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### **Case study of the multinational PSSM program in Moldova, OSCE CASM-8**



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## Abstract

This report is the final product of a case study regarding the Physical Security and Stockpile Management operation OSCE CASM-8 in Moldova, as part of a 10-week internship at the *Swedish EOD and Demining Center*. The purpose of the case study is to survey the activities, results and future visions within the OSCE CASM-8, a project aiming to increase security within stockpile management of conventional ammunition through long-term capacity building. 12 interviews have been conducted with actors involved in the project, such as representatives from the OSCE; Moldovan Armed Forces; Swedish EOD and Demining Center; the Swedish embassy in Chisinau; and the project management of the Mobile Training Team. The data has been processed to render the actors' views of the project. The project consists of a train-the-trainer programme where the participant's responsibility gradually increases. The education includes three training modules, with three phases in each module. The CASM-8 operation is viewed in a positive way by the respondents. The ammunition stockpile management is important in order to improve the security for the personnel working in the ammunition stockpiles as well as civilian population living nearby the storage sites. An awareness regarding the connection between insufficient ammunition stockpiles and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) exists as well. Several respondents identify destruction of ammunition as a further need for Moldova, which is essential in order to achieve a sustainable ammunition stockpile management.

## 1. Introduction

This report is the final product of a case study regarding the Physical Security and Stockpile Management operation OSCE CASM-8 in Moldova, as part of a 10-week internship at the *Swedish EOD and Demining Center*, SWEDEC. The purpose of the case study is to survey the activities, results and future visions regarding the project. Since the study has been executed from the Swedish EOD and Demining Center, a certain focus has been placed upon Sweden's contribution within the project.

### 1.1. Method

A general survey of policy documents within the area of SALW and SCA was necessary to do in order to improve my knowledge within the field. The main part of the case study is based upon material from interviews with actors involved in the project. The data has been processed to render the actors views about the operation. 12 interviews were made altogether, of which 7 were conducted in Moldova.

The following respondents have been interviewed:

- Col. Ronnie Nilsson, Commander of SWEDEC.
- Lt. Col. Fredrik Johnsson, former Commander of the Department for Operational Support, SWEDEC.
- Pär Carlsson, Instructor from the Molbile Training Team, SWEDEC.
- Erik Lindmark, former SALW/SCA administrator at Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters.
- Col. Mihail Olaru, Chief of J4 Logistics Directorate, Moldovan Armed Forces.
- Lt. Col. Andrei Camerzan, Deputy Chief J4 Logistics Directorate – chief of arms, ammunition and military equipment department, Moldovan Armed Forces.
- One educated instructor and one student, Moldovan Armed Forces.

- Per Normark, Programme Manager Conflict Prevention and Resolution, OSCE Mission to Moldova.
- Magnus Bratt, Military adviser, Permanent delegation of Sweden to the OSCE.
- Anja Jahn Günther, Second secretary Political and Economic Affairs, Embassy of Sweden in Chisinau.
- Col. Wolfgang Reitschmied, Austrian Armed Forces, Project Manager OSCE CASM-8
- Werner Kernmaier, Austrian Armed Forces, Project Manager OSCE CASM-8.

#### **A second version**

*Some relevant perspectives are missing in this report due to the limited time frame of the internship. A second version of the report will be sent out in April with those perspectives added.*

## **2. Background**

### **2.1 Survey**

#### *2.1.1. Moldova and the need for PSSM*

The deterioration of the Moldovan ammunition stockpiles during the latest decades is a consequence of the absence of the personnel expertise and financial resources within the Moldovan Armed Forces. The need for a Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) project in Moldova was therefore much needed. For example, packages with mixed ammunition, mines with external crystalized explosives and rusty fuzes were found in the storages, which could all compose a hazard for unplanned explosions (Swedish Armed Forces, 2015). Improper management of conventional ammunition stockpiles poses grave dangers to citizens living close to the storage sites, and to those who attempt to use the ammunition. Poor storage, transportation, and stockpile surveillance procedures can lead to deadly ammunition accidents caused by the deterioration of the propellant stabilizer in obsolete ammunition. According to the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) poor security and accountability of conventional ammunition can also lead to its theft and illicit use in crimes or terrorist activities, which is a further argument that supports the need and importance of PSSM operations (MSAG, 2013).

#### *2.1.2. OSCE Mission to Moldova*

The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established in 1993 to support efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that broke out in 1992 between the Transnistrian authorities and the central government in Chisinau (OSCE, 2015). The objective of the Mission was therefore to facilitate the achievement of a lasting comprehensive political settlement, on the basis of the OSCE principles and commitments (OSCE, 1993). In 2007 the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova called on the Moldovan authorities to improve storage conditions for ammunition stockpiles (OSCE, 2007). The destruction of surplus ammunition is seen as crucial for non-proliferation, regional stability, and the safety of Moldovan civilians (OSCE, 2011a). More than 20,000 tons of such material still

needs to be removed from the territory of Moldova (OSCE, n.d.a). The OSCE Mission also works closely with the Moldovan Ministry of Defense to support its efforts to use best practices in the management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and ammunition with the aim of promoting regional stability and non-proliferation (OSCE, 2015).

### **3. Moldovan request within PSSM**

#### **3.1. Survey**

##### **3.1.1. From, What, When and How**

The Moldovan Armed Forces requested assistance and support from OSCE regarding SALW and CA issues. These requests occurred in 2006, 2008 and 2009, which resulted in the *Comprehensive SALW and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition Programme for Moldova* (Aid management platform, 2015). OSCE member countries were asked to contribute with support through the OSCE, to reduce risks regarding ammunition and stockpile management. This is an ongoing project for more than eight years and is led and developed by the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The programme entails eight projects in total with the estimated cost about 3.1 million Euros. None of the projects envisages any more destruction of SALW and CA (OSCE, 2014a; OSCE, 2014b). The Programme is in line with the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the OSCE Document on SALW, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) as well as SALW and Conventional Ammunition Best Practice Guides (Aid Management Platform, 2015).

