



Security Council

Distr: Sw Course Exercise

25 April this year

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Swarlana of 25 April this year.

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1543 of 4 February this year. In paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Council authorized the deployment of an Interim Multinational Force (IMF) for a period of not more than three months. The Council also declared its readiness to establish a United Nations stabilization mission in Swarlana to take over from the IMF, support the transitional Government of Swarlana and to assist in the implementation of the **Kalari Comprehensive Peace Agreement** (CPA) signed by the parties on 28 January this year. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit recommendations for the size, structure and mandate and deployment of the United Nations force.

2. In order to prepare those recommendations, I requested a Strategic Assessment for Swarlana to evaluate the situation on the ground and engage in further consultations with the Swarlenian parties and other stakeholders. The Strategic Assessment started on 13 February this year and comprised of representatives from United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes. During a field visit from 13 to 27 February meetings were held with the President of the Republic of Swarlana, Mr. Jackson Ogavo; the leadership of **the Angels for a Democratic Swarlana** (ADS), several regional leaders of the **Brotherhood for a Free Swarlana** (BFS), as well as local civil society leaders, including religious leaders of Swarlana. The team also consulted with the United Nations country team, as well as representatives of the Orange Cross, World Bank and the wider diplomatic community. Attempts were made to contact representatives of the **Comboo Defence Units** (CDU) movement but to no avail.

Overview

Background to the conflict

3. After gaining independence from France in 1975, Swarlana was faced with many challenges on the political, economic and social fronts. The advancement of certain groups over others has fostered feelings of inter-ethnic resentment. Swarlenian is the official language, although French is still considered necessary to further one's career prospects. Historically, the French favoured the smaller population of Falin and offered them key posts in the government. This favouritism not only created a rift between the peoples of Swarlana, but also led to the growth of nepotism and corruption in the government. A number of small uprisings against the Swarlana Government developed into armed protests and organized violence, which led to a military coup in 1979 to re-establish order.

4. Rather than return the government to civilian control, the military continued to rule Swarlana until 1988. Under General Dictato's military regime, the country's economic, political and social development was stifled – civil and political rights were not observed, diamond and copper mines were largely allowed to be privatized by foreign companies and resources were directed toward the military sector. One notable exception was the Comboo tribe in the Leppko province, who swiftly accommodated to the military rule and played important role in arms trade between Cimos and Dictato's regime. The death of General Dictato in 1988 created an opening for the country's first democratic elections in 10 years, where Jackson Ogavo from the **Parti Démocratique du Swarlana** (PDS) was elected President.

5. During the first few years of Ogavo's regime, Swarlana showed liberal development and economic prosperity. In an initially popular move, he cancelled the leases for diamond and copper mines granted to foreign companies. Some companies took legal action against the move and maintained their leases. Over time, however, Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with enhancing his own power base. Since 1993, he has expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities through laws and administrative rules. Important trade permissions, including in the oil-rich area of Sureen in Koloni, were granted to companies based in the neighboring country of Ogavia, in exchange for military aid and investments.

6. While Ogavo was re-elected for three consecutive terms (1993, 1998, 2003), opposition to his regime began to grow in 1998 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Bori and Atsi members by his ruling – and predominantly Falin – party. Key government positions have generally been open only to those of Falin descent. Small uprisings occurred between the years 1998-2002 against the Ogavo regime and rebel groups were mobilized to challenge the government's hold on power. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or use of armed force, and eventually escalated into civil conflict in 2002.

7. In 2002, some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and much better organized rebel group known as the Angels for a Democratic Swarlana (ADS) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The ADS defeated the **Forces for the Defence of Swarlana** (FDS) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the west. In 2004, the FDS lost control of

some areas in the western highlands. Although the ADS's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program. The only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power.

