAF HQ and IJC focus on internal matters, partly because restrictions on movement rarely allow them to travel.<sup>154</sup>

As a form of confirmation of the effect of such an adaptation, various international and local stakeholders also report limited interaction with ISAF on gender.<sup>155</sup> As external interaction is a necessary tool for gender work, the opportunity for ISAF to achieve added success in gender mainstreaming is in this instance dependent on such a relatively straightforward matter as transportation.

Most ISAF personnel who spoke with the Review Team could not recall having received gender training. Those who had, said they received it as part of either national pre-

deployment training, or on a voluntary basis.<sup>156</sup> It was often the case that the notion of a gender perspective was thought of as being about “women’s issues.”<sup>157</sup>

The GENADs and some of the Gender Focal Points at the NTM-A focus their work on the MoD and MoI, as well as on the central schools of the ANSF. These individuals are not all strictly ISAF assets; some of them have deployed through a US-UK-Canada initiative. They work as advisors to the gender units that are being organized at the MoD and the MoI, and directly with the Kabul Military Training Centre (the main ANA school), and the Afghan National Defence University.<sup>158</sup> The units at the ministries work with addressing gender and assisting the ANA and the ANP in recruiting women.<sup>159</sup> These initiatives by ISAF and allied forces are an important contribution to the general effort to implement a gender perspective in their interaction and work with both the MOI and the MOD.

In addition to the GENADs, the Review found several examples of concrete gender initiatives that are, or have been, taken by either committed individuals or by concerned nations. These efforts involve the inclusion of a gender perspective in the activities that they conduct, such as ISAF’s anti-corruption work, intelligence analysis, and public health enhancement. Some of these individuals have also been appointed Gender Focal Points.<sup>160</sup> Taken together, the Review considers that the application of these resources directs substantial additional focus to matters of gender mainstreaming, at the same time as the lack of coordination of the various efforts indicates that synergy could be achieved through more of it.

### ***Adoption of measures that ensure protection and respect for women’s and girls’ human rights***

Local women are occasionally invited by ISAF to various meetings, but this is not done in a systematic way, the priority is placed on male actors.<sup>161</sup>

Afghan respondents expressed their view that the efforts of ISAF have done little to increase the security of the population, male or female, in any substantial way. However, they did say that ISAF’s presence is important for protecting the Afghan government and its institutions.<sup>162</sup>

As part of the counterinsurgency strategy, ISAF has supported the organization of the Afghan Local Police, which are essentially local defence militias that defend the villages they belong to.<sup>163</sup> In at least Baghlan and Kunduz, these forces have turned predatory and threaten the security of women there. This appears to be because the vetting of those who enter the ALP has been less than thorough.<sup>164</sup> A more careful analysis of the security situation and the protection needs of men and women in these areas may have done more to prevent the situation.

Respondents from UNAMA related that their organization works with ISAF to reduce civilian casualties; they claim that there has been an overall reduction in direct civilian casualties from ISAF action.<sup>165</sup> Apart from that, the Review could not find evidence that ISAF had conducted analyses of the situation from the perspective of the security of the population in Afghanistan. Similarly, the Review could not find any indications of ISAF efforts to address the security needs of those Afghans, women and men, whom it interacts with.<sup>166</sup> There remains much that ISAF could do to ensure such protection.

### ***Identification of women as actors***

Afghan women respondents reported that women are rarely approached by ISAF. Women’s groups and networks have expectations of ISAF; it is considered to be an important actor that can contribute to both security and the advancement of women’s position, as well as a general improvement in their lives. To date, however, the respondents consider that ISAF has failed to identify women as important actors and, having done so, consult with them on that basis. This is also applicable when considered in several other respects, including from a security perspective, especially during the

transition in responsibility for security; from their roles as mediators in local disputes and conflict; and from the complexities of the transformation process.

ISAF is focused on reducing corruption in the GIRoA, especially within the MoD, the MoI and the ANSF. It has two approaches; one is to develop an Afghan inspection capability, to ensure that the processes that are chosen are being followed, and the other is to support local transparency and accountability committees, to which affected parties can file complaints about corruption. These committees involve all important local stakeholders, including women's groups. Even though it is not certain how much actual influence women have in these committees, the fact that ISAF has advocated their inclusion is commendable, especially in the light of a gender perspective.<sup>167</sup>

Other stakeholders, such as the GIRoA, the International Police Coordination Board and other members of the international community, are also involved in the process of transitioning towards the implementation of the post-2014 NATO mission. The extent of the influence of the other stakeholders is uncertain,<sup>168</sup> and given the importance of the transition, it is notable that women's groups are not well represented. There are no Afghan women on the transition board, for example, which deals with matters that are important for Afghanistan's future security.<sup>169</sup>

ISAF supports the peace and reintegration process mainly through the Force Reintegration Cell. There are women represented in the High Peace Council and the Provincial Peace Committees (PPC), but their influence has so far been limited.<sup>170</sup> Women are not involved in the vetting of former members of Armed Opposition Groups, which may result in increase in threats to security for women, and others<sup>171</sup> The intentions of ISAF and the various stakeholders included in the APRP process may be hampered by neglecting to include women, who not only have grievances that need to be identified, but who can also be a constructive force in the success of the transition.

At the RC level, attempts have been made to identify women as key leaders; however, they are rarely considered to be crucial to the implementation of ISAF's mission objectives, nor are they present when decisions about operations are being made. The Review considers this to be a lost opportunity, from several perspectives; for example, from the population-centric COIN perspective; and from both the intelligence and the protection perspectives.

ISAF has missed many opportunities for better understanding the Afghan context, and finding alternative ways of dealing with the conflict, in, for example, the resolution of disputes and in preventing its own unintentional harming of the civil population. Today, ISAF mainly operates on the basis of a simplified and stereotypical understanding of the role and situation of Afghan women. Through its interaction with women actors, ISAF has the opportunity to serve as a role model; in its enhancement of gender equality, it adds legitimacy to the participation and equality of women in Afghan society.

### ***ISAF's results in relation to Bi-SCD 40-1***

To summarize the gender achievements of ISAF so far, they are based on the presence of the GENADs. The GENADs are largely left to address the major challenges before them with their own skills and training. They have received management support in varying degrees, and are also assisted by initiatives taken by a few committed individuals and nations who have an interest in gender issues. In addition, the presence of women soldiers has allowed initiatives that appear to have occasionally increased the effectiveness of ISAF's activities on the tactical level. Considered together, these assets have assisted in the recruitment of women by the ANSF and also enabled ISAF to conduct some outreach to women.

There has been limited focus on fulfilling Bi-SCD 40-1 in ISAF; the Directive was not known to most respondents. The various local gender-related initiatives cannot be considered as being so much guided by policy, but as being adaptations to having to operate in a highly gender-separated society. The Review found only limited evidence of

gender mainstreaming in operational and intelligence products, nor and could not find any indications that NATO's efforts in the gender field have increased the security for women and men in Afghanistan in anything but a minor way.

The factors that appear to have obstructed the progress of gender work within ISAF include the low level of training and understanding regarding gender issues; the limited mobility, due to security concerns, that GENADs are allowed;<sup>172</sup> the number of vacancies among GENADs (one position at ISAF HQ is still vacant, and the IJC GENAD position was left vacant for most of 2012);<sup>173</sup> the lack of tools for gender analysis;<sup>174</sup> the dependency on the skills and inclinations of a few individuals, which can quickly change as people rotate in and out of theatre;<sup>175</sup> the perceived need to prioritize between gender and other pressing issues during an on-going conflict;<sup>176</sup> the confusion of gender issues with women's issues; and the attitudes about their profession that prevail among men in ISAF.<sup>177</sup>

In sum, it can be stated with confidence that ISAF has made a modest degree of progress in implementing a gender perspective, but that the improvement has mostly been driven by committed individuals, and rarely institutionalized (notwithstanding the measures discussed above). The level of effort observed during the period of the Review appears to be insufficient for achieving sustainable results before 2014; a clearer, consistent focus and greater allocation of resources are required in order to permit a reasonable chance of success.

### **3.4.3 Sustainability**

As a criterion for this Review, the notion of sustainability speaks to whether the benefits that have been achieved by a NATO mission are likely to remain when the assistance has come to a close.<sup>178</sup> In general, assessing sustainability before assistance has ended is hampered by substantial uncertainties, but in the context of ISAF, beginning the assessment with a consideration of the achievements that have been attained in capacity-building provides reasonable substance to the discussion. ISAF's capacity-building is focused on the ANSF, the MoD and the MoI. When it comes to gender work, the GIRoA has built up gender units at both the MoD and the MoI.<sup>179</sup> Both the ANP and the ANA have recruited women into their forces. There are reports of policewomen being harassed by their colleagues in the ANP, while the Review is not aware of reports of similar problems in the ANA.<sup>180</sup>

Women personnel in the ANSF also report that they have received threats when they have been about to go on leave, as have their families.<sup>181</sup> During the Review Team's visit, the recruitment of women to both the ANA and the ANP had ceased. Afghan representatives explained that this is due to the high rate of illiteracy among Afghan women, the reluctance of families to allow their daughters to join the security forces, and a desire to retain the ethnic balance in the ANSF.<sup>182</sup> ISAF and other IC representatives believe that Afghan work with regard to gender is not driven by locally-defined needs, but is largely conducted to satisfy donor agendas.<sup>183</sup> There is clearly a risk that the current stop in female recruitment will continue, and that there will be reverses in the situation for women in the ANSF.

ISAF is also assisting with capacity-building in counter-corruption work, mainly in the ANSF. ISAF personnel assess that these efforts will mainly have an impact on corruption at the lower levels. In this work, ISAF has taken steps to ensure that women are present in the committees that handle complaints in the corruption cases regarding the ANSF. ISAF efforts in the counter-corruption area are intended to continue after 2014, as part of the follow-on operation.<sup>184</sup> Since ISAF will not have a presence in the provinces after 2014, there is clearly a risk that the influence of women will eventually be eroded once more.

ISAF's main support to the peace process is through the work in the Force Reintegration Cell. ISAF's role here is primarily to support the reintegration of former fighters in the Armed Opposition Groups, but it also works with the national and province peace

committees. Women have been invited to these councils, but they generally feel that their influence is limited.<sup>185</sup> There is a definite risk that the limited gains in influence achieved by women in the peace councils will be reversed.

In summary, there have been pronounced gains in working from a gender perspective in both the ANSF, in the counter-corruption process and in the peace process. A hand-over process is in place, but it is not certain how effective it will be. All of these gains face interdependent risks of being rolled back, however, unless the international community can muster the resources for further police reform, and for an improvement of the overall situation for women in Afghanistan.

### **3.5 Summary**

During the course of this Review, it has become clear that, in Afghanistan, the stratified relations between men and women, and women's subordinated role, are key factors that contribute to enhanced awareness of the importance of a gender perspective in ISAF's operations. The previous COMISAF, General John R. Allen, pushed for gender mainstreaming as an element of the COIN doctrine. The COIN strategy is population-centric, although the population has often been defined as men. At all levels, gender is a factor that has to be taken into account in order to fulfil mission objectives. This is particularly accurate at the tactical level, when, during operations, ISAF troops have to take into account the position and situation of women in Afghan society.

Gender work in ISAF is currently characterized by the individual initiatives of personnel who are working hard to implement a gender perspective in all aspects of the ISAF mission. At ISAF HQ level, they enjoy the support of COMISAF and COS. COMISAF has pushed gender mainstreaming as a critical element of the COIN strategy. These individuals are frequently met with a lack of understanding of the purpose and suitability of these activities. Several GENAD positions are vacant. Gender Focal Points are not coordinated and supported in a sufficient way. Despite these particulars, there have been achievements, especially regarding the ANSF, but those gains are currently at risk.

The level of training about gender is generally low. Gender training is required at all levels of the organization. Given the importance of having leadership on these issues, a key point of leverage is to focus on training for flag officers, though at least some training is required at all levels.

Reliance on gender advisors is currently NATO's main approach for realizing its gender intentions. With the highly limited knowledge on gender that is available outside the gender field, the conclusion is that gender advisors will have to continue to be deployed for the foreseeable future in order to realize these policy goals.