The following eight tasks are included within the programme (OSCE, 2014b):

1. Construction of a new storage facility at Bulboaca training area with approx. costs of 2.8 mio Euro.
2. Upgrade of SALW & SCA Storage facilities in Chisinau, Balti, Floresti and Cahul (Repairs to walls and roofs; improvements to intruder detection systems and firefighting facilities) with a Phase II of estimated additional 250'000 Euro.
3. Procurement & equipping of a mobile system for visual inspection of



stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

4. Destruction of 78 Cluster bombs (all Moldovan stocks of this type of ammunition).
5. Destruction of 360 air bombs (all Moldovan stocks of this ammunition)
6. Disposal of R60 rockets (The rockets are no longer needed).
7. Render 48 x 5V28 surface to air missiles safe for disposal.
8. Ammunition technician training.

## **3.2. Perspectives**

### ***3.2.1. OSCE (Vienna/MDA)***

There are ambitions and willpower within the Moldovan Armed Forces to make improvements in the stockpile management area, but the support and resources from a policy level, including long-term visions and strategies are missing. The Moldovan Armed Forces accepts all possible support without a vision, which is seen as a problem by the OSCE Mission to Moldova (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016).

### ***3.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova***

Due to replacement of the staff of the embassy, the exact knowledge of the start-up process of project or information of the Moldovan Armed Forces requests could not be identified. The previous ambassador had taken a great interest in this activities performed in the PSSM area, which is a great reason why there has been a continued interest in this field from the embassy (A. Jahn Günter, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

### ***3.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)***

The exact formulation of the support required by Moldova was not identified in the conversation with the personnel from SWEDEC, but there is an awareness of the request from the Moldovan Armed Forces to the OSCE to improve the management of their ammunition stockpiles regarding security and structure. Sweden and the instructors from SWEDEC were then invited to contribute to the

project in Moldova through the OSCE (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016). A request has to come from Moldova in order to receive support – the country has to know that they need help (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016)). There is an awareness within SWEDEC that there are different perceptions to this support, where the incentives from the receiving country could be that they expect additional equipment etc. for free (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016). The operation in Moldova includes support to capacity building but also to activities regarding the infrastructure. Needs to support the Moldovan Armed Forces in the area of destruction of arms and ammunition have also been identified (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 9, 2016.).

#### *3.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

During the conduction of the project, it is up to the Moldovan Armed Forces to make requests on what they need. The project management usually supports and informs these requests through a task plan which the Moldovan Armed Forces are responsible to forward to the OSCE. The task plan consists of what materials are needed; from plugs and computers to forklifts and training aid. Other requests related to the project activities are organized by the international participants themselves (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *3.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

The Moldovan Armed Forces are aware of the need to improve their stockpile management, but how to do so has not been clear due to the lack of training for the personnel. Since 2009 especially, the Moldovan Armed Forces have been looking for ways to increase the physical security and stockpile management in their ammunition depots with the aim to mitigate risk of explosion in these areas. A comprehensive approach to this situation was recognized. The extensive commitment is much needed since these issues are impossible to solve within a day. In 2010, the Armed Forces made a request to the OSCE Mission to Moldova

and asked for support regarding the making of a plan and an approach for the PSSM. A Memorandum of Understanding between Ministry of Defense and the OSCE Mission to Moldova was signed the same year and covered this project of PSSM training (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **4. MTT Moldova/CASM-8**

### **4.1 Survey**

#### *4.1.1. Background*

The CASM-8 project, is the eighth task within the OSCE Comprehensive Programme, to which Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Canada and Germany are contributing with support in different areas related to the physical security and stockpile management activities in Moldova (OSCE 2014b). Preparations for the OSCE CASM-8 started in 2013 (OSCE, 2014a). The planned activities were presented with the ambition to implement the mission during a period of three years (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

In December 2013 the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna, with representatives of OSCE, Moldova, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, brought up the possibilities of an operation to enhance the stockpile management of SALW/CA in Moldova. It was considered a good idea to use the same model that had been successful in a similar project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Austria, Sweden and Switzerland had participated as well (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 9, 2016). In Bosnia Herzegovina, the EU led operation EUFOR ALTHEA had established a Mobile Training Team (MTT) 2.1.6.1 to rebuild capacities within the Armed Forces (Small Arms Survey, 2015a). The model includes a “train-the trainer” concept that was of great significance due to the emphasis of a local ownership (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 9, 2016). Discussions regarding the PSSM need in Moldova had also taken place within the MSAG, among the states that was contributing to the MTT in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The operative set-up and the financial section had both

been established and the concept was all set to implement in Moldova. This time it occurred under the umbrella of OSCE and was called Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management VIII (CASM-8). For OSCE, this was a new way to work with the area of SALW/SCA, since every participating state would pay for the costs for their own personnel. In concurrence with the OSCE's invitation to participating states to provide extra budgetary contributions to support FSC assistance projects on SALW and SCA, or to contribute resources and technical expertise to the OSCE's comprehensive programme on SALW and SCA (OSCE, 2013), Austria, Germany, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland stated in 2014, that they will contribute to the physical security and stockpile management activities related to the development and introduction of the management of the life cycle of ammunition in Moldova (OSCE, 2014c).