8. Because of the strong commitment of the FDS in the west, small ethnic based rebel movements took their chance and attacked the government institutions in the district of Leppko. The uprising in the south was characterized by brutal violence against members of the Falin and Comboo ethnic groups and looting. While the FDS managed to prevent some looting in the Falin village, and evacuate those willing to the area under their control, Comboo people, mostly due to lack of FDS's capacity, were largely left to their fate. This moment marks an important shift of Comboo loyalties from their Falin brothers. Some of the small rebel groups participating in the uprising in the South subsequently united and called themselves the Brotherhood for a Free Swarlana (BFS). Leadership of this group is unknown and appears to be shared by the leaders of each rebel faction.

Security situation

9. The civil conflict in Swarlana has been mainly fought between government forces, the ADC in the western district of Tereni and the BFC in the south. The Comboo organized themselves in a movement called Comboo Defense Units (CDU), since they were abandoned by the Falin-dominated FDS. The CDUs was initially created for self defence but evolved to looting and pillaging of Falin villages and highway/gang violence; there have been reports of attacks on foreign resource holdings as well. Both the ADS and the BFS took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal. All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Swarlana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease since the beginning of the outbreak of the civil war.

10. Two armed groups emerged as dominant key players. The BFS's exploitation of resources in the south has helped fuel their efforts while reducing the Comboo's role in their trade. The ADS has received external support from the neighbouring country of Atsia. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of the ADS and BFS, as well as President Ogavo, to negotiate a ceasefire, which was reached on 20 December 2015 in Kalari, Cimosá. The Kalari CPA (peace agreement) and associated ceasefire agreement mandates all parties to disband and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including the creation of a new national defence force, Forces for the Defence and Security of Swarlana (FDSS).

11. The Comboo, lacking political goals and even clear leadership, found themselves without their main income from the natural resources in the South and were left out from the Kalari CPA as the parties were uninterested in reinstating their economic domination in the south. Mostly composed of youth, now unemployed and lacking perspectives for meaningful employment, the CDU movement splintered into a myriad of amorphous

groups which started taking profit from the relative lawlessness in the Leppko province, engaging in highway robbery throughout the province and gang-type violence in large towns, including Turon.

12. The level of general security in Swarlana can be assessed as “medium risk” due to: Fighting between government and rebel forces, poor economic situation, a high number of displaced persons, a low police presence outside of the capital, and widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest and smaller uprisings occur on a regular basis in larger cities, while the level of crime is high. Certain areas – such as those around Galassi and Akkar– are “high risk” due to the presence of landmines, IDP camps, and reports of random violence, attacks and killing of civilians by the CDUs. The same can be said about the Leppko province. Thousands of civilians have been abducted by armed groups, primarily by rebel factions, but also by the national army. Abductees are often inducted into the fighting forces and are also used for portage and cooking. In the case of women and girls, sexual abuse as “wives” of the combatants is rampant.

13. In *Galassi*, the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and the IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galassi, poorly organized youth gangs can cause a severe threat even to smaller military formations. Criminality within the IDP camps is mostly a result of poverty and hopelessness. The people in the camps are both victims and perpetrators of violence.

14. In Nullia, the sparsely inhabited central jungle region with very limited infrastructure, security has worsened. Finding shelter and refuge within the jungle, some armed groups have been conducting attacks on military positions on the southern and eastern borders of the district. While these groups have not been identified yet, it is suspected that they belong to the CDUs, who are extending their reach north.

15. The lack of authority in the *Leppko* district has resulted in an increase in the number of banditry acts by the CDU, who in addition to BFS combatants, conduct atrocities against the local civilian population. The CDU groups still also operate in neighbouring Cimosá whose authorities lack capacity for diffusing the situation and perceive the threat as limited and peripheral. Several independent reports indicate that the interrelations and interdependencies between armed groups in the South have become more complex. BFS commanders reportedly also profit from the CDU violence, despite the CDUs having initially been created to protect Comboo communities from BFS attacks. Former BFS rebels, especially from younger age groups, have also joined CDU armed gangs, which adds to the threat to the population. Some NGOs have also reported increasing targeting of foreigners and extremism in the behaviour of CDU units.

16. The FDS have remained in their positions after the cessation of violence. Four Infantry Battalions were deployed along the separation line between the FDS and ADS controlled areas, with additional three battalions deployed in the south around the area claimed by the BFS. There are reports that the FDS is not respecting International Humanitarian Law (IHL), especially with regard to the treatment of civilians during armed conflict.