ISAF's main analytical outcomes, the intelligence and planning products, do not factor-in gender as part of their core analyses. This means that gender, by definition, is not mainstreamed, which makes it difficult to leverage the accomplishments that actually have been achieved on the tactical level.

Counterinsurgency has been called "population-centric war," or "war amongst the people."<sup>186</sup> One important aspect in considering the population is to maintain a gender perspective, which needs to be factored into any estimate. This is especially true in a theatre such as Afghanistan, where the population is stratified along gender lines.

This lack of gender analysis and a gender perspective may have affected the ALP programme. The ALP is implicated in violence against women in Kunduz and Baghlan. Had a more thorough analysis been conducted, it is possible that these problems could have been foreseen.

The prerequisites for mainstreaming a gender perspective into operational and intelligence products should include:

- the determination of the leadership to focus on gender mainstreaming;
- the incorporation of a gender perspective into the tools that support the work of staff in intelligence, planning, operations and assessment; the training of personnel;
- the routine inclusion of a gender perspective—including gender roles and the gender-conflict nexus—in the information made available at both the national and local levels in Afghanistan.

Another important condition for success is the provision by senior leadership of support and advocacy on gender mainstreaming. If NATO aims to support the development of a gender perspective in Afghanistan, then maintaining a constant and steady focus by NATO’s civilian and military leadership, as well as by senior leaders in alliance and partner countries, is a key imperative.

Many of the respondents to this Review made comments to the effect that Afghanistan is “stuck in a previous era.”<sup>187</sup> That viewpoint rests on the unstated assumption that development towards modernity is an inevitable force that will eventually transform all nations in a similar fashion and in more or less the same sequence, and that those changes will largely be for the betterment of the situation of women. That may indeed be the case, but there are no strong arguments for excluding other alternative futures. The vision of inevitable progress is also sometimes used as an argument *against* addressing matters of gender; according to that position, other pressing needs are deemed to have even greater priority. This vision of progress is not a certain fact, and there is no historical basis for assuming that there is a “correct” sequence of events.

### 3.6 ISAF-specific recommendations

The following recommendations are specifically intended for the force that is to follow-on in Afghanistan after 2014:

- focus NATO’s gender-related efforts on the ANSF, the MoD and the MoI. The main outcome of ISAF’s efforts to implement a gender perspective is the initiation of the recruitment of women into the ANSF. The sustainability of this measure is currently at risk; maintaining focus is crucial;
- do not reduce the number of GENADs that are deployed in Kabul. The GENADs have been identified as an essential resource for the implementation of gender policy, especially by those that work with the GIRoA and the ANSF. It is not at all certain that the general level of gender training will increase fast enough to ensure that gender policy can be implemented without the support of the GENADs. Ensure that GENADs can interact with other stakeholders on gender mainstreaming; that requires mobility. Ensure that Gender Focal Points are trained, supported and coordinated.
- emphasize a gender perspective in messages from senior leaders, both civilian and military. Many respondents underline the need for a consistent message on gender in order for the effort to be sustainable in Afghanistan;
- If NATO continues to be the main provider of trainers and mentors to the ANP, it is important that what is required to turn the ANP into a community police force is considered carefully. The current weak rule of law is especially harmful to vulnerable groups, which, in Afghanistan, includes women;
- it should be mandatory that all personnel who deploy to Afghanistan participate in gender training. It is important to train both senior leaders and staff personnel, and the training needs to be specifically designed for each group;

- identify women key leaders at all levels, and include them in transition and transformation, and other relevant efforts; and develop a strategy for partnering with Afghan women leaders and women's groups, and for incorporating the advice and concerns that they have, related to ISAFs mission, in an optimal fashion.
- Continue the support to capacity building of ANSF with a special focus on women military and police.

## 4 KFOR

### 4.1 Background - history and mandate

Kosovo has a mixed population of which the majority is ethnic Albanian. The region enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the former Yugoslavia until 1989, when Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, altered the status of the region, by removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade. The Kosovar Albanians strongly opposed the move. During 1998, open conflict emerged between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovo-Albanian forces. The international community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences and the risk of its spreading to other countries.<sup>188</sup> During this period, rapes of Kosovo-Albanian women by Yugoslav state agents became commonplace.<sup>189</sup>

In 1998, Kosovo-Albanians initiated armed resistance through the recently-formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which attacked Serbian security forces in rural Kosovo. Serbian retaliation measures resulted in 300,000 displaced Kosovo-Albanians. In response to this volatile situation, the international community organised the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), under the auspices of OSCE.<sup>190</sup>

In February of the following year, fighting resumed even as negotiations were being conducted. Actions included orchestrated rape campaigns. The KVM was withdrawn from the region, and NATO initiated Operation Allied Force, with air attacks against Yugoslav forces. The sorties ceased with Milosevic's capitulation, and his signing of the Military-Technical Agreement.

In June 1999, the UN Security Council passed resolution UNSCR 1244, welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles for a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces.<sup>191</sup>

The principles included, among others, an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; the withdrawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic; deployment of an effective international and security presence; with substantial NATO participation in the security presence and unified command and control; establishment of an interim administration; the safe and free return of all refugees; a political process providing for substantial self-government, as well as the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); and a comprehensive approach to the economic development of the crisis region. In addition to specifying KFOR's mandate, UNSCR 1244 authorized the international civilian presence to act as an interim administration, which would be deployed as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Mission was mandated to help ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and to advance regional stability in the western Balkans.<sup>192</sup>

In March 2004, Kosovo-Albanians initiated attacks on Kosovo-Serb communities all over Kosovo, displacing many Serbs. In 2007, the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, presented his *Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement*. The Proposal recommended that Kosovo should be declared independent and that this independence initially be supervised by an international civilian and military presence. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. This declaration has not been recognised by all countries, leaving Kosovo's legal status undefined.<sup>193</sup>

The Proposal stated that NATO should maintain a military mission in Kosovo to continue KFOR's task of providing a safe and secure environment, until Kosovo's institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities. It also stated that the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) should be established and that NATO's continued military

presence should bear the responsibility for its development and training, as well as the establishment of a civilian structure to oversee it.

After a period of relative calm, new tensions arose when, in July, 2011, the Kosovo Police attempted to take over two customs gates in northern Kosovo. This led to a tit-for-tat sequence of events throughout the autumn, and involved KFOR. Serbian activists erected check-points on the roads in the north, eventually denying control to Kosovar authorities.<sup>194</sup> In December, 2012, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina led to implementation of joint border controls, as an accommodation to the concurrent claims by the two parties.<sup>195</sup>

On 19 April 2013, the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo initialled an agreement, which was reached after two years of talks (the so-called Dialogue). The agreement provides some autonomy for the roughly 40,000 Serbs in northern Kosovo who refuse to recognize Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, while preserving the Kosovo government's overall legal authority. At the time of writing, no further details about the dialogue process have been forthcoming, although it bodes well for sustainable peace in the region.<sup>196</sup>

Image 4-1: Map of Kosovo, NATO



## 4.2 Conflict Analysis

The analysis of the conflict has identified four factors that have an influence on, or exacerbate instability and local conflicts, in Kosovo:

1. the status of Kosovo;
2. ethnic conflicts and stratification;
3. the nexus between lack of rule law, organized crime and corruption;
4. traditional justice and clan based family structures.

Each of these factors is either manifested through gender inequality, or is detrimental to women's security, rights and participation. Even though some conflicts are local, the structural root causes can be found at the national level, in, for example, corruption and the weak rule of law. These factors are connected; the weak rule of law and high levels of corruption allow local conflict, whether based on ethnicity or traditional blood feuds, to arise.

### 4.2.1 The status of Kosovo

The goal of Kosovo's government is to obtain full recognition as an independent state. The government appears to be able to implement its agreements with Serbia. However, it has been less successful in handling other sources of tension, such as corruption and organized crime. The uncertain status of Kosovo, as a state, is linked to the difficulties in creating a legal system, and has resulted in a weakening of the rule of law. An example of this is the lack of border control regulations, which enables cross-border smuggling and trafficking of women. The weak rule of law has further aggravated corruption and organized crime, which hampers the government's ability to act.<sup>197</sup>

### 4.2.2 Ethnic conflicts and stratification

Ethnicity permeates almost all aspects of life in Kosovo. The conflict is often defined as ethnic, between primarily Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, which is expressed in local tension and various incidents.<sup>198</sup> The area around Mitrovica is the main scene for such conflicts, which have an immediate impact in both Pristina and Belgrade. There are indications that the language divide is growing, and that young people seldom learn the other group's mother tongue,<sup>199</sup> which in turn further undermines inter-ethnic dialogue in everyday life.<sup>200</sup> Attacks on Kosovo-Serbs have also been increasing, especially in small returnee settlements in villages with an Albanian ethnic majority.<sup>201</sup> Businesses often operate in only one language, as do the educational and healthcare systems.<sup>202</sup>

Minorities such as the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians are extremely vulnerable groups. They marginalised and denied access to services, by the rest of the society. They are also subject to harassments by other groups in the population. Since the war, the Roma have been treated as traitors by both sides in the earlier conflict.<sup>203</sup>

Women from minority groups and who reside in enclaves in the countryside are afraid to travel, and consequently stay at home.<sup>204</sup> At the same time, it is important to note that the fundamental male and female roles are also largely intact in urban parts of Kosovo.<sup>205</sup> Women in Roma groups are essentially doubly discriminated, both by the stratified gender relations in their families and by the society at large.<sup>206</sup>

The Review observed that even civil society groups tend to be organised along ethnic lines, which partly influences the groups' priorities. These organisations include women's groups that advocate for increased participation of women in public life. They provide protection and services to women through shelters, vocational training programmes, literacy campaigns, legal and health advice, media campaigns about family planning, equality and trafficking, and in supporting gender mainstreaming.<sup>207</sup> These groups have

normally been allowed to operate without much interference, though instances of violence have occurred.<sup>208</sup>

Image 4-2: Kosovo, photo by Jock Fistick, Scanpix



#### 4.2.3 The nexus between weak rule of law, organized crime and corruption

While the constitution of Kosovo was described, by several of the Review's respondents, as one of the most advanced in the world, its implementation and the rule of law are weak.<sup>209</sup> There is a tendency to resort to informal legal systems, such as the *Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini*, the customary Albanian legal code, in which revenge and honour, among other things, are important, and relevant in relation to conflict in general. Customary legal systems, since they often maintain men's superiority over women, rarely benefit the latter. The legal code of Kosovo is said to uphold women's rights, but the lack of its implementation, due to the weak rule of law and the use of informal justice, serves to reinforce patriarchal traditions. The *Kanun* does not take women's rights or international law into account, which hampers women's possibilities for participating on equal terms in the society. Domestic violence is common in Kosovo, but legal responses are seldom effective. Women are also victims of internal trafficking.<sup>210</sup>

The *Kanun*, however, is also detrimental to men's security during a blood feud. In numerous instances, its use leaves men isolated in their homes, since the *Kanun* stipulates that an offender may not be killed out of revenge while at home. It is estimated that there are as many as 5000 such house-arrests. This increases the pressure on women, since their domestic responsibility intensifies. An additional threat to women in those families, are internally, from men who are forced to remain caged within the household.<sup>211</sup>

Corruption is common, to the point that many sectors are said to have such practices as a "standard operating procedure, including nepotism in hiring procedures."<sup>212</sup> These practices hamper equal access to power and financial resources, and are especially detrimental to women. In general, the ability to create sustainable structures that are capable of building durable peace is weakened in such difficult circumstances. Research has shown that there is a relationship between exclusion and fragility in post-conflict societies.<sup>213</sup> It has also highlighted the relation between severe economic and social, horizontal inequalities, including gender inequalities, and conflict.<sup>214</sup>

Closely tied to corruption is organized crime. There are currently 28 known organized crime syndicates in operation in Kosovo. They are involved in smuggling and trafficking<sup>215</sup>, and are a direct threat to Kosovar women. Poor families in rural areas have been known to give up their daughters to work as prostitutes in Kosovo towns.<sup>216</sup> Research suggests that profits from organised crime are optimized in a society that is “semi-ordered” and with corrupt governance.<sup>217</sup> The weak rule of law and high level of corruption in Kosovo suggest that it may be approaching such a situation; organised crime may see this as an incentive to preserve the status quo.