#### *4.1.2. Purpose and objectives*

The main objective of the CASM-8 project is to support the Moldovan authorities to develop their own ammunition related training and skills in accordance with international standards (OSCE, 2014a). Moldovan Armed Forces specialists will be trained in safe and secure handling, storage and transportation of conventional ammunition. The best trainees are selected to become the future trainers of Moldovan ammunition specialists (OSCE, 2014d). In order to guarantee the sustainability of the project, the training programme will be integrated into the Moldovan armed forces training institution and systematically be delivered as part of the national training curriculum (OSCE, 2014c).

All respondents involved in this study are agreeing on the importance of reducing risks within the ammunition stockpiles and to give support through capacity building, in order to make sure the Moldovan Armed Forces can handle their ammunition storages in a secure way in the future. The focus is not only to mitigate risks for the personnel working in these storages, but also the civilian population living nearby the storage sites in case of an accident, such as unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) (Small arms survey, 2015b).

The creation of safer and better storage conditions could also contribute to prevent proliferation and illicit trade with these ammunitions, something that also could reduce the risk that this ammunition is being used for the making of IEDs etc.

#### *4.1.3. Time expectancy*

The OSCE has stated in the rapport of the Fifth Biennial meeting of States that they will support the Moldovan authorities to develop its own ammunition related training and skills in accordance with international standards and best practices until 2016 (OSCE, 2014b). However, in 2015 the completion date for the comprehensive programme was set to 2017 (Aid Management Platform, 2015). The project management has also set the completion date of the training activities to 2017 (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *4.1.4. Actors*

##### **Mobile Training Team (MTT)**

According to Small arms survey (2015a) there are few countries willing to invest the human, material, and financial resources to build comprehensive stockpile management capacity in the region of South East Europe. The long -term commitment that is necessary is one possible explanation for this. The mobile training team (MTT) 2.1.6.1. is therefore an exception.

It was first set up in 2011 and implemented by Switzerland, Sweden and Austria in Bosnia Hercegovina. The model seeks to combine a bottom-up approach with top-down reform initiatives (Small arms survey, 2015a:148). The MTT in Moldova also consist of two more countries; Germany and Canada. The training language has changed from German to English, which has facilitated the communication within the team as well as the work with the interpreters (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

### **Lead nation**

The lead nation of CASM-8 is Austria, who has the role of project manager within the MTT. Austria's participants originate from an EOD school and organizes the training connected to ammunition, ammunition storage management and life cycle management. The project management emphasizes that a prerequisite of being lead nation is to have the capacity to perform these activities and training, to ensure that the project can be fulfilled in the event of lost participation from the other supporting countries. The lead nation has responsibility to inform the OSCE how the project is running (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

### **Participation nations**

Sweden, through SWEDEC, has contributed with ammunition technology expertise. Switzerland supports the project with their expertise regarding dangerous goods transportation training. They have also been donating large amounts of money to the project and had the general lead from CASM 1-7. Canada has contributed to the basic ammunition courses and Germany has supported the basic ammunition courses as well as the dangerous goods transportation training (OSCE, 2014a).

### **OSCE**

The OSCE is functioning as an umbrella organization for the CASM-8. The organization has the overall lead and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) has the responsibility to coordinate the operation. The OSCE has been supporting the project with financial donations and the Mission to Moldova is responsible to cover the needs for the project (Aid management platform, 2015). Risk mitigation in ammunition depots is a major concern for the OSCE. Controlled depots correlates to a lower risk of ammunition proliferation, which contributes to security in the whole region (OSCE, 2014d). The organization has also expressed the possibility that the assistance regarding the safe and secure storage of conventional ammunition, could contribute to raising the level of confidence

between the parties of the Transnistrian conflict (OSCE, 2015). The OSCE could stop the project if there are insufficient resources, a risk which has been reduced since the participating nations are funding their own personnel and support (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

## **4.2. Perspectives**

### ***4.2.1. OSCE Vienna/MDA)***

The impression from the OSCE is that the project has been working very well. For a security organization like the OSCE, this kind of activity is definitely viewed in a positive way and it is contributing to the overall purpose of Mission to Moldova as well. The criteria for a successful project depend on several factors, e.g. the project management which in CASM-8 has worked with high ambitions regarding the project and the included activities. The OSCE have noticed that the project is appreciated by the Moldovan participants, and it has also been easy to work with for the organization. Due to the security dimension that is involved in the PSSM projects, this is seen as a “core issue” connected to both the personnel working in the depots and the people living close to in, as well as the theft and proliferation of ammunition. As long as the request for support is being forwarded, the OSCE definitely has an interest to contribute with support (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016).

### ***4.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova***

The Swedish Embassy is positive to the project and sees this as an important security policy issue, where the physical security and stockpile management activities could contribute to a great risk reduction. It is viewed as an achievable project, due to the fact that even with small means, a real difference can be made within the field. The embassy’s involvement in the project has mainly consisted of joining coordination meetings and participating in formal events such as the deliverance of the ammunition guide (A. Jahn Günter, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *4.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)*

The operational dimension of the project was probably not something that the Moldovan Armed Forces had expected when they requested the support. The operational dimension is not one of OSCE's regular support either, but this project was financial efficient and a way to increase capacity for the contributing countries as well as for the Moldovan Armed Forces (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 16, 2016). SWEDEC are very positive to the project and are aware of its importance. It is easy to measure the results and it contributes to developing the center's own capacity as well (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). These kinds of operations are very depending on the project coordinator, who has to push the project forward to reach the intended result. The CASM-8 in Moldova was quite slow during startup, the impression was that the OSSE did not have enough ambitions for the project (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 16, 2016). It is a very person-dependent project, where the Austrian project management's engagement in Moldova has been important in order to keep the project moving forward (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 16, 2016).