17. Approximately 1,500 ADS elements have congregated around district capitals in Tereni and Mahbek, though they are still holding their weapons and have not defected from the ADS. It is assessed that the remaining 3,500 ADS rebels sufficiently balance the presence of FDS troops on the separation line. The returning ADS members will ensure the group's control over the claimed area. The remaining ADS elements have established camps of a few hundred each and conduct patrols west of the separation line. Following the official end of the conflict, the official Headquarters of the ADS in Alur has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre for the region. Some leaders of ADS are permanently in Alur.

18. The ADS operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the ADS is well accepted by some elements of the population in the west, while other elements remain compliant out of fear of the ADS.

19. During the fighting, BFS fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions; they maintain a frontline roughly along the eastern border of Leppko, which they have maintained since the ceasefire. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most BFS rebels, including those who decided to join the CDU groups, are still living in their home villages, and group together only occasionally. The loose structure of the BFS, as well as the CDU who additionally remain outside the Kalari CPA, makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed, however, that the number of active fighters has not changed.

20. The situation remains tense along the demarcation line, particularly between the BFS and the FDS. There are still doubts that the BFS will remain committed to their legal obligations under the Kalari CPA. During the last two weeks, several acts of violence against ethnic minorities were reported in their stronghold area by a number of international organizations. The commitment of at least some individual rebels nevertheless seems likely. The increasing number of reports about BFS rebels conducting joint raids with CDU units are also casting doubt on BFS's leaders control over their combatants and commitment to the Peace Agreement.

21. By contrast to the ADS, the BFS has not establish an administrative/political branch, have generally loose control in the region, and exercise it only by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Police

22. Outside the rebel-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high levels of crime. The role of the police is more symbolic than any guarantee of the rule of law. Police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. Police stations have little or no equipment, while the police training centre is basically a building shell.

23. In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the west, the ADS took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the BFS area there is no policing at all, with CDU/Comboo bandits/gangs operating freely.

Return and reintegration

24. Challenges remain in Swarlana in terms of the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. After years of conflict, many communities have very limited capacity to absorb the returning populations due to insufficient public services and land. Some IDPs and individuals associated with armed groups have voluntarily returned in some areas of Swarlana, including the western region. Return is difficult due to many mined areas, and is expected to become more difficult as the rainy season approaches and more roads become impassable.

Recovery and Development

25. The government of Swarlana embarked on a 5-year national development program in 2014. However implementation is lagging behind and it is mostly supported by the operations of NGOs. Government capacity for development has decreased as financial resources have been cut due to the violent conflict. Capacity remains especially weak in the southern provinces of Swarlana, as well as in difficult to reach rural areas. The central region of Nullia has not received any development, by either the government or NGOs, and has become more isolated since the outbreak of the civil war.

Human Rights

26. Swarlana currently lacks a Human Rights Commission, and requires support to integrate human rights into national legislation. High levels of arbitrary arrests occurred just prior to the signing of the CPA, and many of these individuals are still being held in prisons without due process or access to legal justice, or their whereabouts are unknown.

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

27. Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) have been prevalent throughout the conflict in Swarlana. Female ex-combatants, women associated with armed forces and groups, and female civilians suffer from trauma associated with SGBV. Support is needed to provide medical and psychosocial counselling services for these women, including PEP and EC. In addition, it will be required to reinforce measurements to prevent SGBV (food distribution, lighting for latrines and paths to latrines etc), especially in areas where combatants will be concentrated after demobilization.

28. Many men reported being subjected to SGBV as well. Although their numbers appear smaller from initial surveys, a sensitization campaign to encourage men to seek assistance to deal with trauma related to SGBV should be developed by the Gender Unit of UNSMS.

Health & HIV/AIDS

29. The conflict had a devastating effect on Swarlana's health system, damaging health facilities and decimating health staff, challenging health service provision. In addition, there might be an increased spread of communicable diseases, when ex-combatants and their dependents move within countries and across borders.

