As a member of Nato, Sweden is to actively take part in Nato’s deterrence activities. The concept of deterrence is that one actor persuades a would-be aggressor that an aggression would incur a cost, which would far outweigh any potential gain, material or political. By demonstrating presence, cohesion and capability, an aggressor is deterred from even thinking about attacking a Nato member state. For example, capability may be demonstrated by a joint flyover of a certain area. Nuclear weapons is the ultimate tool of Nato deterrence.

This decision is still pending. The Swedish position is that the Nordic countries are a strategic unit and should be defended collectively. Sweden is of the opinion that all the Nordic countries fall within the same headquarters and operational area, but actual decision has yet to be made.

In accordance with Nato’s article 5, Sweden is to consider an armed attack on another Nato member state as an armed attack on Sweden. However, all member states must agree on invoking article 5 to activate the Nato defence. It is difficult to say exactly how and with what Sweden is to contribute as it depends on the situation and circumstances. But Sweden is obliged to support other member states and take all necessary measures, just as the other member states must assist Sweden.

The risk of an armed attack remains low, but cannot be ruled out. Sweden joins Nato because of the uncertain security situation in the world. Russia’s war in Ukraine is the primary reason for the decision. The Swedish Nato membership is a way to prevent what is now happening in Ukraine to happen in Sweden, but also to reinforce security in our region

No. The assessment made by the parliament, government and the Swedish Armed Forces is that the risk of an armed attack will decrease with the Nato membership. Also, the risk of an armed attack against any other Nato member state decreases as Nato is even stronger with Sweden as an ally.

As a member of Nato, Sweden is to adhere to the commitment of the Nato member states since 2014, and invest at least two per cent of GDP in the defence. At least 20 per cent of the defence budget is to be earmarked for materiel investments. Moreover, Sweden is to contribute to Nato’s civil and military budget, which for Sweden will amount to approximately 50 million euro per year.

Yes. The Nato membership will see a major shift of Swedish defence and security policy. Sweden goes from a close partnership to having 31 allies instead. This means that Sweden and the Swedish Armed Forces will be part of Nato’s collective deterrence and defence. The defence of Sweden will remain the primary task of the Swedish Armed Forces, but also that the defence of Sweden is now part of a larger context.

There are currently no plans to establish Nato bases in Sweden, but the Swedish Armed Forces has been mandated, together with Nato, to make preparations for receiving support and reinforcements from other allies. The overall aim is to create conditions for Sweden, Nato and its allies to conduct activities in order to avert conflict in our region. This requires a certain degree of infrastructure in place. It is too early, however, to give any exact details about what measures will be needed. The development of strong Host Nation Support will continue to be an important area of focus for the Swedish Armed Forces.

Some 200-250 positions are to be manned over a period of seven years. Primarily various types of staff positions – specialists and generalists – in the Nato command structure. Sweden will staff the positions with military and civil personnel.

In that case, our capability to fight back is reinforced, as we defend ourselves together with others and share common operational planning. As members of Nato, we would have real influence over Nato decisions and actions in Sweden and the Baltic Sea region.

We have cooperated with Nato since the mid-1990s. We have participated in all Nato-led international operations and exercises since Bosnia in 1996.

The special partnership entails information sharing and joint exercises. But there is a clear line between being a member and not, as for example collective defence obligations and the common operational planning. As it is today, we have no real influence on the political and military decision-making processes in Nato.

Then we will participate in operational planning on all levels of command, we will be part of the decision-making process and integrate our own defence planning with the other Nato-members; primarily with our neighbouring countries Norway and Denmark. This would make the Nordic countries’ defence more homogenous.

The tactical level, i.e. the various service branches, are already integrated in Nato’s processes and procedures, so changes will be made on the strategic level, linked to Nato’s decision-making mechanisms. It would mean that we would have more influence over Nato actions in and above Sweden. But to the Swedish Armed Forces as a whole it will not mean a drastic change. We already take part in exercises and international operations with Nato.

As regards competences and skills there will be no changes. Swedish units assert themselves well in comparison to other countries’ units in the organisation. However, Nato staffs are increasingly manned by officers, as compared to Swedish staffs.

According to our assessment, they will not be affected at all, as conscript total defence staff cannot be deployed abroad in a war situation without a number of political decisions in place. All our international operations are carried out by permanent staff. However, conscript total defence staff, in basic or rehearsal training, may take part in an armed force abroad. But only on condition that the training falls within the framework of international military cooperation, and provides and develops knowledge and skills required for the specifically assigned task.

Yes, if there is a political will, it is part of the collective concept. There is no difference as compared to the international operations that we currently conduct.

Apart from an air wing in German Geilenkirchen, where a E 3 A unit (AWACS) is stationed, Nato does not have any units of its own.The member states distribute the units, following decisions made by the respective governments and parliaments. Norway and Denmark have caveats regarding storing of nuclear arms and deployment of troops. Sweden may have a similar caveat, if it becomes a member. This will be decided by our parliament and government.

Swedish territory will continue to be the primary area of defence. The defence of the Nordic countries will be the primary task for Sweden and the other Nordic countries in Nato. When the Nordic countries’ defence forces are integrated, a defence barrier against an armed attack is created.

According to article 5, Sweden would be obliged to view an armed attack on another Nato country as an attack on Sweden as well. Sweden would then, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charta, support the attacked Nato country with all means necessary, including military means. However, it is worth emphasising the defensive nature of this, it only applies if another Nato country is attacked.