#### *4.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

The project management are very clear on the fact that this is a project where knowledge transfer and education is the most important tool in order to ensure that these activities can continue without the support of the MTT. The education and the knowledge therefore has to be integrated in the structure of the Moldovan Armed Forces, which is a reason for the long-term commitment included from start. This integration and the required changes cannot be fulfilled in three months or even one year. To be able to reach a successful result, there is important to have an understanding of the culture and structure of the receiving country, so that the project can be implemented in the most beneficial way. A certain adaptation from both sides, the receiving and supporting nations, is seen as a prerequisite to fulfill the project in a successful way (W. Kernmaier & W.



Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *4.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

The memorandum of understanding between mission to Moldova and Ministry of Defense covered the whole comprehensive program, the other task have already been executed or are in progress of implementation as well. The purpose of the eighth task is to give the personnel at the Moldovan Armed Forces the possibility to get further knowledge of their ammunition. Including proper ways to manage it and store it in the depots, as well as how to manage a safe transportation of the ammunition, are knowledge that needs to be improved (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **5. Sweden's involvement in PSSM and CASM-8**

### **5.1. Survey**

#### *5.1.1. Background*

Sweden is an acknowledged actor in the area of global security connected to weapons and ammunition through the assistance within the PSSM-projects (Swedish armed forces, 2015). The participation in the MTT 2.1.6.1. in Bosnia-Herzegovina was definitely a reason why Sweden came to participate in the CASM-8 project in Moldova.

The Swedish support in Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered rather fragmented due to an irregular contribution in various areas of the project and initially, the situation concerning the project in Moldova was the same. A Swedish profiling was therefore identified as necessary. SWEDEC's expertise includes everything involved within the ammunition technology area; educating, developing courses, handling information about the ammunition as well as assessing risks and producing ammunition guides. This was forwarded to the MTT and other international actors to make a more clear vision of what areas Sweden is capable of contributing to (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

SWEDEC identified the possibility to produce a technical ammunition guide based on the actually existing ammunition in the Moldovan storage sites, as a way to further adapt the support for Moldova. Since the ammunition guide had not been a planned activity initially, the Moldovan Armed Forces had to make an additional request to Sweden. To formally receive the Moldovan request regarding the ammunition guide was a long procedure which almost came too late, but eventually the result was a guide of 170 diverse ammunition objects. The ammunition guide has played an important part in the Swedish profiling within the PSSM projects (F. Johnsson personal communication, February 15, 2016). Other than the guide, the Swedish instructors have contributed with their expertise in ammunition technology (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

#### *5.1.2. Purpose and objectives*

Other than mitigating the risks related to the ammunition stockpiles and the proliferation of ammunition, taking part in these projects is also bringing a further knowledge in the area of ammunition technique back to Sweden. What SWEDEC can work with and learn during peaceful operations such as CASM-8 in Moldova, is also valuable for the Swedish personnel in other parts of the world that is being confronted with the same type of ammunition where the security situations are lot worse (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). Even though PSSM is still a quite new and unknown area of work within the Swedish Armed Forces, it is an area that is well suited for SWEDEC and the center's profile. The project aims to do good things and is something that Sweden and SWEDEC should take pride in (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016).

#### *5.1.3. Time expectancy*

The process and preparation of a Swedish contribution to CASM-8 began in 2013, and the Swedish support in Moldova started in 2014 (Swedish Armed Forces, 2015). There has been issues with the planning of the future support. The decisions from the policy level that are needed are only covering one year at a

time and a long-term expectancy from Sweden was missing when the project started. A change that allows decisions to be made on a multiyear basis is therefore more or less a necessity if Sweden wants to be perceived as a trustful cooperation partner, and not least as a prerequisite if Sweden should be lead nation in future project (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 16, 2016).

#### *5.1.4. Actors*

##### **SWEDEC**

SWEDEC's Explosive Ordinance Clearance (EOC) includes clearance of conventional ammunition. An incorporation of the PSSM into SWEDEC's area could be a possibility which could facilitate future contributions in the field. This would make the responsibility more clear within the PSSM operations and also make it possible to confirm the tools and instruments used for EOC (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). The awareness of the need for these kinds of operations is increasing, much due to the many situations in recent time where the consequences of IED could derive from insufficient stockpile management etc. (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016). To see the PSSM as a contributing part in counter IED could also be a way to incorporate these actions as a recognized part of SWEDEC's continuous work (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

The current establishment classifies the Swedish personnel's participation in Moldova as business trips. If it was to be classified as a military operation it would be possible to use certain mechanisms which would facilitate the work for the Swedish instructors. For example, threats and risk could be assessed; it would include risk premiums and the necessary legal protection. These features are currently missing (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

##### **The Armed Forces Headquarters**

The international PSSM efforts are still a rather unknown area in Sweden, both at

the policy level and within the Armed Forces. J9 is responsible for SWEDEC's contribution within the PSSM and the participation in the projects has been financed with means of Security Sector Reform (SSR) from the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Sweden's abilities within PSSM were limited due to both personnel and other resources during the time this project was under its initial administration. The ambition of the project, or the expected result, was not a clear vision during startup. The previous SALW-administrator at J9 is clear on that fact that the PSSM area needs a strategic dimension and a national plan of action. These operations are a cost efficient contribution to enhance security, and to build capacity within the Armed Forces at the same time. Even so, PSSM is not getting prioritized on the political level or within the headquarters (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 16, 2016). The headquarters directions within the area have as a consequence been very unclear from SWEDEC's point of view, since there are no personnel with the explicit responsibility for PSSM. PSSM is not clearly integrated within the Swedish Armed Forces, which affects the ambition to join future projects, but also the Armed Forces professionalism within the area. The PSSM projects have mostly been organized bottom-up, but a recognized responsibility from the headquarters is important for many reasons, such as the security of the personnel, and their mandate and judicial rights (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