30. The deterioration of health services has particularly impacted women, children and the elderly. The prevalence of HIV, malaria, malnutrition is more noticeable in these groups. Further, as a consequence of fighting, a high number of persons with injuries requiring medical treatment are also present throughout the country.

31. The Government's Ministry of Defence does not have a Defence Forces HIV Policy. Therefore personnel of the FDS scarcely have access to HIV prevention, treatment care and support goods and services. The implications of the epidemic on the FDS's combat readiness are obvious. Swarlana has an adult national HIV prevalence hovering at 8%. More than 60% of people living with HIV in Swarlana are women. No nationally representative sero-prevalence surveys have been conducted, and available data is derived using crude and indirect estimates. Knowledge about HIV and AIDS is low, and attitudes and practices (regarding safer sexual behaviour for instance) are even worse. Stigma, discrimination and denial are rife and further impede access to services.

32. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by combatants of communities as well as Sexual Harassment and Military Sexual Trauma within the FDS, ADS and BFS is rife and of extreme concern. There are concerns of social stigma and discrimination against women and children associated with armed groups by receiving communities. Termed "bush wives", they are stigmatized. They are apparently blamed for the rising prevalence of sex work in receiving communities, and the growing HIV epidemic around the country.

33. It is also reported that alcohol and drug abuse, and other risky practices (such as ritual killings, blood sacrifices, cannibalism, sexual cleansing, widow/wife inheritance, partner sharing, polygamy and early sexual initiation) are widespread, particularly among armed personnel and women and children associated with armed forces/groups. These add to the stigmatization of women and children associated with armed groups and combatants.

Disability

34. In large cities, disenfranchised disabled ex-combatants have gathered on occasions to revindicate their rights. It will therefore be important to include them into reintegration programmes with other nondisabled ex-combatants and to eliminate barriers to participation - specific barriers related to socioeconomic reintegration (transport, etc.) must be considered to allow for participation of disabled persons in determining their needs, aspirations etc.

Public Information

35. In Swarlana, the Government controls the radio, TV and major newspapers. They are more an instrument of propaganda than a free source of information. International

newspapers are only available in Galassi, while national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the ADS has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station. As a result of the war, several transmission stations for radio and TV are not functional. Whole areas within Swarlana are without access to official TV and radio programs.

Child protection

36. Some children are in custody in the city of Galassi, and the UN has urged the Government of Swarlana to pardon any children that have been arrested. The UN Stabilization Mission (UNSMS) should work with the Swarlana DDR Commission to identify children who are currently involved with armed forces and groups to provide the proper DDR support. This is to be coordinated with UNICEF as well.

Mine action

37. The UN Stabilization Mission should be tasked to support the Government of Swarlana to clear mines in as many areas as possible before the start of the rainy season. Training of ex-combatants and community members to assist in the identifying and clearing of land mines can be supported by UNSMS mine action teams.

Roads, harbours and airports

38. Swarlana has a system of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the west and the north these roads also ensure cross border travel with neighbouring countries. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season. Swarlana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable against significant rains and floods and deteriorate quickly if not maintained. Use of unpaved roads during the monsoon season and the following weeks is highly uncertain. However, fighting and a lack of maintenance have left some parts of the road system completely destroyed or in very bad shape. This can especially cause limitations in movement and transportation, particularly in Hanno and Leppko. The two railway tracks running between Galassi - Akkar and Turon - Mavi are both operational but not dependable.

39. The international airports in Galassi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. The airport in Galassi is well equipped for handling heavy material, but space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles is limited in and around the airport. This airport is also suitable for deployment of personnel and equipment. The airport in Corma has clear limitations for handling heavy air cargo, but as a result of its location outside the city, has plenty of space. The airport in Corma is also suitable for the deployment of personnel but is limited in handling heavy air cargo. The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields, without additional construction work are only suitable for light

fixed wing aircraft. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galassi and Corma.