An additional factor is that the weak formal economy reinforces the sense of insecurity in Kosovo. The high level of unemployment leaves both men and women—the level is higher among women—with few options for supporting themselves and their families. According to the women’s organisation, Ruka Ruci, many unemployed men feel a loss of self-worth that leads to a higher risk of violence, including domestic violence. This group is also a source of recruitment for organized crime networks.<sup>218</sup>

#### **4.2.4 Traditional justice and clan-based family structures**

Patriarchal norms are prevalent among all language groups in Kosovo society. During the 1990s, such structures were reinforced among Albanians, when they were expelled from all formal institutions; the *Kanun* was seen by many as an option, since there was little trust in the Serb-controlled judicial system.<sup>219</sup> The *Kanun* reinforces patriarchy, through its stipulation of women’s subordinate role.<sup>220</sup> It implies not only the superiority of men, but that most rights, responsibilities and duties pertain to them.<sup>221</sup>

According to a EULEX official, among others, the *Kanun* is interlinked with the clan system that is still in force among Kosovo-Albanians, and are mutually reinforcing.<sup>222</sup> The clans serve as an enlarged family structure that permeates the society on many levels. Clan members are expected to attribute their primary loyalty to their clan; this was reinforced during and after the war, which left many individuals indebted to their respective clans, subsequently strengthening their leaders.<sup>223</sup>

The cultural and social particulars differ between rural and urban areas and constitute a clear divide.<sup>224</sup> The clans, and the *Kanun*, are not only stronger in the countryside, which also tends to be more conservative,<sup>225</sup> but are key sources of tension in the conflicts between Kosovo-Albanian families living there.<sup>226</sup> A consequence of this for security is that the freedom of movement becomes limited, especially for women, who are already restricted in terms of mobility.<sup>227</sup>

Most households in Kosovo have access to firearms.<sup>228</sup> Partly a result of the long history of conflict, it is even more entrenched by the low levels of trust in the judicial system, and the high levels of violence, in general.<sup>229</sup> This means that blood-feuds are often conducted with guns, and that the threat of armed domestic violence is always present.<sup>230</sup>

### **4.3 Gender and UNSCR 1325-related activities**

KFOR has initiated a number of activities that are either directly aimed at including a gender perspective in KFOR operations, or that have the potential of enabling gender mainstreaming; four of these stand out.

Firstly, the position of Gender Advisor has been created, at KFOR HQ level. Secondly, the Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT) have been created, enabling closer liaison with the local communities throughout Kosovo. Thirdly, Gender Focal Points have been appointed at LMTs; and, fourthly, extensive activities in building the KSF provide opportunities for KFOR “to show by good example” how gender mainstreaming can be achieved.

In the sub-sections below, those activities that have been identified as having the potential to improve gender mainstreaming in KFOR operations are first described. Following those descriptions, the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the respective actions are

assessed. Finally, the assessment of the actions is compared to the goals set out in the NATO guidance instrument, namely the Bi-SCD 40-1; this allows the identification of the degree to which KFOR has enabled the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its operations.

#### **4.3.1 Gender Advisor**

KFOR's Gender Advisor position was established in "about" 2010, which makes it a relatively new position in the organization.<sup>231</sup> Along with the Legal Advisor and the Political Advisor, it is located directly under the Chief of Staff.

The task of the Gender Advisor is to provide advice on gender for KFOR leadership. As described for the Review, the Gender Advisor also provides input in order to ensure that the gender perspective is incorporated in KFOR policies and directives.<sup>232</sup> The Gender Advisor also holds briefings to incoming staff, and conducts regular meetings with the recently-established Gender Focal Points, and is available for advice on gender-related matters.<sup>233</sup>

The Gender Advisor thus serves as the "specialist" on gender within the entire KFOR organization. Notably, the Gender Advisor has been a one-person office; during the Review Team visit, it was announced that a decision had recently been taken to increase the staffing in the Gender Advisor office to include one position for an administrator and another position for an assistant. As of April 2013, these positions were still to be filled.<sup>234</sup>

The Gender Advisor maintains and seeks opportunities for liaison activities with relevant organizations and networks in the local community, and shares those contacts with the appropriate unit in KFOR, as necessary.<sup>235</sup>

The Gender Advisor has access to a vehicle, and all the permits required, for being able to travel around the country for liaison activities, and permission to do so in civilian clothing, if that can affect the success of a visit. These features significantly enhance the effectiveness of the Gender Advisor's operational capacity.<sup>236</sup>

#### **4.3.2 Liaison Monitoring Teams**

LMTs, even if not originally created with a gender perspective in mind, present KFOR with an important opportunity for developing gender-oriented practices with good reach. The LMTs are located in all regions of Kosovo; they were established as a result of the unexpected, widespread and sudden outbreak of violence in 2004. The suddenness of the outbreak, its geographical breadth and the gravity of its violence were not foreseen. To improve preparedness, the LMTs were set up to provide early warning, as KFOR's "eyes and ears" in the local communities, with the specific aim of being able to identify potential disturbances, or tendencies towards violence, prior to their occurrence.<sup>237</sup> Some of the teams live among the local population, in field houses, while others merely have offices through which the local population can come in contact with the LMT teams.<sup>238</sup>

The LMTs regularly liaise with different leaders within the local communities.<sup>239</sup> The teams go out on foot patrols, for example, in the villages and towns, visiting local shops and chatting with their owners.<sup>240</sup> The teams produce regular and even daily reports on the situation in their area of responsibility, and forward them to KFOR HQ.<sup>241</sup> The LMT structure represents a capacity that can reach far into the local communities, with the potential for inserting a gender perspective into all of its interactions as the representatives of KFOR in those same communities.

Image 4-3: LMT, photo by Torbjörn Gustafsson, Swedish Armed Forces



### 4.3.3 Gender Focal Points

Gender Focal Points are appointed on a voluntary basis, and carry out that role as an addition to their other respective tasks. There is no specific training for the task, which is to bring the gender perspective into every aspect of the LMT work. To facilitate this, the Gender Advisor plans to hold monthly meetings with them.<sup>242</sup> The meetings are to be discussion forums on gender-related issues, and are intended to contribute to a general understanding among the Gender Focal Points of the importance and relevance of a gender perspective and gender mainstreaming in operations, which they would in turn disseminate more broadly throughout KFOR's entire organization. At the time of the Review, the Gender Focal Point position was still so new that the Gender Advisor had only managed to schedule and hold one meeting. In sum, the Gender Focal Points represent an additional potential for mainstreaming a gender perspective in KFOR operations, but the structure is too new to allow any conclusions about the activities or results of the measure, so far.

### 4.3.4 Kosovo Security Force

The KSF has primary responsibility for security tasks such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, fire fighting and civil protection. It may also participate in crisis response operations, including peace support.<sup>243</sup>

The KSF is mentored by KFOR, and is intended to be developed in line with NATO standards. The recruitment process reaches across society and is being carried out in two official languages, Albanian and Serbian. In August, 2012, the KSF comprised approximately 2200 active personnel. Its total strength, eventually, is planned to include 2500 active personnel and 800 reservists. Training activities and courses began in February 2009. The initial operational capability was reached in mid-September, 2009, with some 1500 personnel.<sup>244</sup> At time of writing, recruitment and training are continuing, with support from KFOR.

KFOR provides extensive support to the KSF through the Military Command Advisory Division (MCAD), who mentor and supervise it on a day-to-day basis, at all levels within the KSF organization.<sup>245</sup> According to the KSF, the advisory role of KFOR towards the

KSF will remain until such time as the KSF has been approved for full operational capability.<sup>246</sup> The KSF maintains that the assistance provided by KFOR has been and still is invaluable to the KSF's possibilities for building a security force of an internationally high standard.<sup>247</sup>

The KSF has produced a guidance instrument on gender and diversity, which identifies the need for the inclusion of a gender perspective in its tasks, on the basis of the different needs of women and men, the young and the elderly. The guidance document further highlights the need to focus on gender and diversity so as to encourage the KSF's acceptance by, and service to, all the people of Kosovo.<sup>248</sup> It also aims at creating career possibilities for women, by calling for policy that allows for maternity leave, and for flexibility regarding assignments and duties following pregnancy.<sup>249</sup>

At the time of the Review, in April, 2013, the KSF included a total of approximately 8% women.<sup>250</sup> The KSF is also actively seeking to increase the number of women applicants, as well as applicants from minority groups, through recruitment campaigns. The KSF also attempts to facilitate the promotion of women to higher ranks by offering women officers the opportunity of receiving education abroad.<sup>251</sup> The KSF has also appointed its own Gender Advisor at the organization's Land Force Command-level, with an expectation of eventually having access to all parts of the KSF organization. Such policies are essential for creating sustainable gendered and ethnic diversity in the security force.

## **4.4 Assessment**

### **4.4.1 Relevance**

The discussion of relevance hinges on the analysis of the activities that are part of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as restated through the NATO Bi-SC Directive 40-1, and on the conflict analysis that was conducted for the present Review.<sup>252</sup>

#### ***KFOR's conflict analyses***

Another important ingredient in assessing the relevance of activities for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is what the Review could ascertain about KFOR's conflict analysis.<sup>253</sup> In other words, knowing what the understanding that KFOR has, of the situation in which it operates, is central to assessing the relevance of the activities that it undertakes. This type of analysis can mainly be found in the various written products that KFOR uses for planning and action. Another important access to the thinking in this regard is gained via interviews with staff.

Staff members contended that gender is not an aspect that is relevant for consideration in assessing the security situation, and that the gender perspective therefore are of limited or no value to KFOR's role and task. This indicates that more training in the way that a gender perspective has a part to play in resolving conflict is needed, so that it can be allowed its due weight in the analysis, planning, or execution, of activities.

#### ***KFOR's Gender Advisor***

The establishment of a permanent Gender Advisor position at a high level in the KFOR organization is, according to the Review Team's assessment, a prerequisite for enabling a gender perspective at all levels in KFOR operations.

In practical terms, the task of the current Gender Advisor position has been described as largely limited to providing advice and guidance to the leadership level in KFOR.<sup>254</sup> The Gender Advisor has been able to contribute advice in the appointment of Gender Focal Points, and has provided briefings to all incoming staff in the KFOR organization, both of which are essential minimum prerequisites; their accomplishment signals another positive development in the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in KFOR's mission.

The Gender Advisor has established regular liaison with networks or organizations in the local community and amongst NGOs, and relevant parts of the KFOR organization, which can contribute to collection of information relevant for its task and role. This basic contact structure facilitates an overall understanding of the situation in Kosovo, especially with regard to the gender and security nexus.

### ***The LMT***

In being the “eyes and ears” of KFOR in the local community, the LMT functions as a form of early warning system. Through the functions and organizational structure of the LMTs, especially its local outreach and daily reporting, KFOR possesses an optimal opportunity for ensuring that a gender perspective is included in its operations and reporting.<sup>255</sup>

### ***Gender Focal Points***

The establishment of Gender Focal Points also represents an opportunity for ensuring a gender perspective at the LMT level and, by extension, all of KFOR’s operations. This requires, however, that the reporting from the LMTs includes a gender perspective as a routine practice, and that this is collected and included in general assessments at KFOR HQ level.

Since the Gender Focal Points are appointed on a voluntary basis; they receive no additional training for the task.

The organizational structure of Gender Focal Points is too new to enable an assessment of the operational results and potential, but the creation of the role is without doubt a promising development in KFOR’s organization. Although few concrete results can be expected at this early stage, the mere existence of Gender Focal Points throughout the organization has the potential of enhancing gender mainstreaming in KFOR’s operations, if properly utilized.

### ***Kosovo Security Force***

The Gender Advisor in KFOR has limited contact with the KSF. In addition to the KFOR Gender Advisor, NATO has reportedly appointed a dedicated Gender Advisor who is assigned directly to the Kosovo Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. It is outside of the scope of the present Review to assess the role and task of that Gender Advisor, but respondents indicated that, because of the communication with, and advice to, the KSF, the role it plays is significant.