As a member of Nato, Sweden must honour the commitment made by all Nato members since 2014, and allocate two per cent of their GDP to the defence. At least 20 per cent of the defence budget must be earmarked for investments in materiel.

Also, Sweden would have to contribute to Nato’s civilian and military budget, which for Sweden would entail approximately 50 million Euro per year.

The Swedish Armed Forces’ main task is to defend Sweden against an armed attack, single-handedly or together with others. If Finland joins Nato, but not Sweden, our assessment is that the conditions for the Swedish Armed Forces to defend Sweden together with others will be adversely affected.

It would have a negative impact on our international defence cooperation as we would no longer be Finland’s closest partner, with a common operational planning for the defence of our two countries. Also, it would likely entail a weakening of our international cooperation with other partners.

And if Finland joins Nato, but Sweden does not, then both Russia’s and Nato’s interest in using Swedish territory in an armed conflict would increase.

In an armed conflict with Russia, Nato would need to use Swedish territory in order to defend Finland and the Baltic States. Meanwhile, it would of course be in Russia’s interest to deny Nato access to Swedish territory.

If Sweden does not join Nato, we would have less say in Nato’s actions in Sweden, at the same time as Russia’s military strategic interest in our territory would soar.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributes to a deteriorating security policy situation in the vicinity of Sweden and in Europe. The invasion demonstrates that the Russian state leadership’s threshold for military violence is very low, and that it is prepared to take risks to achieve their objectives.

The risk of an armed attack on Sweden continues to be low.

Currently, there are no concerning military movements along our borders, however, an armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out.

The risk of misjudgements and incidents that may escalate the situation between Russia and the west has increased, making it difficult to predict the development of events in the vicinity of Sweden.

Russian representatives have long said that Russia will take actions if Sweden joins Nato. Several times the term “military technical” measures has been used in this context, but Russia has never explained in detail what this would entail.

Aurora 20 will build up strong defences and enhance our overall ability to deal with attacks on Sweden. This exercise is taking place all over Sweden, and so this exercise will be bigger and more extensive than its predecessor, Aurora 17 − at the time the biggest Swedish exercise of its kind for more than 20 years.

We are defending Sweden in a local area as the security situation has deteriorated and the Riksdag has advised us to continue to build stronger Swedish defences where the operational capability of our military units is high and our total defence system is reinforced. Aurora 20 is a national exercise designed to build stronger defences, where the fighting services, parts of the total defence system and other countries will be enhancing their abilities to work together to deal with any attack on Sweden.

As things stand at present, an attack on Sweden is not deemed likely to happen, but of course it can never be ruled out. The scenario for the exercise has been selected with the Riksdag’s focus of the defence service in mind − primarily to be able to deal with any armed attack on Sweden. The configuration of the scenario is determined entirely by our exercise and training targets − and Aurora 20 should go on building stronger defences, where the fighting services, parts of the total defence system and other countries will be enhancing their abilities to work together to deal with any attack on Sweden.

The exercise will be taking place in May and June 2020, with elements of the exercise happening all over Sweden − from low-intensity battles in the north to high-intensity battles in the south. Aurora 20 will be bigger, longer and more extensive than its predecessor, Aurora 17 − at the time the biggest Swedish exercise of its kind for more than 20 years.

The exercise will be taking place in the air, on land and at sea, with elements of the exercise happening all over Sweden − from low-intensity battles in the north to high-intensity battles in the south. Participating units will be moving forward and taking part in the exercise in areas that are sometimes beyond the Armed Forces’ own training grounds and firing ranges so as to strengthen our national defences and practise dealing with attacks on Sweden.

The Aurora 20 Armed Forces training exercise is a national exercise that will build stronger defences, where the fighting services, parts of the total defence system and other countries will be enhancing their abilities to work together to deal with any attack on Sweden.

Developing the ability to work together with the military forces to run joint operations, developing the ability to neutralise the force of an opponent’s attack, and developing the ability to give and receive military support with priority international partners, including basing third party military forces on Swedish territory, are all examples of general targets for the Aurora 20 exercise.

Additional, specific points of focus and elements for the exercise will be developed as the exercise is devised.

The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, regional commands, the Home Guard and military units from other countries will be taking part in Aurora 20. The exercise will involve most Armed Forces personnel and units in roles that involve practice, support or action linked with the exercise.

The Home Guard will be present and participate extensively all over Sweden. The new Air, Land and Maritime Component Commands will be joining in with the
exercise for the first time and will constitute the main training audience with the
associated manoeuvring unit and functional and basic units. Regional Commands will
be practised in the north and south military regions and on the island of Gotland.

Hence the exercise will help to reinforce Sweden’s total defence system as the Armed Forces will be working together with a number of authorities to implement one of the four activities of the national total defence exercise during Aurora 20.

There will be international participants in Aurora 20 in order to build security together with other countries and organisations. No decisions have been made as yet as regards who these will be or which unit types will be taking part. The international contributions to Aurora 20 will be based on Swedish national needs to train Swedish military units, with and against qualified foreign units and in order to ensure that the exercise is as effective as possible.

Aurora 20 will be noticed and influence many different things, and so environmental
planning and other initiatives prior to the exercise will be extensive. Environmental work is a strategically important area for the Armed Forces, and the environment will be
safeguarded as far as possible with good planning and training prior to the exercise.