Airport	Paved Runway	Runway length	Paved Apron (Sqm)	Instrument Approach System	Loading Equipment
Galassi	yes	3200 m	40 000	yes	Yes
Corma	yes	2900 m	10 000	yes	Yes
Alur	yes	1300 m	-	No	No
Folsa	yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Amsan	yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Mavi	no	1100 m	-	No	No

Political developments

Despite the signing of the Kalari CPA on 29 January this year, Swarlana remains a politically unstable country. A transitional government was established on 28 March this year, consisting of the signatories to the Kalari CPA, with Jackson Ogavo as President. However, the government is struggling to consolidate its power across the country. The government has lost control over the western and the southern provinces of the country, and is struggling to consolidate control in the increasingly volatile borders of the Nullia region. Even in government controlled areas, the transitional government's administration's real power is very limited. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government's security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Additionally, the BFS, having gained control over the southern province of Leppko, utilizes its resources for deterrence of the government forces and has failed to curb Comboo highway/gang violence even in the townships. This violence spilled over to the neighbouring Cimosá, where it was reported 60-80 km into the country.

40. Political parties besides the Parti Démocratique du Swarlana (PDS) do not exist. Remaining elements of former parties have lost their internal structure and are represented by a few motivated individuals only. These groups are not very well organized and suffer from a lack of followers.

41. Realizing that political participation will eventually be determined by the elections currently scheduled for the beginning of next year, the leadership of the Angels for a Democratic Swarlana (ADS) is currently formulating a comprehensive political platform and is preparing for a long-term political role. With strong public support in the west, ADS can become a strong political party.

42. In contrast, the Brotherhood for a Free Swarlana (BFS) lack any parallel political structure that would enable them to transition into an effective political party. Support

for the BFS is based on frustration over poor living conditions primarily in the South, dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration, and friction with the Falin ethnic segment of the Leppko province. There is also a growing perception that the central government cannot address CDU violence and only the locally-based BFS can do it. Clear political motives and aims do not exist within this movement. Swarlana has no organized political exile groups in other countries.

Elections

43. While the Kalari CPA calls for free and democratic elections by January of next year, the current situation makes this outcome very difficult. After years of human rights violations, despotism, civil war and corruption, public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Effective political opposition groups are also non-existent. As a result of years of inefficient administration, civil war and large population movements, current census information and voter registration lists do not exist.

44. Subject to the adherence to the Kalari CPA and ongoing political will, the ADS is evolving into a political party and is expected to participate in the upcoming elections. The long term political role of the BFS however remains uncertain. Adding to this uncertainty are the armed and rogue CDU groups in the BFS-held area, which present a severe security risk in the preparation and conduct of elections.

IV. Recommendations for a United Nations operation

45. As foreseen by the Security Council in its resolution 1543, I recommend the establishment of a peacekeeping force to be known as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Swarlana (UNSMS). The mandate, structure and size of the force are described in the following sections.

A. Mandate

As indicated in the SCR 1543 - The mandate of UNSMS should consist of the following:

46. To support the transitional Government of Swarlana and all parties in the effective and timely implementation of the Kalari CPA of 28 January of this year;

- (a) To monitor adherence to the ceasefire agreement;
- (b) To assist the Government in extending State authority throughout Swarlana;
- (c) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;
- (d) To facilitate the free movement of people, humanitarian assistance and goods throughout Swarlana and across its borders;

- (e) To support the safe and sustainable return of Swarlenian refugees and internally displaced persons;
- (f) To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of immediate deployment of United Nations forces, particularly in the district of Leppko;
- (g) To advise, train and assist the Swarlenian law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions, including the judiciary and corrections systems, and facilitate bilateral and multilateral assistance;
- (h) To assist the transitional Government in the implementation of a DDR programme, including via appropriate action directed towards irregular armed groups in Leppko, and factoring in the special needs of women, children and disabled combatants;
- (i) To assist the transitional Government in security sector reform, including the creation of a new national defence force, **Forces for the Defence and Security of Swarlana** (FDSS) as well as police reform;
- (j) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction;
- (k) To assist the transitional Government with preparations for elections;
- (l) To monitor and report on the human rights situation and provide training and capacity-building in the field of human rights and child protection;
- (m) To provide support for gender mainstreaming, including training in gender issues.