The Review notes that significant work has been done by NATO in establishing a gender perspective in various aspects of KSF’s activities.

Mainly because of the guidance instrument, *Improve Gender and Community Balance*, the KSF has significant potential for ensuring gender mainstreaming, both in its organizational policies and in its operations. Although the specific and often differing needs, capabilities and expectations of individual women and men is specifically highlighted in the guidance instrument,<sup>256</sup> the KSF representatives refer to staffing achievements and targets when they address questions about the inclusion of a gender perspective in operations.<sup>257</sup> This is an important initial step, which provides a basis for further constructive steps towards gender mainstreaming, if sufficient attention is paid to the spirit, and specifics, of the guidance documents, and the positive example provided by KFOR.

#### **4.4.2 Effectiveness**

The assessment of the effectiveness of KFOR’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 is directed by the Bi-SCD 40-1 2009, in which the requirements for implementation of UNSCR 1325, as understood by the Review’s theory of change analysis, have been identified.

### ***Incorporation of a gender perspective in peace-keeping operations***

While both UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SC Directive 40-1 2009, call for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace operations, the latter also emphasizes the inclusion of women's perspectives. The mere presence of "women's perspectives" must not be mistaken as the equivalent of a gender perspective, however. Just as "women" should not be equated with "gender," "an awareness of women's perspectives" should not be mistaken for a gender perspective.

The Review Team has had difficulty in finding evidence of a gender perspective in the collection of reports and analyses that have been made available. Interviews supported the finding that women's perspectives are not specifically addressed, nor are they included in assessments of the security situation. The assessments are based on information that is collected mostly from and by men, although it is possible that the Gender Advisor's liaison efforts may have led to some fruitful inputs.

UNSCR 1325's call for the inclusion of a gender component in field operations is mirrored in the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, in terms of the latter's recommendation that Gender Advisors should be utilized.

The Gender Advisor is utilized primarily towards the KFOR Command structure. The Review assesses that the level of the Gender Advisor's office, in the KFOR organization, should enable the Gender Advisor to have sufficient reach into KFOR operations at HQ level, and to allow sufficient effectiveness in operations. However, opportunities for influencing certain parts of the KFOR HQ organization are limited.<sup>258</sup> Although access to the mission's leadership, when needed, or requested, is permitted, the fact that the Gender Advisor is not an integral part of the mission leadership limits both the reach and the authority of the position in KFOR.

The inclusion of the Gender Advisor in the mission leadership could therefore enhance the perceived internal authority of the Gender Advisor, and thus the effectiveness of the input provided to the various operational aspects of the KFOR organization. The Review believes that, while important progress has been achieved, the effectiveness of the work of the Gender Advisor and, hence, KFOR's overall mission, could thereby be significantly enhanced.

The Gender Advisor is also widely perceived as the person who is responsible for all gender-related issues, and as "the one" who provides "the gender perspective" in KFOR's operations. In other words, the understanding of gender is held to be the Gender Advisor's responsibility alone; even though the impacts of the Gender Advisor's one-person efforts at developing gender mainstreaming are commendable, they make it obvious that the rest of the organization could find inspiration in them for achieving corresponding gains.

### ***Adoption of measures that ensure protection and respect for women's and girls' human rights***

The adoption of measures to ensure the protection of women's and girls' human rights requires the inclusion of the various and specific vulnerabilities and protection needs of women, men, girls and boys in the analysis of security. The Review has not been able to find evidence that indicates that KFOR's security analyses include a gender perspective. With the addition of a gender analysis to those security analyses, it is likely that a significant contribution to gender mainstreaming is within reach.

### ***Identification of women as actors***

Interviews suggest that the actors who KFOR considers to be relevant for the security situation are primarily those who are leaders within the local community, and those leaders are almost exclusively men.<sup>259</sup> This has resulted in a predominantly male perspective on the situation. As a result, in a form of self-fulfilling expectations, a frequently expressed opinion was that the relevance and value of addressing women's perspectives regarding security-related issues is limited.<sup>260</sup> This provides yet another focus for a constructive

approach to Bi-SCD 40-1, with ample opportunities for training staff in the integration of a gender perspective in all areas of operations.

### **LMTs**

The LMT structure can reach far into the local community, since some of its personnel live in so-called field houses, which allows the possibility of close liaison with the local community. The potential that this provides for contributing a robust gender perspective to KFOR operations could be taken advantage of, however, in expanding the variety of intentional liaison opportunities. Experiences in the LMTs, so far, indicate that they already provide an alternative source of security for individual members of the local population, who have sought out the field houses for assistance when other institutions, such as the Kosovo Police, have been reluctant to act. This has been reported especially in instances of domestic violence. LMT personnel, although not specifically trained in mainstreaming a gender perspective, nonetheless revealed an internalized notion of gender that was useful in devising the appropriate and effective response in such ad hoc situations. This ability to respond effectively in non-standard situations is commendable, at the same time as it shows that even more application of this approach is worth striving for.<sup>261</sup>

Since there are indications that some LMTs address minorities only to a limited extent, and have the tendency to focus primarily on community leaders, there is the likelihood that only a limited understanding of a community is achieved.<sup>262</sup> In addition, the rotation schedule of between six and twelve months is problematic for the continuity of the gains achieved, and poses further challenges to the effectiveness of applying a gender perspective in LMT operations. There is therefore ample room for improvement regarding the implementation of a gender perspective, which would enrich the mix of liaison contacts and the way it is made use of; this can be enhanced through its standardized inclusion and role in the LMT's systematic reporting.<sup>263</sup>

### **Training**

The Gender Advisor provides briefings for all incoming staff in the KFOR organization, which helps to fill the gap created by the general absence of pre-deployment gender training, which only some countries carry out. Some of the respondents nevertheless revealed a basic knowledge of both the concept of gender and the importance of a gender perspective in peace operations. However, few respondents were able to describe how a gender perspective relates to their specific task in KFOR; this indicates the need for more training opportunities, wherein methods for operationalizing a theoretical understanding of the importance of a gender perspective can be taught, and learned.

### **Gender mainstreaming**

The promise of monthly meetings between the Gender Advisor and the Gender Focal Points may be a substantial contribution, if carried out, to the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in various LMT operations and, by extension, to a more uniform implementation of UNSCR 1325 in KFOR operations.

As discussed above, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is limited to the work of the Gender Advisor alone, which can by definition only have limited impact, and is insufficient for any programme of effective gender mainstreaming in KFOR operations.

The Review considers that the gender briefings that the Gender Advisor holds for incoming staff are an essential first step, but that they have the potential of enabling uniform implementation only insofar as the consideration of a gender perspective is fully understood and internalized for both individual staff members and in the organizational procedures. Only through thorough understanding of how a gender perspective is relevant to each staff member's task and role, and through its systematized inclusion in reporting and analysis, among other things, can gender mainstreaming become a routine reality.

### 4.4.3 Sustainability

As a criterion for this Review, the notion of sustainability speaks to whether the benefits that have been achieved by a NATO mission are likely to remain when the assistance has come to an end.<sup>264</sup> In other words, it can be asked whether all of the work contributed by KFOR, in this case with regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, has any potential for continuing to play a positive role in the future transformation of Kosovo. Since the primary bearer of KFOR's legacy, upon its departure, will most likely be the KSF, only the achievements with regard to the KSF are considered here.

KFOR's Gender Advisor, currently the key implementer of a gender perspective in the organization, occasionally liaises with the KSF. In addition to that contact, the Review Team learned that NATO has dedicated yet another Gender Advisor to the Kosovo Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, and is providing important assistance and advice to the KSF.

In regarding the KSF's efforts at gender mainstreaming, such notions as gender balance and gender equality were the ones most frequently used by those respondents who spoke with the Review Team. The Review makes a clear distinction between the inclusion of a gender perspective in operations, and the notion of gender balance within a force. Gender balance is also distinct from gender equality within a force. While gender balance relates to the number of men and women in a force, gender equality relates to how men and women are treated and enabled within it.

As the analysis above shows, the KSF has a clear and established gender focus in its policies and recruitment processes. It was repeatedly pointed out that, at the time of the Review, the number of women in the KSF was approximately 8% of the total, and that the policies adopted to enable and encourage women to join and seek careers within KSF indicate a significant potential for sustained gender equality in KSF operations. The KSF also actively seeks to increase the number of staff from minorities in Kosovo. This is further substantiated by interviews that revealed that the KSF is regarded by women as an attractive employer, since it is seen to provide a source of livelihood and training that improves quality of life for women. The measures being implemented by the KSF suggest that a good foundation for a relevant, effective and sustainable gender- and ethnically-balanced force is being built.

The existence of a Gender Advisor position at the Land Force Command level of the KSF organization is another measure that has the potential to develop a gender perspective in an effective, systematized and routine way that can reach into all of the KSF's operations. There appears to be significant capacity for effective and sustained gender mainstreaming in the KSF's operations, if it can be fully utilized. In addition, provided that the guidance instrument on gender and community is sufficiently promoted and implemented throughout the KSF organization, its implementation may lead to effective incorporation of a gender perspective on all of levels of the organization.

A difference between the status of the KSF's gender mainstreaming efforts in the carrying out of its assigned activities and in its organizational and policy-related aspects was observed. The central leadership in the command of the KSF are conversant in matters pertaining to a gender perspective, but this is apparently only present to a limited degree in its field operations. The possibility that trickle-down effects will lead to tangible results can be accelerated through a focus on concrete, tactically-relevant measures, such as more thorough training for all personnel regarding gender. This would, in turn, provide a necessary balance, and strengthen the comprehensiveness, of the otherwise top-down, but laudable, approach demonstrated by the KSF leadership.

## **4.5 Summary**

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion of KFOR's operations; the most significant of them are listed under the headings below. Several aspects of KFOR's operations that have been identified as central to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 are discussed in the ensuing section, 4.5.4, "Remaining challenges."

### **4.5.1 "Women's perspectives" versus "a gender perspective"**

Within KFOR, the notions of gender and of a gender perspective are generally understood as being brought into military operations through, and by, the women who are part of the military staff. The absence of women in the staff, conversely, is held to be a reason for the lack of a gender perspective in operations. Moreover, the implementation of a gender perspective is held to be the task of solely the Gender Advisor. There are also indications that even for those who express a basic understanding of the underlying, general reasons for assuming a gender perspective in military operations, there is often incomprehension of how a gender perspective is relevant for the operations and tasks at hand.

### **4.5.2 Theory versus practice**

While there is some understanding of the importance and purpose of gender mainstreaming in the KFOR organization, there appears to be a lack of understanding of how to operationalize it in the practical aspects of the respective tasks. There are several dedicated structural components in place, such as Gender Advisor, Gender Focal Points and LMTs, which could be utilized for encouraging gender mainstreaming, but they are not taken advantage of in a way that would maximize their impact on relevant, effective and sustainable gender mainstreaming in all of KFOR's operations.

The reporting and planning structures do not incorporate a systematic and structured consideration of a gender perspective, which undermines the prospects for gender mainstreaming in operations. This means that any aspect of a gender perspective that does occur in the operations is reliant on the capacity and initiative of specific individuals, which in turn makes its presence sporadic and serendipitous.

In sum, while there is some understanding in KFOR of gender and the importance of having a gender perspective in military operations, there is little recognition that this could, or should, be further institutionalized, and subsequently operationalized, in an effective and sustainable way.

### **4.5.3 The role of the Gender Advisor**

The role of the Gender Advisor is essential for any implementation of UNSCR 1325 in KFOR. The fact that the Gender Advisor is a one-person branch, however, significantly reduces the possibility that the Resolution is sufficiently implemented throughout KFOR's operations. The common misunderstanding that it is the Gender Advisor's role to be the sole guarantor of "the gender perspective" in all aspects of KFOR's operations poses a significant limitation on the prospects for the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in KFOR's operations. Apart from the Gender Advisor's efforts, this situation results in only random consideration of a gender perspective and little gender mainstreaming in KFOR's general operations.