## **5.2. Perspectives**

### **5.2.1. OSCE (Vienna/MDA)**

Previously Sweden has been regarded as deeply engaged and as an actor with a lot of money to spend on OSCE related SALW-activities. This has led to requests from other OSCE countries, who expect Sweden to contribute and be a committed supporter in the area of SALW. Still, the area of PSSM is not one of the most prioritized for Sweden within the permanent delegation of Sweden to the OSCE in Vienna. Today there are no financial resources left to these kind of projects and the Swedish focus and support is now instead mainly related to election observations, equality and freedom of media (M. Bratt, personal communication,

February 11, 2016). The Swedish military adviser at the delegation has the opinion that Sweden could do a fundamental contribution in the SALW-, or more specifically PSSM-, field. To raise awareness and affect other counties and actors to take their responsibility in the area, Sweden needs to be an active and accountable actor for future cooperation. Benefits from engagement within the PSSM area can be information and capacity building, but currently there is a lack of ambition to coordinate these actions. A Swedish contribution to disarmament and arms control could also be a future approach to PSSM. There is already a perception that Sweden should be active in these sort of questions, but the opinions regarding what form those activities should take may differ (M., Bratt, personal communication, February 11, 2016).

#### *5.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova*

The engagement from the Swedish embassy in Chisinau originally depends on the previous ambassador's great interest within the area. The embassy is positive to the Swedish support to the Moldovan Armed Forces and sees it as strengthening regarding the relations between the two countries. The knowledge transfer has been important, and the ammunition guide and the ammunition that has been secured are concrete results. The project has definitely had a confidence building dimension to it. The embassy has also had the possibility to be involved in several concrete ways, such as participating in meetings and formal events. The embassy's involvement could also facilitate the work for the personnel in Sweden, since it can support with practical matters in Moldova (A. Jahn Günter, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *5.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)*

The general opinion amongst the respondents at SWEDEC is that the international cooperation has been successful and that the education has been accepted in a good way by the participants from the Moldovan Armed Forces. The technical knowledge acquired during these projects is of great importance for the Swedish instructors and the center's future capacity and development. To be

able to gain information about these ammunitions during peaceful operations, is of great importance in other international interventions since it could facilitate future analysis of threats and risk assessment (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). Another objective is that this kind of operations could mitigate the risks of theft and illicit proliferation, preventing these objects from occurring in our surrounding area and could therefore be seen as a part of the self-help as well (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016). The connection to IED has been quite unknown within Sweden. This has also consisted of a resistance from the headquarters to see the full potential in these kinds of activities (E. Lindmark, personal communication, February 16, 2016). As activities involving IED have increased during the last years, the connection between IED and insufficient ammunition stockpiles have gotten clearer. As a consequence the PSSM area is receiving more international attention as well (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016). A Swedish profile would be cost efficient for SWEDEC and would enhance the capacity within the center. A unified vision outwards could market the Swedish competence and experience within the field. This could facilitate a future contribution to these projects, since everyone would be onboard with a joint vision of what the Swedish profile consists of (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

#### *5.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

Austria and Sweden are comparable countries in size and within the ammunition branch. The teams from Sweden and Austria has had a good relation and a continuity, which makes it easy to work with each other on a daily basis. Sweden was an obvious cooperation partner to work with in the CASM-8 project in Moldova, much due to the previous cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Swedish support has been trustful, with information regarding what support could be reckoned with or not. In this project, Sweden is the main partner according to the project management. The Swedish contribution, e.g. the ammunition guide, has been much appreciated and useful within the project (W. Kernmaier & W.

Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *5.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

The Moldovan armed forces have expressed their appreciation regarding the Swedish support. They are looking forward to a continued cooperation within this field, and are open to receive support and recommendations since Sweden has a lot of experience in the field (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **6. The CASM-8 concept and activities**

### **6.1. Survey**

#### *6.1.1. Three modules*

The model used in the CASM-8 project consists of three modules, each of which is taught in three different phases. It revolves around six key pillars of sustainable stockpile management capacity building which are; the need for all modules to follow international standards; the MTT's train the trainer approach means that every module it provides is taught at least three times with increasing responsibility; the material and equipment needs to meet international standards; Simultaneous reforms at strategic levels; coordination with international PSSM partners; and that the host nation must take ownership (Small arms survey, 2015a).

The first module is *Basic Ammunition Course (Theoretical)* which gives the Moldovan participants the basic theoretical knowledge in safe management of ammunition. The second module is *Basic Ammunition Course (Practical)*, where the participants receives basic practical knowledge in safe management of ammunition. The third module is *Visual Inspection*, which consists of inspection and classification of the ammunition. The third module gives the participants a more advanced knowledge regarding safe management of the ammunition. One module is more or less an activity for one month, which makes up three

months of time spent in Moldova for the MTT during the project. These three months are being distributed over a longer period of time to be able to give the Moldovan participants a chance to integrate the practice and knowledge (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

This model could function as a role-model and be used and to assist other countries in need of stockpile management capacity building. A reason for this is that the core of the project and aim with the model is to support the receiving country with knowledge so they can provide the necessary activities themselves, instead of doing it for them (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016). As it is a well tried model, it could also facilitate the startup process in future operations (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

#### *6.1.2. Train-the-trainer*

The three modules are implemented in three iterations each - through moderating, mentoring and monitoring - where the participant's responsibility gradually increases (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016):

Moderating	Instructors from the MTT train the Moldovan future trainers.
Mentoring	Instructors from the MTT mentor the Moldovan future trainers to teach students.
Monitoring	Instructors from the MTT monitor the Moldovan future trainers when they teach students.