B. Structure and concept of operations

47. UNSMS will be a multi-dimensional stabilization mission under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and consisting of military, police and civilian components. The mission would work with all relevant parties to assist them to observe the terms of the Kalari CPA. It will also identify ways of addressing the groups remaining outside the treaty and, in particular, engaging the Comboo communities in the political process. It would provide support to the Transitional Government in efforts leading to the restoration of stability, establishment of the rule of law and the installation of a democratically elected Government.

Build-up

48. The mission's support element would create the essential infrastructure to enable it to reach the required operational capacity within 90 days of the beginning of the mandate and to maintain that capacity throughout the different phases of the mission.

Security

49. The mission would use a twin-track approach consisting of both diplomatic and military activity in order to assist all stakeholders in the Swarlenian peace process to achieve lasting peace and stability. As the basis for this activity, an integrated civil and military headquarters would be established in Galassi that would, together with coordinated political and economic encouragement from the wider international community, ensure total cessation of hostilities and compliance with the Kalari CPA. Physical deployment by UNSMS forces to strategic areas and or domination of those areas would be essential. In so doing, UNSMS will ensure that all lines of communication remain open for the delivery of humanitarian relief.

50. A credible and loyal Swarlenian security sector will be vital for the country's future. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) under the management of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), will be fundamental in creating the conditions leading to lasting peace and stability. As stated in the Kalari CPA, the NCDDR, based in Galassi and established by decree, will be composed of members from all sides of the conflict (Government of Swarlana, FDS, ADS, BFS), with the UN as an advisory member. However, to this date, the inaugural meeting has been postponed several times due to conflicting messages from the BFS regarding their participation. UNSMS would actively support NCDDR in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the combatants of the warring parties. The Gender Unit of UNSMS should be closely involved to ensure gender-sensitive DDR programming that addresses SGBV.

51. The restructuring of the national defence force will be carried out by a National Military Integration Commission (NMIC). While UNSMS may be called to provide technical security sector reform advice to the NMIC, the training and equipping of a reconstituted Forces for the Defence and Security of Swarlana (FDSS) will be undertaken by the Swarlenian Government with support from bilateral partners and a European Union training mission. The size of the new FDSS has been agreed as totalling 12,000 soldiers with up to 1,000 being drawn from ADC and up to 500 being drawn from BFC.

52. UNSMS would be actively involved through its police component of 875 police personnel in enhancing the present capacity and subsequent restructuring of the Swarlenian National Police (SNP). The new national police force shall not exceed 7,500 officers with up to 500 being drawn from ADS and up to 250 being drawn from BFS. UNSMS would work with other United Nations partners to establish and staff a police academy. It would also support the operations of the new national police through on-the-job training, monitoring and the conduct of joint patrols. Support would also be provided for the reform of other elements of the security sector, including the establishment of a Border Police unit composed of 1,300 officers.

53. Effective protection of important national infrastructure, aid convoys and UN international staff, aid workers, and civilians under threat of violence will assist in the creation of a path to lasting peace and stability.

Troop deployment

54. Swarlena would be divided into three sectors. Sector Central would correspond to the area currently controlled by the FDS. Sectors West and South comprise the territory currently under the control of the ADS and BFS respectively. Sectors and force levels have been defined by a number of factors which include the centres of gravity of each of the two main parties, the need to monitor the border areas, locations of areas of humanitarian priority, administrative boundaries, lines of communication and the need to have a balanced deployment covering the whole country.

55. Deployment of military personnel would take place during four phases. In Phase I, three battalions would be deployed as United Nations peacekeepers. Primary tasks during this phase would include separating the warring parties along the de facto boundaries and establishing the interim Force Headquarters in Galassi. Logistics assets and other key capabilities such as engineers and aviation would also be deployed during this phase. To enhance mission capacities, a fully integrated Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) would be established to widen and increase the flow and assessment of information.

56. During Phase II of the operation, three additional battalions would be deployed, one each in Sectors Central, West and South. Main tasks during this phase include monitoring the ceasefire, securing the area, establishing Regional Force Headquarters in Kika and laying the foundation for further deployments. Limited troop capability would be reinforced by the early deployment of key assets such as attack helicopters and APCs.