### **4.5.4 Remaining Challenges**

In addition to the above main conclusions, the Review has identified several areas of KFOR operations and activities that, even though they lack a gender perspective, are important to recognize as being central to any effort to implement UNSCR 1325.

### ***Planning and reporting***

The Review has not been able to identify the formal inclusion of a gender perspective in the actual structures of either planning or reporting functions in KFOR. While respondents expressed a general recognition of the importance of a gender perspective, the Review, in spite of its various efforts, has not been able to identify any concrete initiatives in that direction in KFOR's planning and reporting activities.

In order to enable the mainstreaming of a gender perspective throughout the KFOR organization, the Review considers that the inclusion of a gender perspective in both planning and reporting is essential. Its absence, and the lack of understanding of how and why a gender perspective relates to the planning and reporting task and structures, undermines KFOR's ability to ensure a gender perspective in operations and gender mainstreaming throughout the organization.

Image 4-4: Officer



### ***The security situation in Kosovo***

Understanding the context in which any measure is implemented is essential for being able to assess its validity, effectiveness and probability of success in achieving the ultimate goal. An assessment of the security situation in Kosovo, as the context in which KFOR must work when it considers its gender mainstreaming aspirations, is therefore useful.

The weak rule of law, organized crime and corruption were also mentioned as factors that can threaten the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. An additional factor is the existence of customary law, or the *Kanun*, and its role in fuelling feuds in the country, with their impact on the security of both men and women.

The security situation for minorities is also relevant from a gender perspective. Minority women have been identified as particularly vulnerable; the tendency is for them to refrain from moving outside of their home areas, where they perceive that they are safer from attack; there is poor access to health care, which exacerbates ethnic divides; and a general sense of decreasing human security for minority groups in Kosovo.

## **4.6 KFOR-specific recommendations**

Being able to sustain the capacity to influence the implementation of a gender perspective in all areas of operations requires that the position of the Gender Advisor becomes an inclusive part of the mission leadership. This would enable the Gender Advisor to provide inputs regarding a gender perspective to a broader range of operational activities than those that have already been identified. Training about gender in military operations and the provisions of UNSCR 1325 and BI-SCD 40-1 needs to become mandatory in pre-deployment training, and complemented by in-theatre training. This would provide a platform for the understanding and implementation of UNSCR 1325.

If a gender perspective were to be included and systematized in planning and reporting so that it was performed on a routine basis, the ability and effectiveness of KFOR to enable gender mainstreaming throughout the organization could be significantly enhanced.

By tasking Gender Focal Points to have a gender perspective in their analysis and documentation routines at the local LMT level, this would facilitate the ability of new, incoming staff in each rotation to apply a gender perspective that is more relevant for the continuing LMT operations. This would contribute to an improvement in gender mainstreaming in KFOR operations, as well as enhance operational effectiveness.

## **5 Conclusions**

### **5.1 NATO—Political and Military component**

#### **5.1.1 NATO policies and working mechanisms**

This Review has revealed that, since the adoption, in 2007, of the NATO/EAPC policy on implementation of UNSCR 1325, NATO has made significant progress in integrating a gender perspective. Policy frameworks have been adopted and working mechanisms developed in order to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325 throughout NATO's entire structure. A significant and symbolically important step was taken, with the appointment of the Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security.

This achievement constitutes a robust platform in support of the advancement of the UNSCR 1325 agenda. The Review has thus not identified any urgent need for additional policy frameworks, or working mechanisms. The current challenge is to proceed with the implementation of the already adopted UNSCR 1325 and existing policies in the entire organisation—from the strategic to the tactical level.

#### **5.1.2 SHAPE and Joint Force Commands**

In response to political decisions, NATO's military component developed practical proposals and guidelines for implementation of UNSCR 1325, in the form of the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, in 2009, and a revised version, in 2012. The Bi-SCD 40-1 is a comprehensive directive, which provides adequate and relevant guidance to all levels in the military structure, including national armed forces. The immediate challenge is to disseminate and reinforce its instructions for implementation, since the Review established that few commanders and staff officers in KFOR and ISAF are aware of the guidance it provides. The vast majority were not aware of the Directive's existence.

In addition, NATO's military component, under the leadership of ACO/SHAPE, has established a structure for ensuring the integration of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming. This is being achieved through the creation of Gender Advisor positions throughout the organisation, which includes the JFCs; maritime, land and air components. This measure has been accompanied by the creation of Gender Field Advisors at the tactical level, and in the field operations. The main challenge with regard to the Gender Advisor structure is the dilemma posed by having vacant positions. If these positions, at the various levels, remain vacant, it creates a situation that will hamper the Chain of Command, which would in turn be detrimental to the implementation of directives and orders related to UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1.

### **5.2 ISAF and KFOR**

The Review's over-all impression of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Bi-SCD 40-1 is mixed. Although progress has been made through the establishment of Gender Advisor positions, Gender Focal Points and Gender Enablers, the integration of a gender perspective and its relevance to military operations leaves ample room for improvement.

The Review found that there was a higher degree of understanding of gender relations and their impact on operations within ISAF than in KFOR. This is explained by the extreme stratification between men and women in Afghanistan, in comparison with Kosovo, where women also are subordinated to men, but not to the same extent as in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, efforts at the tactical level would simply not be possible if gender roles and

gender relations were not taken into account. This is especially true when it comes to force protection.

The Review identified the following areas as pivotal to progress on the integration of a gender perspective in NATO's military operation:

- the dissemination and enforcing of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1;
- the regular monitoring and assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1;
- leadership, at all levels, within NATO's military structure;
- the activities of Gender Advisors and manning of Gender Advisor positions;
- the integration of a gender perspective with the tools used for assessments, intelligence work, planning, operations and reporting;
- the training of all personnel;
- the identification of women as actors.

### **5.2.1 UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1**

In both ISAF and KFOR, there has been limited focus on fulfilling UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1. In neither of the missions were the two instruments known to any larger extent, nor were they used as guides by the leadership, or commanders. Various gender-related actions taken by ISAF are not so much guided by policy, but are rather adaptations to having to operate in a highly gender-separated society. Little evidence of gender mainstreaming, neither in planning, operational, nor intelligence documents, was identified by the Review. Both KFOR and ISAF have various gender annexes attached to their OPLAN, but no presence of a gender perspective was reflected in the main bodies of those documents.

The lack of awareness of the provisions of UNSCR 1325 and of compliance with Bi-SCD 40-1 is detrimental to the implementation of the 3Ps. Protection, is of especial concern, since gender is closely interlinked with security risks for women and men, and boys and girls, and as highlighted in the conflict analysis, gender relations have an impact on both the level of conflict and stability in a country or region.

### **5.2.2 Leadership**

The Review finds that if ISAF and KFOR are to succeed with gender mainstreaming throughout their missions, then the support and advocacy of senior leadership is an imperative necessity. If NATO intends to support development of gender equality and improve protection for women and girls, a constant focus from NATO civilian and military leadership, as well as from senior leaders in alliance and partner countries, is a key ingredient for succeeding.

The Review found that it is of critical importance that military commanders at all levels—strategic, operational and tactical—lead by example and integrate a gender perspective into their actions. The Review verified that when ISAF's commanders understood and integrated a gender perspective, it had a positive impact on operations.

### **5.2.3 GENAD, Gender Focal Points and Gender Enablers**

#### ***Gender Advisor***

Integration of a gender perspective into ISAF and KFOR is currently characterized by the initiative of committed individuals working hard to implement UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1. At HQ-level the position is placed under the COS office. The Review found that these individuals are frequently met with a lack of understanding of the purpose and suitability of the activities, although they do enjoy the support of the COS. In addition, KFOR has only one Gender Advisor, which is not sufficient for the complexity and size of

the task. ISAF, on the other hand, has several vacant positions, including at the highest rank, OF6. These conditions hamper the sustainability of the Gender Advisor's achievements and fragmentise gender mainstreaming throughout the mission. Furthermore, the tasks and the placement of the Gender Advisor position are not coherent throughout the military organisations.

Individual commanders decide where in the organisation to place the GENAD, which impacts the perception of the position throughout the organisation and determines the focus of the work. At some Regional Commands in ISAF, the integration of a gender perspective is understood to be a stability issue, rather than as a perspective that should permeate all military activities, especially operations with an impact on the security of women and girls.

In sum, the progress being made in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in ISAF and KFOR is the result of the work of dedicated GENADs, the support from higher management, which has varied with commander rotations, and the efforts that are largely based on individual or national initiatives.

### ***Gender Focal Points***

The Gender Focal Points in the branches, divisions and cells are an essential tool for gender mainstreaming. However, the appointments are made on an ad hoc and voluntary base, which impedes coherent and strategic implementation. There is no "job description" of what their tasks entail and of what is expected of them. In ISAF, no coordination, training, or support, is provided to the GFPs on a regular base. In KFOR, the GFPs are identified and coordinated as a tool for the integration of a gender perspective into the LMTs.

### ***Gender enablers***

The presence of women soldiers has allowed initiatives that have occasionally increased the effectiveness of ISAF's activities at the tactical level. They are the FET, MET and CST. These assets have assisted in recruitment of women into the ANSF; enabled ISAF to conduct some outreach to women in Afghanistan; and enhanced the protection of women and girls during operations, e.g., arrest operations. In KFOR, the LMTs have the potential to become gender enablers, through their close cooperation with the local communities.

The Review found that some of these gender enablers applied a cultural relativistic perspective, rather than a gender perspective, on relations between men and women. Although cultural sensitivity is commendable and of importance in Afghanistan, it is crucial that the concept of culture does not become an excuse for not addressing women as actors, or for addressing the protection needs of women and girls. The review of ISAF reveals that there is general confusion about the difference between culturally appropriate behaviour towards women and the maintenance of a gender perspective.

## **5.2.4 OPLAN, intelligence, planning and operations**

The OPLANs for KFOR and ISAF, respectively, do not incorporate a gender perspective in the main body of the document, although they do have gender annexes. The main body of the OPLAN is generally read by a large number of the staff, while annexes are left to those functions that they specifically concern. The Review identified few staff officers who had read the gender annexes. In order to communicate the importance of gender mainstreaming, a gender perspective has to permeate the main body of the OPLAN.

The Review found, further, that the main analytical products, whether intelligence or planning products, do not factor gender into their core analyses. That means that gender is not mainstreamed, which makes it difficult to leverage the accomplishments that are actually being made on the tactical level. This lack of analysis may have affected the ALP programme in Afghanistan. It is considered by ISAF to be a highly successful program,

but it has had implications in violence that has been committed against women in Kunduz and Baghlan. Had a more thorough analysis been conducted, it is possible that these problems could have been foreseen.

In Afghanistan, COIN has been defined as a “population-centric war.” One important aspect of understanding the population is provided by a gender perspective, which needs to be factored into any estimate. This is especially true in a theatre such as Afghanistan, where the population is stratified along gender lines. Integration of a gender perspective has to be considered in planning and operations. The same is true for KFOR; in order to maintain a safe and secure environment, a gender perspective has to be mainstreamed in its operation, especially in the LMTs.

In discussion with staff officers at ISAF and KFOR, it became obvious that there is a need to mainstream a gender perspective in the tools used for analysis, planning and operations. This is exemplified by the reporting praxis of the LMTs. The integration of a gender perspective was not included in their routines or required, although.

The prerequisites for mainstreaming a gender perspective into operational and intelligence products are assessed to include:

- the determination of leadership to focus on gender mainstreaming;
- the incorporation of a gender perspective in tools supporting the work of staff in intelligence, planning, operations and assessment;
- the training of the personnel involved.

### **5.2.5 Training**

The main threat to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1 is the low level of gender training throughout both KFOR and ISAF. Some nations have mandatory pre-deployment gender training, but the almost unanimous majority of our respondents had not, as far as they could recall, participated. This is reflected in the lack of awareness of UNSCR 1325 and of the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, of their provisions and content, as well as in the limited understanding of basic gender concepts that was revealed in the interviews. Most of the respondents associated gender with women; gender is generally considered a task, and gender mainstreaming is defined as outreach to women.