The purpose of this is to make sure that the knowledge produced can be accurately used in the future as well. The train-the-trainer concept is of such importance since the knowledge and capacity is staying within the Moldovan Armed Forces after the MTT has left. The structure within the personnel has not included trainers in this way, "so to just jump in for a short period of time and



train some personnel with no experience of teaching – you can expect the result to be thereafter” (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

### 6.1.3. Completed modules

The first module has been implemented within all phases. The second module’s third phase is planned for summer 2016. The third module’s first phase has been implemented; the two other phases are planned for 2016 and 2017.

<b>Module 1</b> Basic Ammunition Training, theoretical	moderating ✓ 2014	mentoring ✓ 2015	monitoring ✓ 2016
<b>Module 2</b> Basic Ammunition training, practical	moderating ✓ 2014	mentoring ✓ 2015	monitoring 2016
<b>Module 3</b> Visual Inspection (Chemical assessment)	moderating ✓ 2015	mentoring 2016	monitoring 2017

### 6.1.4. Other activities

The Swedish ammunition guide was produced in parallel with the first phase of the third module in September 2015. SWEDEC was responsible for the production and supported this activity with personnel and necessary equipment. The task was conducted together with personnel from the Moldovan Armed Forces as well. The ammunition guide was not included in the original concept for CASM-8, the need was identified while the project was running. The guide

was believed to be a way to further adopt the education for Moldova specifically, to make it relevant to the ammunition actually existing in the ammunition depots instead of just general ammunition. The education and following activities would then be based on the content of the guide, which would constitute the main document regarding the country's actual ammunition stockpiles (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2015).

## **6.2 Perspectives**

### *6.2.1. OSCE (Vienna/ MDA)*

OSCE are satisfied with the education and the way it has been performed. The focus on how to manage the ammunition is making an actual change and its contribution to change the way of thinking about ammunition is important from a security perspective. To keep the capacity and knowledge within the army, which both the train-the-trainer concept and the ammunition guide is contributing to, is of vital interest. The ammunition guide is also viewed as an asset and important tool to new personnel and students, in case the trained experts are being replaced. The interaction between the receiving and supporting actors, both formal and informal, is viewed in a positive way as it is contributing to the confidence building dimension of the project (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016).

### *6.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova*

The embassy has noticed that the people working within the project are very devoted to the task, but the interest and involvement from the higher level is also vital. One of the risks identified by the embassy regards the long-term sustainability within the project. The insecurity of the people involved in the project, whether they have the possibility to stay at their positions or if they get replaced somewhere else, is one possible threat to the continuity of the project and the capacity that has been built up (A. Jahn Günther, personal

communication, March 1, 2016).

### *6.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)*

The Swedish support has involved logistics which isn't an area of expertise within SWEDEC, other actors have a greater experience in this field. SWEDEC's capacity lies in the area of ammunition technology; how the ammunition functions and how it is composed. To be able to focus on SWEDEC's expertise in PSSM, it should also be clear in what areas Sweden should not contribute. The production of the ammunition guide is one of the areas where SWEDEC has expertise and was therefore a suitable way for SWEDEC to support the project (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). To benefit the education even more, the guide should preferably be produced at an earlier stage of the project than what was the case in Moldova. It was a long process before the Moldovan Armed Forces formally requested the support to produce an ammunition guide. Sweden has clarified that the quantity of the ammunition objects is not an objective, since the production of the guide is an area where the confidence building aspect between the nations is of importance (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016; F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

A possible way to implement the guide within future projects at an early stage is to bring the guide up for discussion during assessment visits in the countries. Then the need for an ammunition guide can be evaluated as an integrated part of the assessment. This idea is already acknowledged within the (MSAG), but the action is not yet fully implemented. A Swedish production would be preferable, and much suitable to the desirable profiling. Therefore it would be preferable if an expert from SWEDEC were to join the Staff Assessment Visits as well (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

#### *6.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

The project management emphasizes how the knowledge transfer is the main focus of the project. It all aims to make the Moldovan Armed Forces self-sustainable within conventional ammunition stockpile management. The three modules are the only modules that are being integrated in the Armed Forces, all other training needs to be organized by Moldova itself. The first modules show the importance of this area with the purpose to support the necessary development and then taking a step back and let the participants conduct the tasks. This is the key ingredient of the train-the-trainer concept. Another important part of the project implementation is to affect the Moldovan Armed Forces on a higher level, to make them realize what more is important to implement in order for the country to be able to reach a sustainability within the area. There is a need for a personnel structure, and a possibility for the trainers to do the training, research and development. The creation of a new training that is really integrated in the country is a next step that should be created by the Moldovan Armed Forces (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *6.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

The Moldovan Ministry of Defense has expressed that the implementation of this training is a significant contribution in developing its own capabilities to train specialists in the stockpile management and security area. The training provides the opportunity for officers of the Moldovan Armed Forces to deepen their expertise regarding the stockpile management and security within SALW and SCA (OSCE, 2014a) One of the biggest challenges for the Armed Forces is the funding of their activities. They are now looking for support to improve two classrooms which will make it possible to further develop the quality of the training through ammunition samples and different kind of equipment available in the rooms. To use the adequate equipment are of high importance to give the students the right knowledge. The ammunition guide is also a tool used for the training. The information about the ammunition such as weight, measurements

and how it is packaged can contribute to better planning for the future activities. The plan is to continuously add or cut tools, depending on what changes are being made within the ammunition depot. The combination of different tools is something that will contribute to deeper knowledge and more professional ways to train the personnel (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