57. Phase III of the military concept of operations would see the deployment of three more battalions, bringing the total troop strength to the recommended level of 10,000, including 200 military observers and 100 staff officers. The two sectors in the rebel-controlled areas, Sectors West and South, would have 3,500 troops and 3,000 troops respectively. Sector Central, which is under FDS control and incorporates the capital, Galassi, would have 3,500 troops. The military observers would be deployed evenly throughout the whole country.

58. Full deployment of troops could be completed by the earliest by the end of September 2017. On reaching full operational capability, the force would enter Phase IV during which the mission would fully execute its mandate, although many of the tasks would have started in the previous phase. Phase IV would continue for as long as is necessary to achieve the successful conclusion of the Mission and would lead into Phase V, the final phase, of downsizing and ultimately liquidation.

Humanitarian and development assistance

59. The Mission would work closely with the United Nations humanitarian and development agencies. The agencies would be provided with security protection, and where possible, the

Mission will also provide logistical support within its means. The Mission will cooperate closely with the World Bank.

Elections

60. Mission activity would reach its peak during the preparations for and conduct of free elections of a democratic government by the people of Swarlena. The elections are to be held by January next year.

Public information

61. UN support for the peace process would be closely linked to a convincing information campaign along with carefully coordinated humanitarian and human rights advocacy programmes to lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability. To this end, the UN Mission would have a fully integrated public information component.

62. The mission should set up a United Nations radio station to provide country-wide radio coverage. Through radio programming and by other means, the information component would undertake intensive public outreach and advocacy efforts in support of key mission activities, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, civic education including on the electoral process, humanitarian matters and human rights. The information capacity would also open up channels of communication with local, regional and international media outlets and should be well coordinated with other United Nations public information resources in Swarlena and the region.

Observations

63. Although the humanitarian and security situation in Swarlena is deeply troubling to me, I have hope in the success of the peace process, if assisted by UNSMS. The tasks of the future mission will not be easy. UNSMS will have to work closely with Swarlenian parties to move the peace process along to a successful conclusion. A key requirement will be concerted efforts to help the parties create an environment of security and confidence and to maintain the good will they have demonstrated by concluding the Kalari CPA. These efforts will also require the good will and continued assistance of the international community.

64. I commend the fact that since the signing the Kalari CPA in January of this year, all parties have remained in their positions along the boundaries between rebel and government controlled areas and signatory parties have honoured the terms of the agreement with no violations reported to date. I call for the rapid implementation of the political and security provisions of the peace agreement in the best interest of the people of Swarlena, particularly the holding of free and democratic elections by January next year.

65. It can be assumed that the ADS will honour this commitment as long as there is confidence in the commitment level of all other parties, as well as if the ADS obtains a fair share of political power in the country. Small numbers of ADS troops have already begun

assembling around major towns in ADS-controlled Tereni and Mahbek as part of pre-cantonment activities. The integration of ADS rebels into the new defence force of Swarlana will also be a critical confidence building element.

66. While there are no concrete indications that the BFS will not disarm and fulfil its commitment, the loose leadership and discipline structure of the BFS may pose a threat to the political process if rebel members do not see a clear – and often personal – advantage in disarmament. BFS combatants are still deployed along the ceasefire line, and there are at this stage no indications of pre-cantonment.

67. However, the most difficult part in the peace process will be the disarmament and reintegration of the less identifiable armed groups, most notably CDU factions. These groups are not signatories of the Kalari CPA, and are profiting economically from criminal activities. While I encourage the other parties to bring these remaining groups into the political process, the absence of alternative sources of income and livelihood for CDU combatants meanwhile will likely force them into increased criminality and could undermine the overall peace process.

68. Lastly, I am concerned about increasing reports of rising extremism in the behavior of CDU units and youth bandit groups in the Southern provinces, particularly South-East Cimosá. These reports need to be investigated and if substantiated, strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism may need to be incorporated in UNSMS's strategy.