### **5.2.6 Women as actors**

Women in Kosovo and Afghanistan are rarely identified by KFOR and ISAF as actors, or parties to the conflict. They are subsequently neither approached nor included in decision-making on interventions that have impact on their security and community. This is reflected in cases from both Kosovo and Afghanistan. KFOR considers mainly leader of the communities, which are by default men, to be relevant for the security situation. This has resulted in a predominantly male perspective on the situation, where women’s concerns, needs and priorities are not taken into the security equation. This is likewise true for ISAF led processes. Afghan women are largely absent from important security-related process and meetings, e.g. the process on the transition of security responsibility; the transformation process; and, the peace and reintegration process.

The Review regards the above as missed opportunities for both KFOR and ISAF, and a breach of the intention of UNSCR 1325 (3Ps). Through the interaction with women actors and stakeholders, a better understanding of the conflict and the situation in the communities could have been gained; alternative solutions of dealing with the conflict and other security-related issues could have been identified; and unintentional harm to the civil population could have been prevented. Today, ISAF and KFOR operate on the basis of a simplified and stereotypical understanding of the role and situation of women in the respective countries.

Both KFOR and ISAF have the additional responsibility (and the opportunity) of serving as a role model for the enhancement of gender equality. Identifying women actors, consulting with them and including them in processes of relevance, adds legitimacy to the participation and equality of women in both Kosovo and Afghanistan.

### **5.2.7 National Forces and sustainability**

ISAF has contributed significantly to women's inclusion in the Afghan Security Forces, and to the establishment of gender units at both the MoD and the MoI. Both the ANP and the ANA have recruited women into their forces. Still, joining the ANSF remains a security risk for women. There are reports of policewomen being harassed by their colleagues in the ANP, although the Review is not aware of reports of similar problems in the ANA. Women personnel in the ANSF also report that they have received threats. The recruitment of women to both the ANA and the ANP has currently ceased. This is due to the high rate of illiteracy among Afghan women, and the reluctance of families to allow their daughters to join the security forces. There is clearly a risk that the current halt in women recruitment will continue, and that there will be reverses in the situation for women in the ANSF.

ISAF is also assisting with capacity-building in counter-corruption work, mainly in the ANSF. ISAF has taken steps to ensure that women are present in the committees that handle complaints in the corruption cases regarding the ANSF. ISAF efforts in the counter-corruption area are intended to continue post-2014. Since ISAF will not have a presence in the provinces, there is clearly a risk that the influence of women will eventually be eroded once more.

There have been pronounced gains in establishing a gender perspective in the ANSF. A hand-over process is in place, but it is not certain how effective it will be. All of these gains face interdependent risks of being rolled back. The continued support of the international communities—post 2014—will be imperative to the continued participation of women in the ANSF.

The Kosovo Security Force has made significant progress in advancing the UNSCR 1325 agenda; there is a clear and established gender focus in its policies and recruitment processes. The policies that have been adopted by KSF enable and encourage women to join and seek careers among its ranks; this indicates a significant potential for sustained gender equality in KSF operations. Women regard KSF as an attractive employer, since it is seen to provide a source of livelihood and training that improves quality of life for women. The measures being implemented by the KSF suggest that a good foundation for a relevant, effective and sustainable gender-balanced force is being built. The existence of a Gender Advisor position at the Land Force Command level of the KSF organization is another measure that has the potential to develop a gender perspective in an effective, systematized and routine way that can reach into all of the KSF's operations. There appears to be significant capacity for effective and sustained gender mainstreaming in the KSF's operations, if it can be fully utilized. In addition, provided that the guidance instrument on gender and community is sufficiently promoted and implemented throughout the KSF, its implementation may lead to effective incorporation of a gender perspective on all of levels of the organization.

## **6 Recommendations**

### **6.1 Relevant elements of UNSCR 1325**

The Terms of Reference for this Review requested an assessment of the elements of UNSCR 1325, and related Resolutions, that are applicable to NATO-led operations and missions. Given the above conclusion, that NATO's policy framework and working mechanism is robust, the Review does not deem that it is necessary for NATO to prioritize the relevant elements of UNSCR 1325 any further, since this has already been done through the issuance of Bi-SCD 40-1 (2012). The Directive prioritizes its different elements and focuses on the areas of importance for NATO's implementation, which are protection, participation and prevention of conflict. The continued implementation of the Directive will facilitate the inclusion of women actors and stakeholders, the protection of women and girls, and the active participation of women in negotiations and in the mediation of dispute and violent conflict.

Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- seize the opportunity and devote itself to the implementation of existing instruments;
- focus on the dissemination and enforcement of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1(2012) throughout the entire military structure;
- ensure that the implementation of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 is executed and monitored and that its progress is regularly assessed.

### **6.2 Leadership responsibility**

Senior leadership's support and advocacy of gender mainstreaming in all military activities is imperative for success at all levels throughout the military structure.

Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- make gender training a requirement for the advancement to, and holding of, high-ranking commands;
- hold Senior Military Leadership accountable for the implementation of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (2012), through regular reporting on Directive-specific indicators;
- ensure that every Commander's initial mission analysis is informed by UNSCR 1325.

### **6.3 Gender Advisor - an imperative for gender mainstreaming**

Currently, Gender Advisors are imperative for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1 (2012).

Recommendations to NATO and all current and future Operational Partner nations:

- ensure that there is a roster of trained Gender Advisors, deployable to NATO's missions;
- ensure that Gender Advisor positions throughout the military system are filled and not left vacant.

## 6.4 The role of Gender Advisors

There is a need to define the position of the Gender Advisor in the organisations that are responsible for the field operations, and to develop job descriptions that are coherent throughout the military system.

Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- establish the Gender Advisor positions to support the Commander, and ensure that the placement of the position in the organization is a reflection of this;
- standardize job descriptions for Gender Advisors in order to guarantee that the roles and responsibilities of the Gender Advisor are coherent throughout the chain of command, are not subject to the interpretations of individual Commanders, nor of the individual Gender Advisors.

## 6.5 Training of all personnel

The Review identifies the absence of gender training as the main threat to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SCD 40-1.

Recommendations to NATO and all current and future Operational Partner nations:

- make UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming a mandatory requirement in all education, training and exercises for military staff, at all levels, regardless of whether they are, or about to be, deployed in a theatre of conflict. The minimum level for Commanders should include doctrines, policy context and content, and facilitate the ability to provide leadership. Staff should learn what tools can be used to implement the principles of UNSCR 1325 and Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (2012);
- train trainers on UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming, with the objective of supporting on-the-job training;
- make UNSCR 1325, and specifically the 3Ps<sup>1</sup>, a mandatory requirement in pre-deployment training.

Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- ensure that in-theatre training on UNSCR 1325, specifically the 3Ps is held regularly throughout the existence of a mission (such as KFOR and ISAF).

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<sup>1</sup> Women's **Participation** in conflict prevention, peace-building and reconstruction; **Protection** of women and girls' human rights during conflict; and the **Prevention** of gender-based violence.

## **6.6 Plans, orders and tools**

The Review identifies limited inclusion of a gender perspective in intelligence analysis, planning and operations, and assessments and reporting.

Recommendations to NATO/ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS:

- revise relevant intelligence, planning, report and assessment tools so that they include a gender perspective, with the objective of facilitating gender mainstreaming through all phases of military operations;
- make the inclusion of a gender perspective and the principles of UNSCR 1325 a basic requirement for military orders, guidance and operational plans.

## **6.7 Support to women in the ANSF and the KSF**

KFOR's support to the KSF has resulted in a force with an integrated gender perspective. The KSF, however, still needs to implement its policy frameworks. ISAF has contributed to the recruitment, training and acceptance of women soldiers and military staff. Nevertheless, working with the ANSF is a security risk for women and their families, and their presence in the ANSF is at risk after ISAF's withdrawal at the end of 2014.

Recommendations to NATO and all current and future Operational Partner Nations:

- continue the support of the Afghan National Security Forces, with a distinct focus on training women in the police and military personnel post-2014;
- continue the support of the Kosovo Security Force, with the objective of facilitating the implementation of its gender policy framework.

# Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The phrase, “the gender perspective,” is the way it is stated in the original Terms of Reference. The difference between that and the preferred phrase, “a gender perspective,” is noteworthy.

<sup>2</sup> NATO, SHAPE, *Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions—Terms of Reference*, NATO OPS(2012)0461 (Brussels: NATO, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> This section provides only a brief summary of the methods used for the Review. A more complete description can be found in Appendix 1.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, SHAPE, *Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure*, Bi-SCD 40-1 REV1, 8 August 2012 (Belgium/Norfolk, Virginia: NATO, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> NATO, SHAPE, *Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives into the NATO Command Structure Including Measures for Protection During Armed Conflict*, NATO Bi-SC D 40-1, 2 September 2009 (Brussels/Norfolk: NATO, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> OECD, *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility—Improving Learning for Results*, DAC Guidelines and References Series (OECD Publishing, 2012). Two additional frameworks have been used in order to capture other important aspects of this Review. One of these is utilization-focused evaluation; it was chosen in order to make the Review as useful and accessible as possible for its main, intended audience. In this respect, the key approach was to attempt to maintain continual contact with the main users throughout the process, which included their being invited to join the field trips, and a number of reference meetings with NATO officials. The second is the UN’s framework for gender and human rights evaluations, which was helpful in ensuring that the Review reflects the global consensus on standards for this kind of assessment. See M. Q. Patton, *Utilization-Focused Evaluation (U-FE) Checklist*, revised January 2013 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Western Michigan University, 2002/2013), accessed 7 May 2013, [http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/UFE\\_checklist\\_2013.pdf](http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/UFE_checklist_2013.pdf); and United Nations Evaluation Group, *Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation—Towards UNEG Guidance*, UNEG Guidance Document, UNEG/G(2011)2 (New York: United Nations, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> “American Evaluation Association Guiding Principles for Evaluators,” American Evaluation Association, revised July 2004, accessed 7 May 2013, <http://www.eval.org/publications/GuidingPrinciplesPrintable.asp>; Swedish Research Council, Expert Group on Ethics, *Good Research Practice*, Vetenskapsrådets rapportserie 3:2011 (Stockholm: Swedish Research Council, 2011), accessed 7 May 2013, [http://www.vr.se/download/18.3a36c20d133af0c1295800030/1321519981391/Good+Research+Practice+3.2011\\_webb.pdf](http://www.vr.se/download/18.3a36c20d133af0c1295800030/1321519981391/Good+Research+Practice+3.2011_webb.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)/United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Gender and Conflict Analysis*, UNIFEM Policy Briefing Paper, October 2006 (New York: United Nations, 2006), accessed 7 May 2013, [http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender\\_issues/women\\_war\\_peace/GenderAndConflictAnalysis\\_UNIFEMPolicyBriefingPaper\\_200610\\_en.pdf](http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender_issues/women_war_peace/GenderAndConflictAnalysis_UNIFEMPolicyBriefingPaper_200610_en.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)/United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence—An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 5, accessed 7 May 2013, [http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Analytical\\_Inventory\\_of\\_Peacekeeping\\_Practice\\_online.pdf](http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Analytical_Inventory_of_Peacekeeping_Practice_online.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> UN Women/UNIFEM, *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 5.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security* (New York: UN S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000).

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1325*, Articles 1 and 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Articles 9-15.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 10.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 1-6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 6.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 8.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1325*, Articles 5-7, 8 and 16-17.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1820* (New York: S/RES/1820, 19 June 2008), Article 1

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Security Council, 5916<sup>th</sup> meeting, *Press release*, (New York: SC/9364, 19 June 2008), accessed 7 March 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>.

<sup>22</sup> Amy Barrow, “UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: Constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 877 (2010): 232.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1888* (New York: S/RES/1888, 30 September 2009).

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1889* (New York: S/RES/1889, 5 October 2009).

<sup>25</sup> UN Women, “Resolution & Instruments,” accessed 7 March 2013, [http://www.unifem.org/gender\\_issues/women\\_war\\_peace/resolutions\\_instruments.html](http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/resolutions_instruments.html).

<sup>26</sup> Interviews and discussions with Staff members at ISAF HQ and SHAPE;

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g. NATO, 2011, “How gender makes a difference to security in operations—indicators,” accessed 23 April 2013, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20120308\\_1869-11\\_Gender\\_Brochure.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120308_1869-11_Gender_Brochure.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> NATO, “Women Peace and Security,” 2013, accessed 23 April 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_91091.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_91091.htm).