#### *6.2.6. Instructor from the Mobile Training Team*

The previous use of the concept of the MTT and the three modules in Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered a great advantage. The accomplished activities so far have been positive. It has also been noticed that the participants from the Moldovan Armed Forces are more comfortable and safe in their role as well, something that has improved during the projects course of time. The framing of the project with a “train-the-trainer” concept that is thoroughgoing in all aspects of the set-up - first the Moldovans get educated and later they are in the role of teachers as well - is the main reason why the project is successful (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

#### *6.2.7. Trainer from the Moldovan Armed Forces*

At the beginning of this year, the trainers were officially appointed as teachers within the training cell, which consist of three trainers and one commander. The trainers from the Moldovan Armed Forces are positive to the training and the courses, where the iterating of the modules are making the trainers surer of their capabilities. They learn from their mistakes, which is contributing to their further knowledge. The MTT is considered to have been very open and supportive. The team’s presence and monitoring have been very important, since the training has been a new experience. The trainers already had some experience from the management of stockpiles of ammunition and weapons. Although, there was a lack of information about the ammunition in the Moldovan storage sites, since most of the ammunition are of Russian origin. The Swedish produced ammunition guide presents information about this ammunition, in the native

language. The pictures of the ammunition are in color, which is also of high importance. The format is user friendly to bring to the storage sites and to use the information while working there. The data is also useful regarding transportation – to be able to do measurements from an office instead of the storage sites facilitates the process (personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **7. Results**

### **7.1. Survey**

#### *7.1.1. Accomplishments*

Improvements of the storage sites connected to surveillance systems and some upgrading of the storages have been made (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016). There has been a demand that the Moldovan Armed Forces creates a training cell that includes an organizational structure with trainer positions to guarantee that the project and the knowledge stays active (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 16, 2016). The training cell is a necessity for the sustainability of the project (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016). For this reason, the Moldovan Armed Forces has created the Arms and Ammunition Center, to keep continuity within the PSSM field. This is to make sure the personnel, the trainers, can make research in this field and develop future courses (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016). The ammunition guide is another hands-on result that has been used to explicitly adopt the education to Moldova's need (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 16, 2016).

#### *7.1.2. Experiences*

The long-term capacity building concept has been a central part of reaching a change at all. The need to go directly to the Ministry of Defense in Moldova would have been desired from the beginning and could have facilitated the projects integration within the country. The Arms and Ammunition Center would

also preferably have been integrated within the military academy, where there is a school structure (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016). An earlier implementation of the ammunition guide would have been preferred from SWEDEC's point of view, but there is awareness that the confidence building that is necessary for that kind of activity is a long process (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016). The Moldovan Armed Forces have had issues regarding the long-term visions of their activities, which has improved but still has a long way to go (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016). The reluctance to destroy ammunition – even obsolete and dangerous ammunition – is a future issue that has been identified by several of the respondents.

## **7.2 Perspectives**

### *7.2.1. OSCE (Vienna/MDA)*

The OSCE has noticed a progress within the Moldovan Armed Forces regarding the insight of what activities that remains to be done. The people working with the ammunition are interested and positive to make a change, but there is no support from the policy level in the country. The insufficient resources are always an issue (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016).

### *7.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova*

The impression from the embassy is that the project has been running without any significant problems. They are aware of the difficulties that international cooperation can bring, especially when the MTT is not always on set in Moldova. The embassy has been able to join the ceremony when the ammunition guide was delivered. Even if there are projects with a possibly larger distribution, the CASM-8 capacity building project is considered very useful. It is not only strengthening the relations between Sweden and Moldova, but also contributing to a higher security within the country due to the fact that some ammunition has

been secured. The impression is though that the Moldovan Armed Forces does not want to destroy any of its obsolete or damaged ammunition, something that can affect the long-term sustainability of the project (A. Jahn Günter, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *7.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)*

SWEDEC is positive to the fact that the three modules are going to be successfully achieved. The creation of the training cell is a long procedure which could delay the project, but what is most concerning at this point is what will happen in the next step. The modules and creation of a training cell is not a final solution, there is a lacking of a dimension of destruction. This is also a part of the mentoring dimension of the project, to support the country with information and create an understanding to why the obsolete ammunition is hazardous and needs to be destroyed (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

#### *7.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

The creation of a training cell is important for the integration of the project within the Moldovan Armed Forces. The problem of not including the training cell within a school structure as the military academy, is that the future training might not get prioritized in the way it should. The Arms and Ammunition Center is organized under J4 command, which means there is no permission to write certificates or plan curriculas. Therefore it would have been an advantage to have the training cell within a school structure, which would have given the personnel the position as trainers. Now the risk is that the operational task might contribute to the down prioritization of the training cell (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).



#### *7.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

In 2013, the Moldovan Armed Forces approved a new regulation; Regulation on PSSM/CASM in National Army of Republic of Moldova (Aid management platform, 2015). This was based on best practices, IATG and international standards necessary for the Moldovan Armed Forces. To create the Arms and Ammunition Center was a challenge for the army, since they had to make a modification within the structure of the unit. The aim is that this center will be independent and where planning of activities, teaching, maintenance etc. are able to be done without asking for permissions. There are a lot of things remaining to get to that point, right now there is just the building (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

#### *7.2.6. Instructor from Mobile Training Team*

The program has contributed to risk reduction as well as a better understanding of risks and how to handle ammunition in a safer way. There has also been clear that the trainers have made progress and become more and more secure and comfortable in their role as trainers in the course of time. There has also been clear that the relation between the instructors from the MTT and the Moldovan participants have strengthened due to the continuity of the support (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