- <sup>29</sup> NATO, “NATO/EAPC policy for implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and related Resolutions,” 2007, accessed 23 April 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-56926A04-32533258/natolive/official\\_texts\\_76395.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-56926A04-32533258/natolive/official_texts_76395.htm).
- <sup>30</sup> NATO, “NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions,” 2011, accessed 24 April 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-56926A04-32533258/natolive/official\\_texts\\_76395.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-56926A04-32533258/natolive/official_texts_76395.htm); NATO, “Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions,” 2010, Section 5 “Towards implementation,” accessed April 24 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68578.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68578.htm).
- <sup>31</sup> NATO, Bi-SC Directive 40-1, “Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structures Including Measures for Protection During Armed Conflict,” (Mons and Norfolk: NATO, SHAPE, 2009).
- <sup>32</sup> NATO, Bi SCD 40-1, Paragraph 1-1.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., Paragraph 1-6 and Annex C.
- <sup>34</sup> See the above sections on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.
- <sup>35</sup> NATO, Bi-SC Directive 40-1-Revision 1 “Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structures Including Measures for Protection During Armed Conflict, (Mons and Norfolk: NATO, SHAPE, 2012).
- <sup>36</sup> NATO, 2010, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” 2010, accessed 23 April 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm).
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# List of interviews

## **NATO/SHAPE**

Gender Advisor

## **KOSOVO**

### **KFOR Headquarters**

Com KFOR

Chief of Staff

GENAD

POLAD

LEGAD

ACOS J2

ACOS J3

J3 SO Training

ACOS JEC

MCAD Chief

ACOS Support

MCAD Vetting

MCAD LFC

MCAD RRB

### **LMT**

COM JRD N

Staff JRD N

COM LMT N2

Member of N2

COM JRD S

Staff JRD S

COM LMT S3

Member of S3

### **Kosovo Security Forces**

COM KSF

Gender Advisor

Commander LFC

Trainees of KFOR Mentors LFC (2)

Trainees of KFOR Mentors RRB (2)

### **Kosovo Police**

Captains (2)

### **EULEX Kosovo**

Political Advisor

Deputy Commander JRD

Head of EU Office for Criminal Intelligence

### **UNWOMEN Kosovo**

Staff member

### **UNDP Kosovo**

Programme Coordinator

### **Gender studies center**

Staff member

**Kosova Assembly- Womens Caucus group**

Staff member

**Kosovo Women's Network**

Staff member

**Ruka Ruci (NGO)**

Operation manager

**Network of Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian Womens Organisations in Kosovo  
(NRAEWOK)**

Executive Director

**Woman to Woman Sweden**

Field representative Kosovo

**AFGHANISTAN**

**ISAF Headquarters**

DCOS STAB

Current GENADs (2)

Previous GENAD (1)

INS team

CAAT (4)

Reporting and Assessment Cell

FRI-C (3)

CJIAT COM

CJ MED

DCOS STAB

CJ 5

Transformation Task Force

AFPAK CJ2

SOJTF

Assessment Team Lead, CJ2

COS

COS Office

Chief of staff of stability

Special Advisor on economics, development and governance

**IJC**

GENAD

Chief of training

Head of Planning

Head of FUOPS

DCOM Office

DCOS JOPS

CJOC

Director of future plans

IJC CHIEF J3C

COS

ATTF

**RC West** (VTC group interview)

**RC East** (VTC group interview)

**RC South** (VTC group interview)

**RC North**

Culture Advisor CJ 9  
CJ 5  
CJ 3  
CIMIC  
CJ-CIED  
DCOM RC North  
ANSF Development  
MA to DCOS Support  
DCOS Stab  
Gender Advisor at GPPT  
Chief of SOF  
GENAD  
HTAT  
TAA PsyOps  
DCOS Sec  
SOF, ANSF Development

**NTM-A**

Special Advisory Team  
Gender advisors, ANSF – training mission

**NATO Senior Civilian Representative Office, Afghanistan**

Deputy SCR  
COS  
Deputy Director of Policy

**ANSF**

ANA, female officers, Kabul (2)  
ANA, female CPT RCN AOO (2)  
ANP, Head, Directorate of Women's Affairs, Kabul  
AUP, COL, RCN AOO  
ABP, NCO, RCN AOO  
RPTC, student, RCN AOO

**KMTC-A (ANA)**

Commander of KMTC-A  
Head of recruitment  
Medical officer  
COS  
Instructors (female)  
Head of Female Training Unit, women, OF5  
Mentors (male and female)  
Female Soldiers, trainees (20)

**Dutch Police Training Mission Kunduz**

Staff Officer Rule of Law

**EUPOL**

Officials from Human Rights and Gender Office, HQ Kabul. (2 persons)  
Gender Advisor, RCN AOO

**Ministry of Interior, Afghanistan**

Program coordinator for Women, Peace and Security  
Director Human Rights  
Deputy Director Gender, Human Rights and Children Rights

**Ministry of Defence, Afghanistan**

Head of Gender and Human Rights department  
Deputy Head of Gender and Human Rights department  
Director of Family Supply Unit

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Head of implementation of UNSCR 1325

**Ministry of Women's Affairs**

Deputy Minister  
Head of Department, Balkh Province

**The Dutch Embassy, Afghanistan**

Deputy Head of Development  
Senior Civilian Representative RCN

**UNAMA**

Director of Human rights  
Human rights officer

**UNWOMEN, Afghanistan**

Deputy Country Director

**USAID RCN AOO**

Development Advisor

**GIZ RCN AOO**

Development Advisor

**Balkh Children Support Centre**

Director

**ICRC Sub-delegation, Mazar-e Sharif (MeS)**

Delegate

**Afghan Family Lawyers – MeS**

Legal Counselor

**Five Pashtun Clans, Northern Provinces**

Representatives (5)

**Independent Consultant** working with civil society and ISAF, 19 years of experience from Afghanistan

**Young Afghan Professional** working with international NGOs, Kabul

**Three Round Tables Kabul**

- Civil Society representatives, Afghan Women's Network and High Peace Council member (11)
- Afghan young male professionals from business and culture section (3)
- Afghan Women's Business Federation (3)



## Appendix 1: A theory of change analysis of Bi-SC Directive 40-1 (2009)

The directive is applicable to all international military headquarters, or any other organization operating within the Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation chains of command.

Chapter one provides an introduction to the instrument. The introduction provides a number of context assumptions, inputs, outputs and expected outcomes from a general perspective on NATO operations and missions. Paragraph 1-1 provides the overall aim of the directive:

*This Bi-Strategic command[...] is provided to the military organization and forces in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1325 to afford the Alliance and NATO led missions and operation the advantage of including female perspectives [...] encouraging a policy of gender mainstreaming and protecting women and girls during armed conflict.<sup>1</sup>*

The passage enables the identification of several main goals with the directive, namely enabling female perspectives to be included in NATO operations and missions; encouraging a policy of gender mainstreaming; and protection of women and girls during armed conflict.

The passage also contains some important assumptions relating to the background/context:

*Female perspectives are an advantage to operations and missions;*

*The directive (or policy) is capable of enabling gender mainstreaming;*

*Women and girls are to be protected during armed conflict.*

Notably, while the directive takes note of the obligation to protect “all children”,<sup>2</sup> the directive aims at providing protection to women and girls rather than to civilians entitled to protection regardless of biological sex. The directive also does not aim at enabling protection of women and girls outside the context of armed conflicts, putting the relevance of the policy into question for missions and operations operating outside the context of armed conflicts, such as peace operations.<sup>3</sup>

*This policy enables women and men to benefit equally from opportunities and responsibilities. The complementary skills of both male and female personnel are essential to the effectiveness of NATO operations [...]<sup>4</sup>*

Notably, the cited paragraph refers to the NATO organization itself rather than the responsibilities towards the host nation in missions and operations. It is assumed that the directive is able to influence how men and women are enabled and limited in regards to opportunities and responsibilities. More important for this analysis, however, is the clearly stated assumption that female skills are different from male skills, and that the skills are complementary. The differences in individuals’ skills, hence, are assumed to- at least partially- lie in the biological sex of the individual rather than in the training, experience or education of the individual.

Further, the different skills of men and women are assumed to be essential to the effectiveness of the operations. Thus, there is an assumed link between the differences in skillsets and effective operations. In the context of NATO operations, differences/

complementary skills can be seen as an input, and *effective operations* are identified as an assumed output.

The paragraph goes even further, and identifies that effective operations contributes to sustainable peace:

*Nato's operational effectiveness includes making a contribution to sustainable and lasting peace, within which gender equality is a key factor.*<sup>5</sup>

Sustainable and lasting peace is thus the expected or hoped outcome of the operation, and operational effectiveness is held to contribute to lasting peace. There is consequently also an assumed link between operational effectiveness and lasting peace resulting in the following causal link:

1. Complementary skills of men and women in operations (input)- effectiveness of NATO operations (output)- contribution to lasting peace (outcome)

The paragraph also introduces an important link between sustainable peace and gender equality in identifying gender equality as key to sustainable and lasting peace. While the wording provides an assumed causal link (although not exclusive link) between gender equality and peace, no clear link is expressed between operational effectiveness and gender equality. Therefore, there is not necessarily an assumed link between operational effectiveness and gender equality, but gender equality is held to be key to achieving sustainable peace.

Much like operational effectiveness, thereby, gender equality can be interpreted as a separate necessity for sustainable peace. Neither operational effectiveness nor gender equality can be described as activities or actions, and must therefore be held to constitute hoped results from operational activities. As such, the elements would constitute *outputs*, with the assumed outcome of sustainable peace. Thus, rather than providing a complete theory of change, the wording provides two separate and partial theory of change-assumptions that can be described as follows:

2. Operational effectiveness (output) contributes to lasting peace (outcome)
3. Gender equality (output) is key to lasting peace (outcome)

Paragraph 1-3 further holds:

*Through the uniform implementation of this directive, gender mainstreaming should become routine with full regard to operational requirements in order to improve operational effectiveness*<sup>6</sup>

The paragraph identifies uniform implementation as an activity resulting in gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming *as routine* is further held to result in improved operational effectiveness. There is therefore an assumed causal link between uniform implementation (input) and gender mainstreaming as routine(output), and between gender mainstreaming as routine (input) and improved operational effectiveness (output).

The paragraph thereby provides a complete theory of change:

4. Uniform implementation (input) results in routine gender mainstreaming (output) which leads to improved operational effectiveness (outcome)

Paragraph 1-3 continues, and holds that:

*Women should also be seen as actors to ensure a sustainable peace, and should be involved in all stages of crisis and conflict.*<sup>7</sup>

Paragraph 1-3 thereby also identifies recognition of women as actors to ensuring sustainable peace. Thereby, there is an assumed causal link between identifying women as

actors (input) and achieving sustainable peace (outcome), providing the following theory of change elements:

5. Identifying women as actors (input)- (unknown output)- sustainable peace (outcome)

Paragraph 1-3 further identifies women's involvement in all stages of crisis and conflict as important. The wording of women's involvement can be held to either be linked to the recognition of women as actors to achieve lasting peace, or be a separate statement that women should be involved. The nature of the aspect of women's involvement is therefore not easily identified as a specific element in a theory of change. Assuming, however, that women's involvement is linked to the ability to achieve sustainable peace, women's involvement is a key input resulting in the following possible causality:

6. Identifying women as actors (input)- women's involvement (output)- sustainable peace (outcome)

Paragraph 1-4, in turn, holds:

*Because of the importance of women in the military forces of the Alliance and the influence they can have in all stages of conflict of crisis, this directive seeks to more fully incorporate their perspective to enhance the effectiveness of NATO-led operations and mission in order to ensure Alliance success.*<sup>8</sup>

This passage provides a complete causal theory of change. Firstly, women are claimed to be of importance in the military forces of the Alliance, which is considered a background assumption or information on the assumed *context*. Women are also assumed to be able to have influence "in all stages of conflict or crisis (context). Due to these assumptions, the directive states that the *input* of incorporating women's perspectives will result in enhanced effectiveness of NATO-led operations (output), and result in success of the mission (outcome).

Thus, the theory of change provided in paragraph 1-4 is as follows:

7. Incorporation of women's perspectives (input)- enhancement of effectiveness (output)- success of the mission (outcome)

Paragraph 1-4 further holds:

*Realising that gender dimensions are an important component of such efforts, this directive seeks to mainstream gender issues in all phases of NATO's military activities, ensuring gender awareness throughout the chain of command; integrating gender dimensions in an operational context will be seen as a force multiplier.*<sup>9</sup>

Gender dimensions are thereby provided as an important component of "such efforts". Assuming that "such efforts" relate to enhancing effectiveness and ensure Alliance success, the aspect of gender dimensions is held to constitute an *outcome* of the efforts. Having identified gender dimensions as important, the paragraph provides an input of mainstreaming gender issues in all phases of NATO operations and ensure gender awareness throughout chain of command will result in the outcome of force multiplier. Thus, the paragraph provides an argument for internal capability that only (and possibly) indirectly will have a specific effect on the context outside the NATO organization.

The identified theory of change is therefore:

8. Gender dimensions in operations (context)- mainstreaming gender issues (input)- force multiplier (output) and
9. ensure gender awareness (input)- force multiplier (output)

Paragraph 1-5 provides that in order to keep with UNSCR 1325, gender mainstreaming will be requested by NATO to nations during force generation and manning conferences,

and it may include requests for qualified Gender Advisors. The appointment of gender advisors can be held to constitute an input (input either as an activity or input as a resource element of a theory of change that differentiates between *activities* and *resources*).

The very last paragraph of the introduction to the instrument adds to the understanding of the assumed context. Paragraph 1-7 holds:

*Finally, this directive recognizes both males and females (women and girls) are impacted negatively during armed conflict. However, to integrate UNSCR 1325, this directive addresses measures NATO forces will undertake in the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations and missions to protect women and girls.<sup>10</sup>*

The paragraph provides an important context, in which both men and women are recognized as victims of armed conflict. It also clarifies that in order to integrate UNSCR 1325, the focus of planning and operations will be to protect women and girls. This provides an indication that the understanding of UNSCR 1325 is that it aims at providing protection for females only. The paragraph continues:

*These measures are applicable during and after conflicts as part of NATO's wider policy objectives of enhancing security and stability.*

The paragraph thereby clearly recognizes that the obligation of providing protection is not limited to armed conflicts, but also for operations and missions operating outside the context of an armed conflict. This constitutes an assumed context, and is of importance due to the fact that many peace operations operate outside armed conflicts.

Paragraph 1-7 further states:

*The Alliance recognizes that women and girls are potentially more vulnerable than males to certain risks that occur in conflict situations and/ or in the temporary presence of military forces (whether hostile, neutral or friendly) in their environment. These risks range from condoned cultural behaviors, mild sexual harassment to extreme sexual assault and exploitation; historically, these vulnerabilities have been exploited deliberately to exert influence. Consequently, as this directive mandates, NATO-led commanders and forces must not accept, condone, facilitate or commit acts of exploitation against women and girls, and will strive to prevent them within their sanctioned power and authority.*

The directive thereby recognizes the potential differences in the risks that face women and the risks that face men, and that the mere presence of military forces may constitute a threat to the civilian population in conflict areas. When defining the risks that may face women more than men, however, the risks are limited to threats of different forms of sexual violence, or behavior relating to the female sex (such as condoned behavior). The listing consequently does not exemplify the risks that may specifically face women due to the social roles women have in the society, such as being responsible for collecting water, firewood, or travelling long distances by foot to sell or buy food items.

Moreover, the directive largely limits the input to protecting women from the identified risks by focusing activities on the behavior of the NATO forces. The directive holds that NATO commanders and forces must not accept, condone facilitate

or commit acts of exploitation against women and girls, and shall “strive to prevent *them* within their sanctioned power and authority”. Seemingly, the term “them” entailed in the quoted paragraph can be held to refer back to the named threats of condoned behavior, sexual harassment and exploitation. In such case, the strife to prevent such acts constitutes the only element that is not immediately linked to the NATO forces own behavior or activities. The inclusion of strife to prevent thereby opens for the possibility of providing protection of women from acts originating from other actors. The strife to prevent is, notably, limited to the sphere of the power and authority awarded the NATO commanders

and forces, and no specific policy or operating procedure is mentioned as a means of ensuring general protection from such threats.

Paragraph 1-8 provides some key concepts for NATO operations. The key concepts consist of *inputs*, or activities, to a large extent. The inputs are not related to expected outputs or outcomes, and thereby do not provide elements necessary to identify a theory of change. The inputs are still, however, of significance to the overall goals of the directive, and is thus of essence to the analysis of the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

The following *inputs* can be identified in paragraph 1-8:

1. Strive for a representative workforce
2. Integrate needs of females during planning (such as medical requirements, supplies facility accommodations)
3. Provide training on protection, rights and needs of women and girls, the importance on involving women, and cultural awareness
4. Increase representation of women throughout the NCS and crisis establishments
5. Include measures to respect international law on the rights of women and girls in pre-deployment training and training programs
6. Strongly encourage national training programs of international law and the rights of women and girls
7. Ensure adherence to NATO standards of behavior
8. Gender advisors to share and exchange information that advance gender perspectives in other organizations (UN, OSCE, EU, etc)
9. Analyze measures to protect against gender based violence.

Paragraph 1-9 provides input for manning principles, and is largely limited to recruitment processes inside NATO. The manning principles have been excluded in the present analysis, but may be relevant to revisit later in the evaluation process.

Paragraph 1-10 handles education and training, and offers a number of elements relevant for a theory of change analysis. Firstly, the paragraph outlines the purpose with education and training, and holds that it “will improve awareness of women’s perspectives and advance gender mainstreaming in NATO military organizations”.<sup>11</sup> It further holds that “the program will complement existing national action plans and directly link the policies contained in this directive to specific actions during peacetime as well as the NATO Operational Planning Process. To this end, the following are the minimum responsibilities to comply with this directive.” Thereafter, the paragraph lists five requirements, which in this context constitutes inputs. The inputs have not been linked to outputs or outcomes, but are as follows:

1. Include UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions in education and training programs. Review programs to ensure updating to most current related information and trends
2. Include UNSCR 1325 in education and training at garrison and deployed locations. Request nations to include subjects listed in national pre-deployment training- to aid in standardization
3. Use a Gender Advisor to assist commanders and staff in planning and conducting of training on UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions at all levels.
4. Disseminate related information to staff
5. Monitor, review and analyze the effectiveness of training programs

Consequently, a number of inputs for a theory of change are provided in paragraph 1-10; *include* UNSCR in education and training, *request inclusion* of subjects in national pre-deployment training, *use* gender advisors, *disseminate* information and *monitor, review* and *analyze*. The paragraph also provides one expected outcome from the request of inclusion of listed subjects in national (member states) pre-deployment training, namely *to aid in standardization*. Apart from a number of inputs, the paragraph thereby entails an assumed causal relation between *requesting inclusion of listed subjects in national pre-deployment training programs* and *standardization*:

10. Request inclusion of listed subjects in national pre-deployment programs (input)- aid in standardization (output)

The directive thereafter, in paragraph 1-11, provides an outline for the role of gender advisors, which has been excluded from the present analysis due to limited relevance to the study at this point. The study may find reason to revisit the issue of the role of gender advisors later in the evaluation process, but at the present time, it is of limited value to the analysis. Similarly, chapter 2 entails directives on standards of behavior for operations and missions, which for similar reasons has been excluded at this time.

Chapter 3 of the instrument, however, provides aspects of central importance to the evaluation and analysis of the theory of change entailed in the instrument. Chapter 3 addresses measures for the protection of women and girls in armed conflict, and provides important information on the assumed context of operations.

Paragraph 3-1 holds:

*Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions is imperative when developing strategies to address the full spectrum of crisis management scenarios. The Alliance recognizes that female perspectives, insights and skills add value across all its activities, and will pursue all practical measures to optimize this integration.*

The paragraph thus assumes that addressing the full spectrum of crisis management requires integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions. The paragraph further provides that female perspectives, insights and skills add value. Assumingly, the added value lies in crisis management, resulting in the following link:

11. Inclusion of female perspectives, insights and skills (input)- added value to crisis management (output)

The paragraph further explains that due to the added value, measures (input) will be taken to optimize integration (output)- assumingly of female perspectives, insights and skills. Measures to be taken to achieve the identified output of added value to crisis management include training, administrative and logistical facilitation and incorporation of qualified gender advisors. The listed measures are seemingly not exhaustive, but possibly held to constitute a combination of inputs which together will result in the defined outputs and outcomes.

The measures are also held to be crucial factors to enhancing NATO's planning and preparation. Thus, the three listed inputs together are linked to the hoped output of added value and the expected outcome of enhanced planning and preparation. Therefore, the following elements of a theory of change are as follows:

12. Training, administrative and logistical facilitation and incorporation of qualified gender advisors (combination of inputs)- added value to crisis management (output)- enhanced planning and preparation (outcome)

The paragraph thereafter provides an essential context of operations in general, and holds that:

*[...] it is important to obtain a clear understanding of the local culture including gender dimensions, and to take measures to promote gender*

*equality relevant to the operation. Lessons learned indicate that a force mix that is representative in gender enhances the sharing of information, knowledge, intelligence and is instrumental in garnering trust and credibility.*<sup>12</sup>

The paragraph provides an important aspect of the context for operations in general in recognizing the importance of understanding the gendered aspects of the local culture. This recognition of the gendered aspect of local culture is notably, however, not further developed in the activities identified in the instrument.

A gendered balanced force is consequently held to enhance sharing of information, knowledge and intelligence, which is further held to be instrumental in garnering trust and credibility.

13. Ensuring a gendered balanced force (input)- enhanced information sharing, knowledge and intelligence (output), garnering of trust and credibility (outcome)

Paragraph 3-3 thereafter lists a number of inputs; some of which are clearly linked to an expected result:

14. Utilize gender advisors (input) to ensure full integration of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in operations and missions (output).
15. Use gender advisors (input) to provide expertise to commanders and planners (output)

Provide mission specific training and information on gender-related issues (input)

16. Incorporate lessons learned from NATO, EU and UN and international women's and non-governmental organizations (input)
17. Analyze the need for implementation of to protect civilians- with specific consideration to women and girls and from violence, rape and other forms of sexual abuse( input) in order to comply with UNSCR 1325 (output or outcome)

Notably, women and girls are given *specific consideration* in the analysis of needs to protect civilians. Consequently, men and boys are not excluded from protection entirely. The threats from which protection is assumed to arise, however, are limited to violence and various forms and degrees of sexual violence.

Furthermore, the awareness and compliance with NATO standards of behavior is identified as an activity, together with the need to ensure that personnel are aware of their responsibility to report any allegation and incident of harm to civilians. It is emphasized that such responsibility to report be with specific consideration to the protection of females and from violence, rape and other forms of sexual abuse.<sup>13</sup>

Notably, the directive again gives special priority to women and to the protection from violence and crimes of a sexual nature.

The paragraph also outlines the need to, where appropriate, include women in activities that involve contact with local populations, such as CIMIC, investigations, information operations, public affairs and relations. Again, a main focus of the activities is on the internal organization and staffing of NATO operations.

The directive furthermore provides definitions of many essential terms, such as gender, gender equality and gender mainstreaming. One frequently occurring term not defined, however, is *gender dimensions*.

## Endnotes Appendix A

<sup>1</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-1.

<sup>2</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-1.

<sup>3</sup> This is in slight contradiction to the wording in paragraph 3-3 in Chapter 3, which highlights the obligation to protect civilians *with specific consideration* to women and girls.

<sup>4</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-3.

<sup>7</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-3.

<sup>8</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-4.

<sup>9</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-4.

<sup>10</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-7.

<sup>11</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 1-10.

<sup>12</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 3-1.

<sup>13</sup> Bi-SC 40-1, 2 September 2009, 3-3 (f and g).





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