#### *7.2.7. Trainer from Moldovan Armed Forces*

The education and training is mainly about the situation and ammunition that exists in Moldova, a future wish would be to learn from the experience in the field of ammunition storage management of other countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and how they managed their stockpiles. The comparison between their experience and the Moldovan experience could be a support for Moldova, to see what actions they should take in order to reach the required level. The main task at this moment however, is to inform the students about the ammunition and

the structure of it, what hazards the ammunition compose and of eventual danger in case of an explosion (personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **8. Future visions**

### **8.1. Survey**

#### *8.1.1. Remaining activities*

The remaining phases of the three modules are the monitoring of the Basic Ammunition Course (Practical) and mentoring and monitoring of the third module Visual Inspection. The Arms and Ammunition Center has to be finished and the training cell needs to be integrated within the structure of the Moldovan Armed Forces (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *8.1.2. Additional support*

Additional support and activities should include the destruction of obsolete and/or excessive ammunition (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

### **8.2 Perspectives**

#### *8.2.1. OSCE (Vienna/MDA)*

The OSCE are aware of the need for an extension of the project. Until now the center has been formally established, but is not up running. The main issue of the ammunition storing is that much of the ammunition should be destroyed. This is an included part of the training received, to be able to analyze in what condition the ammunition is currently in. The problem is that they don't want to destroy any of the ammunition, not even the obsolete and hazardous. There is a plan to send one or two people from the Moldovan Armed Forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina to

show what has been achieved in that project. This could possibly contribute to a clearer vision regarding the long-term perspective of the future work in Moldova (P. Normark, personal communication, March 2, 2016).

#### *8.2.2. Embassy of Sweden in Moldova*

From the embassy's point of view, a continuation of the project is positive. As a security policy issue this is a highly important area to keep working with, regarding both national and international security (A. Jahn Günter, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *8.2.3. Swedish Armed Forces (Headquarters and SWEDEC)*

A future risk for the sustainability of the project is that the Moldovan personnel won't continue the work by themselves, or that the educated instructors might be transferred to another position too soon. In the event of an escalation of the Transnistrian conflict, a shifted focus for the Moldovan AF could also affect the future prioritization of the stockpile management training (R. Nilsson, personal communication, February 18, 2016). It is of high importance to see beyond the three modules, the project cannot be regarded as finished after completing these steps. The ammunition will be stored according to international standards, but the ammunition could still be a hazard in the future. The Moldovan Armed Forces must have a possibility to destroy the obsolete ammunition. The Moldovan participants will be able to identify hazardous ammunition, but what comes next if this ammunition doesn't get taken care of? This is also a problem. In that way, the physical security and stockpile management concept lacks a long-term strategy with a destruction dimension (F. Johnsson, personal communication, February 15, 2016).

#### *8.2.4. Project management OSCE CASM-8*

The completion date for the training is set to 2017. The training project will be successfully achieved until then. However, if Moldova is willing to do further changes and fully integrate the lifecycle management, Austria could extend the project. This includes dismantling of ammunition and a more detailed visual inspection that is focused on the ammunition in the Moldovan systems instead of an overall. This task as well as the work within the ammunition depots should be done by the trained personnel from the Moldovan Armed Forces. A proper storage management would automatically reduce risks and be a way of realizing the condition of the ammunition; visual inspection and the knowledge of how the ammunition should look like will contribute to knowing when it needs to be destroyed as well. This should be a self-running system. The training alone is not the key to a sustainable storage management and a vision from the Austrian project management is therefore to start the visual inspection (W. Kernmaier & W. Reitschmied, personal communication, March 1, 2016).

#### *8.2.5. Moldovan Armed Forces*

The Arms and Ammunition Center will be further implemented, with the hope to increase the knowledge and the security of the ammunition storages. The plan for the Moldovan Armed Forces is to continue the work within the life cycle management through developed training that can lead to implementing the handling of ammunition and the chemical assessment. Reaching international standards are desired, but realistically there are not enough financial resources to implement those requirements (A. Camerzan, personal communication, February 29, 2016).

#### *8.2.6. Instructor from Mobile Training Team*

The Moldovan Armed Forces needs to have a structure in their own armed forces to be able to develop and advance the courses, and to be able to create new courses in the event that they get new ammunition. There is also a surplus of

ammunition that is not needed, which should be destroyed (P. Carlsson, personal communication, February 9, 2016).

#### *8.2.7. Trainer from Moldovan Armed Forces*

The trainers still need to learn a lot of things to become experts within the field. There is a will to continue this development, to be able to implement international standards in the future. The collaboration with the MTT has been much appreciated, with the hope to continue this cooperation in the future as well (personal communication, February 29, 2016).

## **9. Summary**

The project has been received in a positive way, for the participants of the Moldovan Armed Forces as well as the MTT participating countries. There are several reasons why the project could be a possible role model for future PSSM projects. Knowledge transfer and capacity building are the key ingredients. The possibility for the Moldovan Armed Forces to integrate the project during a longer period of time, with the support and pressure from the project management makes it a realistic project, which increases the possibility to achieve the goal. PSSM projects are cost-efficient; with rather small means, a large contribution can be made. Not only for the Moldovan Armed Forces and the Moldovan civilian population, but also as a way of preventing proliferation of ammunition which is contributing to a global security dimension.

PSSM is an area that continues to grow within the international community. UN, GICHD and of course the OSCE are all participating within this field. SWEDEC has taken the opportunity to contribute to this field as well, and a further involvement could continue to a development of the centers capacities. PSSM is therefore viewed as a well suited area to include within the center and could be a way to further strengthen a Swedish profile within the field.

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